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ABSTRACT
It has been widely suggested that since the early 1980s the trend towards ever
greater corporate diversification has been reversed in many mature economies;
with many diversified firms narrowing the scope of their activities by refocusing
on what are perceived to be core businesses primarily, though not exclusively,
through major divestments. Whilst recent research, largely in the US context,
has started to take place on corporate refocusing there is a paucity of evidence
on refocusing in the UK. The aim of this thesis is to address this shortcoming
and to examine corporate refocusing activity in the UK.
This study uses a specially constructed data set compiled from primary and
secondary sources, covering 158 publicly quoted companies over the period
1985 to 1993. The thesis initially examines the extent and nature of refocusing
activity in the UK. It is found that refocusing activity is undertaken by a
substantial majority of the sample firms. Firms refocused primarily by divesting
unrelated businesses and acquiring related activities. The thesis proceeds to
examine the characteristics of refocusing firms using cross-sectional OLS and
logit techniques. It is found that refocusing firms are characterised by high
levels of diversification, low levels of management ownership and to a limited
extent by an attractive core business on which to refocus. The thesis next
examines the determinants of firms' divestment behaviour using both cross-
sectional and panel data proportions and count data (Poisson and Negative
Binomial regressions) techniques. The results indicate that divestment is a
purposeful response to financial, strategic, corporate governance and - to a
limited extent - market structure characteristics. In the final part of the thesis,
we examine the impact of divestment on firm performance by adopting a
dynamic profitability equation augmented with divestment variables. The results
suggest that divestment has a positive impact on the profitability of divesting
firms. The performance effect is greater for firms operating weak governance
mechanisms.
It is concluded that corporate refocusing is an important phenomenon in the UK
and is not merely an invention of the business press. The determinants of divestment
indicate that divestment is not simply a reflection of managerial idiosyncrasies or
mean reversion behaviour in the activities undertaken, but a purposeful response to
a change in the equilibrium level of diversification. The adoption of a refocusing
strategy appears to improve the overall performance of divesting firms.
vi
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research SUbject
In terms of corporate behaviour, the 1980s and beyond have been characterised
as a period of extensive corporate restructuring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991;
Denis et al., 1997). Corporate restructuring is a relatively new term employed
to embrace significant and rapid changes in the asset, capital or management
structure of the firm (Singh, 1993). More specifically,restructuring mechanisms
can be classified into one of three categories (Gibbs, 1993; Bowman and Singh,
1989): (1) portfolio restructuring involving divestments, acquisitions, and
refocusing; (2) financial restructuring including stock repurchases, leveraged
recapitalisations and changes to the financial structure, usually involving the
infusion of large amounts of debt; and (3) organisational restructuring including
downsizing, reorganisation and changes in business strategies which are
designed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of management teams.
Given the scope of restructuring, this study concentrates on one aspect of
portfolio restructuring, namelycorporate refocusing.
Corporate refocusing is defined as the voluntary reduction in the scope of
activities by a firm in an attempt to concentrate on the core business, primarily,
though not necessarily, achieved through major divestments. This reduction in
diversification has also been referred to in the business press as 'de-
diversification', 'de-conglomeration' or more colourfully, as 'sticking to the
knitting' (peters and Waterman, 1982). Corporate refocusing is chosen for this
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study because it is this form of restructuring that has dominated corporate
behaviour in the UK in recent years.
The prevalent explanation for refocusing (for example, Bhagat et al., 1990;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Markides 1995a), is that firms are attempting to
reverse their excessive levels of diversification, most of which occurred in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. This explanation implies two things: first, that there
exists some optimal limit to the extent to which a firm may diversify without
adversely affecting its performance; and second, that if refocusing became a
widespread phenomenon from the 1980s, as Bhagat et al. (1990), Markides
(1995a, b) etc. suggest for the US and is argued here for the UK, then a large
number of firms must have found themselves to have been in breach of this
optimum, during the period in question. As a result, the profitability and market
value of overdiversified firms will suffer and the issue of externalising
transactions by divestment to form an independent entity (e.g. a management
buy-out) or to another organisation becomes worthwhile (Wright & Thompson,
1987).
The existence of an optimal limit to firm size is a widely debated subject in the
economics literature. Transaction-cost economics (Teece, 1982) and the
resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) emphasise the benefits
which may accrue when a firm diversifies to exploit under-utilised, firm-specific
assets. However, the benefits to diversification may be strictly limited and will
decline as firms diversify further and further from the core business. In addition,
certain costs associated with an increase in firm size have been identified. For
2
example, as Penrose (1959) described in the case of managerial resources,
constraints on internal expansion are generated through hiring and training new
mangers. Williamson (1967) suggested that information and control-loss
problems limit the viable height of hierarchical organisations, while intra-firm
transactions may inhibit hierarchical decomposition.
If corporate refocusing became widespread in the 1980s, then a large number of
firms must have found themselves simultaneously to be in breach of their
optimum level of diversification. At least three inter-related explanations for a
downward displacement in the optimal level of diversification during the 1980s
have emerged from the literature. First, Jensen (1989) and others have argued
that the optimal level of diversification has declined due to an increase in the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control during the 1980s. From the
agency literature, if divestment is a reversal of past managerial discretion then
diversifying expansions are more likely in situations of weak governance. The
increase in the use of debt-financed takeovers, hostile bid advisors and the
emergence of a venture capital market in the 1980s, have not merely reduced
the ability of managers to divert free cash flow to preferred but unprofitable
expansions, but have also encouraged them to divest loss-making activities.
Second, firms may have experienced a reduction in the optimal level of
diversification in the 1980s as a consequence of the decline in the comparative
advantage of the multidivisional form of organisation. Williamson (1975) argued
that informational and decision-control failures led to the superiority of the
internal capital market, organised around inter-divisional competition of funds,
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over its external counterpart. However, if capital market innovations during the
1980s made it easier for external investors to finance and monitor projects, as
has been suggested, then the information advantages of the internal capital
market would be attenuated (Bhide, 1990).
Finally, the capital market reversed its previous optimistic stance on
conglomerate mergers in the 1960s and 1970s and started to prefer more
narrowly focused firms in the 1980s. The effect has been to encourage firms to
engage in de-diversifying transactions.
The emergence of corporate refocusing in the 1980s represents a dramatic shift
from the previous merger trend by UK firms. This emphasis upon specialisation
appears to have reversed the formally dominant tendency towards increasing
levels of diversification that had characterised business development for several
decades. The business press abounds with examples of firms narrowing the
scope of their activities in an attempt to maximise shareholder value. For
example, during the 1980s Lex Service Group divested its interests in
transportation in order to concentrate on electronics and strengthen its core
motor-distribution activities. Both Hanson and Thorn EM! demerged quoted
conglomerates into tightly-focused individual businesses in an attempt to create
greater focus and growth opportunities. BTR announced plans in the 1990s to
sell off businesses worth £622 million to concentrate on its core business.
This apparent reduction in diversification over the past 15 years or so has been
associated with widespread divestment in the US (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992;
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Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). The fragmentary evidence available also suggests
that UK. firms have narrowed their range of activities through high levels of
voluntary divestment over the same period (Geroski and Gregg, 1997), although to
date there is little substantive evidence to support this. As shown in Tables 1.1 and
1.2, in terms of the overall pattern of corporate restructuring, divestment has
become an important feature of the UK. market for corporate control during the
1980s both in terms of the total value and number of transactions. A significant
contributor to the increase in divestment activity has been the emergence of
management buy-outs (MBOs) where existing managers become equity holders
in the newly acquired divested unit (see Wright et ai, 1997 on the historical
development of the MBO). Earlier divestment activity was much less significant
and typically involved the disposal of business units horizontally or vertically
related to the core business (see Hannah, 1983 for a discussion on earlier
restructuring waves). In contrast, corporate refocusing activity from the 1980s
onwards is perceived to be associated with widespread diversification-reducing
divestments.
Whilst recent research, largely in the US context, has started to take place on
corporate refocusing (Johnson, 1996), a number of important questions need to
be addressed and further analysis is warranted. In particular, what is the extent
and nature of this phenomenon, what factors have prompted this change in
corporate behaviour, and what effect, if any, has it had on the UK firm?
s
Table 1.1 The UK Market for Corporate Control- Value of Transactions (£m)
Year Acquisition 1 % Divestment' % Total
1983 1,907 70 811 30 2,718
1984 4,353 74 1,534 26 5,887
1985 6,298 76 1,968 24 8,266
1986 12,278 73 4,595 27 16,873
1987 11,871 59 8,106 41 19,977
1988 17,307 62 10,541 38 27,848
1989 21,572 62 13,165 38 34,737
1990 5,388 47 6,046 53 11,434
1991 7,487 56 5,826 44 13,313
1992 4,108 45 5,095 55 9,203
1993 2,986 30 6,944 70 9,930
1994 5,743 48 6,142 52 11,885
1995 25,647 67 12,423 33 38,070
Notes:
1Independent acquisitions
2Includes sell-off of subsidiaries, buy-outs and buy-ins
Source: CMBOR (1998)/Barclays Private EquitylDeloitte & Touche and Office for National
Statistics
Table 1.2 The UK Market for Corporate Control - Number of Transactions
Year Acquisition 1 % Divestment' % Total
1983 305 44 387 56 692
1984 398 49 418 51 816
1985 340 44 425 56 765
1986 621 51 590 49 1,211
1987 1,188 61 774 39 1,962
1988 1,123 56 869 44 1,992
1989 896 48 966 52 1,862
1990 437 32 944 68 1,381
1991 292 27 787 73 1,079
1992 232 23 791 77 1,023
1993 337 33 681 67 1,018
1994 465 38 760 62 1,225
1995 299 27 798 73 1,097
Notes:
1Independent acquisitions
2Includes sell-off of subsidiaries, buy-outs and buy-ins
Source: CMBOR (1998)/Barclays Private EquitylDeloitte & Touche and Office for National
Statistics
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1.2 Shortcomings of Previous Research
The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical investigation of corporate
refocusing in the UK. The aim is to evaluate the extent of refocusing by UK
firms, to distinguish the characteristics of refocusing firms and to analyse the
causes and performance consequences of a refocusing strategy using a large
sample of UK quoted companies over the period 1985 to 1993. This period is
chosen to correspond with intense refocusing activity in the UK (see Tables 1.1
and 1.2). A sample of quoted companies is adopted since it is believed that it is
these firms that are undertaking most of the refocusing. The data consist of a
unique panel of observations on firms through time compiled from primary and
secondary sources.
Whilst there is a large descriptive and analytical literature on restructuring in
general, there is a lack of systematic empirical evidence on refocusing,
particularly for the UK. Given the importance of the phenomenon and the
relative scarcity of information in this area, the goal of this study is to learn
more about refocusing in the UK and to offer some informed opinions. This
study is primarily concerned with the decision to refocus through divestment
activity, where divestment is defined as the disposal of a firm's assets. It is
believed to be the first comprehensive attempt to analyse divestment activity in
the UK.
Whilst research is beginning to take place, largely in the US, most empirical
work has concentrated on the ex ante stock market response to sell-offs or
7
refocusing announcements. However, since it is clear that the market initially
favoured and then turned against conglomerate mergers, there is no guarantee
that its initial view of divestment is any more reliable. The event study approach
also relies on the identification of the event as a single divestment, yet for larger
firms multiple divestments are typically part of larger restructuring programmes.
Whilst more recent research has started to look at the ex post performance
effects of refocusing firms (e.g. Markides, 1995a) many studies provide little
more than indirect evidence on the performance consequences for the vendor
company. Moreover, much of the previous evidence on corporate refocusing is
limited because of its use of cross-sectional models to examine longitudinal
relationships (Bergh and Holbein, 1997). As such, previous research which
examines the causes of divestment may be subject to specification bias and
inefficient estimates of relationships. It is clear that a substantial amount of
further empirical work is necessary to investigate the antecedents and
consequences of the refocusing process.
One explanation for the apparent neglect of research on refocusing is the
inherent difficulty in obtaining detailed and reliable data on diversification and
divestment activity in the UK. In addition, divested activities have no separate
share price and/or accounting data, rendering analysis problematic. This
contrasts with the availability of stock market and accounting data for merger
studies.
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1.3 Statement of this Research
The approach adopted in this study is novel in a number of respects. First, it
utilises a unique data set compiled from primary and secondary sources,
covering 158 publicly quoted companies over a number of industrial sectors
over a period of9 years (i.e. 1985 to 1993). Second, it provides an econometric
analysis of the causes and consequences of refocusing activity, using what is
believed to be more appropriate and sophisticated techniques than previously
adopted. Given that diversification is a dynamic process, it seems more
appropriate to use a panel of firms to examine the relationships between the
causes and consequences of refocusing than a cross-section. In addition, count
data techniques are employed to model divestment given the discrete nature of
the divestment data. Neither of these techniques has been used explicitly in this
area before.
In order to address some of the shortcomings in previous research, the first
objective of the study is to determine the extent and nature of refocusing across
a sample of UK firms. It is found that approximately half of the sample reduced
their level of diversification over the period. The extent of refocusing is
therefore consistent with the perception that refocusing is a relatively
widespread phenomenon and not merely an invention of the business press. The
majority of divestment undertaken by firms also appears to be unrelated to their
core business. This result is consistent with previous research in the US (for
example, Markides 1995a).
9
The second aim is to analyse the characteristics of refocusing firms. An
examination of the data revealed that the refocusing firms are those with the
highest mean level of diversification at the beginning of the period. These firms
also suffered, on average, from lower start-of-period performance compared to
firms who diversified over the study period. Regression techniques were
adopted to estimate the distinguishing characteristics of refocusing and non-
refocusing firms using a variety of firm-specific and industry characteristics. The
results indicate that firms that refocused are characterised by high
diversification, low insider ownership and to a limited extent, by the existence of
an attractive core business on which to refocus.
The third main objective of the study is to provide an econometric analysis of
the causes of refocusing. In so doing, the intention is to try and isolate the
determinants of divestment and to discriminate between the alternative
hypotheses put forward to explain such transactions. Developments in the
theory of the firm have extended the characterisation of the firm as a "black
box" and a number of competing and complimentary explanations for refocusing
activity have emerged in the theoretical literature. However, the antecedents of
corporate refocusing remains a relatively under-researched area and only a few
studies attempt to distinguish between the theoretical approaches (Johnson,
1996). In this study, the determinants of refocusing are modelled using both
proportion and count data techniques in which divestment is related to financial,
corporate governance, business strategy and market structure characteristics.
Divestment is found to be systematically related to financial, governance,
strategy and - to a limited extent - market structure characteristics. The results
10
confirm that corporate divestment is not merely a reflection of managerial
idiosyncrasies or mean-reversion behaviour in the activities undertaken, but is a
purposeful response to exogenous change in a manner broadly consistent with both
the agency theoretic and strategic views of the firm.
Finally, the research seeks to determine whether, and under what circumstances,
the adoption of a refocusing strategy improves the performance of large, quoted
companies. In order to address these issues, a standard dynamic profitability
equation, augmented by divestment variables, is estimated for the sample of
firms. The results suggest that divestment does have a non-trivial and
statistically significant impact on the profitability of the divestor. Attempts to
discriminate between hypotheses indicate that the performance effect is greater
for firms operating weak governance mechanisms and gives support to those
who see divestment as a reversal of the consequences of previously exercised
managerial discretion.
The results from this study help to contribute to our knowledge and
understanding of corporate refocusing activity by UK firms, which to date has
received very little attention.
1.4 Outline of Chapters
This thesis is divided into four main parts. The first part considers the treatment
of diversification and refocusing in the economic, finance and strategic
management literatures. Chapter 2 sets the thesis in context by analysing
11
corporate diversification. Trends in diversification and the nature of
diversification in the UK over the post-war period are highlighted. Chapter 2
also examines the theoretical arguments for diversification and reviews the
available empirical evidence. The development of diversification in theories of
the firm is considered, including resource-based, transaction costs, market
power and managerial explanations for diversification.The empirical literature is
organised around four broad themes: the measurement of diversity; the nature
and extent of diversification; the determinants of diversification; and the
consequences of diversification.This framework is chosen since few studies are
direct tests of existing theories of diversification. It also provides a framework
for the empirical analysisof the thesis.
Chapter 3 follows on from the review of the treatment of diversification to
discuss the corporate refocusing literature. It considers the theoretical
explanations for refocusing and summarisesthe existing empirical literature. The
main' focus of this chapter is on the divestment process through which
refocusing is primarily, but not necessarily, achieved. The view that that there
exists an optimal limit to diversification is presented, followed by a detailed
analysis of the factors which are likely to lead to divestment and the
consequences of a refocusing strategy on the vendor company. The empirical
studies are organised in a similarfashion to that in Chapter 2.
Part II considers the features of the study design and the methods adopted.
Chapter 4 outlines the approach adopted in the thesis and relates it to the
objectives of the study. It also examines the characteristics of the sample and
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defines the study variables. Problems associated with the measurement of
certain variables are also highlighted. Chapter 5 outlines the methods adopted
during the course of this study. Four separate techniques are used to examine
the different aspects of corporate refocusing activity: first, linear static cross-
sectional models; second, linear static panel data models; third, nonlinear cross-
sectional and panel data models with discrete dependent variables (logit,
Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions); and finally, dynamic panel data
models.
Part III comprises the empirical analysis of the thesis. It is divided into four
chapters. The first, Chapter 6, concentrates on the extent and nature of
corporate refocusing and examines the characteristics of refocusing firms. It
considers the importance of refocusing in the UK with an extension to the
characteristics of refocusing firms. The purpose is to assess the extent of
refocusing both across the sample and within the sample. Summary statistics of
the data and cross-sectional regression techniques are adopted to determine the
distinguishing characteristics of refocusing and non-refocusing firms.
Chapter 7 examines the determinants ofthe divestment decision. It considers the
impact of performance, strategy, governance and market structural
characteristics on divestment. Divestment is alternatively estimated using the
proportions measure and count data analysis, employing Poisson and negative
binomial distribution regressions, to explore the determinants of divestment in a
cross-sectional framework.
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Chapter 7 can be considered a preliminary analysis and relates closely to
Chapter 8~the latter considers the same relationships but in a panel context and
including additional explanatory variables. Chapter 8 has the merit of covering a
larger number of observations and by employing unbalanced panel data
techniques is better able to discriminate between the alternative hypotheses put
forward to explain refocusing transactions. This analysis is unique within
existing studies on the antecedents of corporate refocusing which largely adopt
a cross-sectional design.
Chapter 9 investigates the ex post relationship between performance and
refocusing for UK firms. In particular, attention is given to the effect of
divestment on the subsequent performance of the divesting firm. Divestment is
considered to improve the subsequent performance of the vendor firm. In order
to test this proposition a dynamic panel data model is employed to estimate the
long-run effect of refocusing on the vendor. In addition, the extent of
diversification and governance for each firm is used to classify firms into
'complex' and 'non-complex', and 'weak' and 'strong'; the relationship
between performance and divestment is considered separately for each group to
see if performance varies over the groups. This analysis is unique within existing
studies on refocusing which largely concentrate on the stock market
performance of divestment. This chapter aims to extend the existing analysis of
firm performance to include refocusing activity.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a summary and discussion of the results.
Chapter 10 aims to draw together the separate conclusions from each chapter to
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provide a broader view of the relationship between these results and the
implications they have for the themes discussed throughout this thesis. In
addition the limitations of the analysis are discussed and areas of further
research are identified.
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2. CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION
2.1 Introduction
Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, both the US and the UK witnessed a
significant trend towards increasing levels of diversification (see for example,
Rumelt, 1974; Utton, 1977; Arney, 1964; Gorecki, 1975; Hassid, 1975). Table
2.1 highlights the distribution of firms by strategic category for these two
countries over the post-war period. The table indicates that in the 1950s both
countries' corporate population was composed largely of relatively
undiversified firms. By the 1970s, there had been a significant reduction in the
proportion of single business firms and a dramatic increase in the degree of
diversification.
Diversification describes the process by which a firm extends its activities
beyond the products and markets in which it currently operates. (A narrow
definition excludes expansion in the direction of closely substitutable products,
as with horizontal integration, or in the direction of supplies or outlets, as with
vertical integration.) A firm may diversify in the direction of broadly similar
activities (i.e. related diversification) or shift direction into an entirely new
activity (i.e. unrelated diversification). Diversification may occur through the
internal development of an existing resource or through acquisition. The latter
form is the primary means of firm diversification (porter, 1987), although not
all mergers occur for diversification purposes.
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Table 2.1 Trends in Diversification, UK and US
UK US
Strategic Category 1950 1960 1970 1949 1959 1974
Single business 34 20 6 42.0 22.8 14.4
Dominant business 41 35 34 28.2 31.3 22.6
Related business 23 41 54 25.7 38.6 42.3
Unrelated Business 2 4 6 4.1 7.3 20.7
Note: percentage m each category
Source: Channon (1973) for the UK; Rumelt (1974) for the US
Since corporate refocusing is essentially a reduction in the level of
diversification it is necessary to review the literature in this field. (The
discussion in this chapter provides a precursor to Chapter 3 of this thesis which
examines the literature on corporate refocusing.) The process of diversification
has received much attention in the literature; as far back as the 1960s, Chandler
(1962) in his seminal work suggested that successful firms expand their
operations by diversifying their product offerings. The aim of this chapter is to
examine the theoretical explanations for diversification and to summarise the
main empirical studies in this area. There exists a series of complementary
models drawn from the economics, finance and strategic management
literatures which attempt to explain firm diversification behaviour and these are
presented in detail in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reviews the empirical evidence
on diversification. The literature review is organised around four broad themes;
the measurement of diversity; the extent and nature of diversification; the
determinants of diversification; and the effects of diversification. A brief
summary follows in Section 2.4.
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2.2 Theoretical Explanations for Diversification
This section exammes the alternative theoretical explanations for
diversification. Attempts to explain diversification have involved either
adaptations of the neo-classical theory of the firm or more frequently, the
adoption of a different approach to examining firm behaviour by dropping the
assumption of perfectly competitive markets.
2.2.1 Neo-Classical Theory
The neo-classical theory of the firm assumes that firms are homogeneous
profit-maximising producers of single products operating in perfectly
competitive markets with zero transaction costs and complete information. This
approach has little interest in the organisation and role of the firm and
essentially treats it as a "black box". That is, the firm is known to exist but no
attempt is made to justify the internal operations or decision making process.
Limited diversification may occur within this framework if one introduces
economies of scope' (Panzar and Willig, 1981) and/or firm risk (Fama, 1970),
both of which are different variants of profit-maximising behaviour. For
example, Panzar and Willig (1981) suggest that multi-product firms may exist
in perfectly competitive markets due to cost savings resulting from the scope of
enterprise. Fama (1970), assuming a perfect capital market, argues that firms
will diversify to reduce firm risk. This view is essentially based on portfolio
theory and argues that when separate cash flows of a multi-product firm are not
perfectly correlated, total risk (measured by the variability of consolidated cash
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flows) is reduced by diversification (Markham, 1973). In addition, a firm may
diversify through acquisition if the value the potential buyer places on the
potential victim is higher than the value placed on it by its current owners. This
will occur if there exists a potential synergy between the two firms. All of these
explanations suggest that diversification will lead to improved performance.
However, Teece (1980, 1982) argues that the existence of multiproduct firms
cannot be adequately explained by neo-classical theory because there is no
justification for why joint production needs to be organised within one firm if
contracts can be devised to share the inputs yielding the economies of scope.
Therefore, economies of scope have no direct implication for the breadth of the
firm unless external transfer is subject to market failure. Deneffe (1993) also
argues that the static concept of economies of scope cannot adequately explain
the dynamics of the diversification process. Assuming perfect foresight and
invariant demand, with static economies of scope a firm may start up as multi-
product but will never diversify. In such a context, all diversification must be
demand driven.
Teece also disputes whether financial synergy is a justification for
diversification because it does not necessarily reduce the risk to shareholders.
In perfect capital markets shareholders can obtain the same benefits by
diversifying their own portfolio of shares (Alberts, 1966; Levy and Sarnat,
1970). Even with market imperfections, the traditional explanation for
diversification to reduce firm risk is questionable given the relatively low cost
of portfolio diversification in the capital market. Moreover, call-options pricing
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models (for example, Black and Scholes, 1973) suggest that the adoption of
projects that reduce the variance of an income stream may adversely affect
equity holders by inducing a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders
(see Benston, 1979 for a comprehensive study). Teece therefore concludes that
there is no justification for diversification under the assumptions of perfect
product and capital markets. Instead, he argues that multi-product firms exist
due to the presence of market failures (see also Chandler, 1962).
2.2.2 Resource Heterogeneity
The resource-based view of the firm (for example, Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney
1991) models the firm as a collection of historically-determined distinctive
resources and capabilities (also referred to as 'core competencies'; Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990). A firm's resources may be defined as those (tangible and
intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm (Caves, 1980).
(Tangible resources include financial reserves and physical resources, such as
plant and equipment. Intangible resources include reputation, technology and
human resources.) The analysis assumes that these resources are distributed
heterogeneously across firms and are imperfectly mobile. Rent-seeking firms
will diversify in response to excess capacity in these resources, in the presence
of market failure, as long as expansion provides a way of more profitably
employing its under-used resources. Because firms are heterogeneous, they
will have different optimal levels of diversification (this will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis).
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The resource-based view provides a basis for identifying what resources
diversification should be based on and into what markets diversification should
take place and what firms should be acquired (see for example, Teece et al.,
1997). Diversification patterns will reflect attempts to utilise existing 'rent-
yielding' resource endowments more intensively and to exploit the economies
of scope which arise from the possession of imperfectly marketable, non-
transferable, firm-specific assets. Generating higher returns through acquisition
should involve taking over a firm that has supplementary resources (i.e. more
of the same resources) or complementary resources (i.e. resources that combine
effectively with existing resources) to those of the acquiring firm. In other
words, a firm should acquire activities that have some form of synergy or 'fit'
between the buyer and target's resources (Venkatraman, 1989). This suggests
that related diversification will be more profitable than unrelated
diversification since there is a greater strategic fit between resources.
2.2.3 Internal and External Incentives
The above resource-based theories of diversification may not lead to
diversifying activities unless activated by incentives. These incentives may
come from the external environment or from within the firm. External
incentives include high transaction costs, tax incentives, capital market signals
and government competition policy. Internal incentives include low
performance, the desire to reduce firm risk (see Section 2.2.1), uncertainty over
future cash flow and market power motivations.
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The seminal work of Coase (1937) views the firm as a governance or control
structure rather than a production function as neo-classical economics would
seem to suggest. At any point in time, the optimal boundary of the firm will be
determined by the extent of transaction and organisation costs. The core
prediction of transaction cost economics is that if total transaction costs exceed
the costs of governing the same transaction within a hierarchical structure, the
transaction should be internalised within a firm. Thus, the failure of the market
through the existence of transaction costs provides an explanation for
diversification. This is especially relevant for the market for firm-specific
assets, which is imperfect and characterised by high transaction costs. A firm
will therefore diversify (i.e. internalise the market) in order to exploit these
assets in other markets (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1988).
Williamson (1970, 1975) suggests that firms diversify in response to external
capital market failure. In line with transaction cost economics, if the costs of
using the external capital market become too great due to asymmetric
information, firms may forego some positive net present value (NPV) projects
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Firms will therefore diversify and create internal
capital markets with a multi-divisional (M-form) structure characterised by
lower information asymmetry, enabling easier access to capital through the
cross-subsidisation of divisions.
Another external influence argued to encourage firms to diversify is tax
benefits. Tax incentives of diversification may be examined from both
individual and corporate tax points of view. With regards to individual tax
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levels, whilst Jensen (1986) argues that free cash flow should be redistributed
to shareholders in the form of dividends, dividends were substantially more
heavily taxed than personal income up to the 1980s. As a result, shareholders
may prefer managers to retain these funds to buy andlor build companies in
high performance industries. If the stock value appreciates over the long term,
shareholders may receive a better return because they are more lightly taxed
under capital gains rules. However, this situation changed in the 1980s and this
may account for some of the de-diversification that occurred over this later
period. Also, the tax savings available from shifting the financing of an
enterprise from equity to debt have been argued to be a major factor in
stimulating the growth of divestment by management buy-out from the 1980s
(Lowenstein, 1985).
With regards to corporate taxation, Auerbach and Reishus (1988) argued that
firm acquisitions typically increase depreciable asset anowance which
produces lower taxable income, therefore providing an additional incentive for
diversification. Lewellen (1971) argues that corporate diversification allows
firms to maintain a higher level of debt. If tax shields of debt increases firm
value then conglomerates will be more valuable than single business firms.
Capital market signals may also encourage diversification. During the 1960s
and 1970s the capital market responded favourably to conglomerate mergers,
providing an incentive for firms to engage in diversifying activities. For
example, Matsusaka (1993) found that conglomerate acquisitions in the 1960s
and 1970s were associated with increases in the stock price for the acquiring
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firm. (The role of the capital market will be examined in greater detail In
Chapter 3 of this thesis).
Finally, competition policy has been argued to encourage firms to diversify.
The evidence on anti-trust policy in the US suggests that constraints on
horizontal mergers in the 1960s and 1970s may have lead to the merger wave
that was predominately conglomerate in nature (Ravenscraft and Scherer,
1987; Scherer, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). As takeover constraints
became more relaxed in the 1980s, highly diversified firms became more
focused. In the UK, as a response to the increased internationalisation of the
world economy, government policy encouraged consolidation within industries
as an effective means to compete.
Incentives from within the firm have also been cited as explanations for
diversification. It has been argued that firms will diversify in response to poor
performance, especially if under-utilised resources exist to pursue a
diversification strategy (e.g. Rumelt, 1974). However, continued poor
performance after further diversification may slow the pace of diversification
and may even lead to restructuring divestments. Therefore, theory predicts a
curvilinear relationship between performance and diversification.
Firms may also diversify to overcome uncertainty with regards to expected
future cash flows in their primary industry. That firms diversify as a defensive
action to survive over the longer term is evident in maturing industries at the
advanced stage of a corporation's "life cycle" - i.e. after opportunities in the
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original businesses have been exhausted. Both Penrose (1959) and Marris
(1964) emphasised the role diversification plays to increase size and sustain
growth.
Finally, the market power view of diversification argues that diversified firms
"thrive at the expense of non-diversified firms not because they are more
efficient but because they have access to what is termed conglomerate power"
(Hill, 1985). This may be obtained through cross-subsidisation (potential for
predatory pricing by using funds from a profitable market to undercut rivals in
another market), mutual forbearance (competitors meeting each other in
multiple markets recognise their interdependence and compete less vigorously;
Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) or reciprocal buying (interrelationships
between large diversified firms foreclose markets to smaller competitors). The
predicted result is reduced competition and increased profits, implying a
positive relationship between diversification and firm performance.
2.2.4 Managerial Motivations
Following Mueller (1969), Jensen (1986) and others, diversification is seen as
an outgrowth of the agency problem that arises between managers and owners
when ownership and effective control are largely separated. An agency
relationship is defined as one in which a principal (e.g. shareholders) engages
an agent (e.g. managers) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). According to agency theory there is a divergence of interest
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between shareholders and managers; shareholders want their firms to maximise
profits, whereas managers derive personal benefit from the expansion of the
firm. This may be due to a number of reasons: first, firm growth may reduce
employment risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989); second, diversification may
reduce the risk of undiversified personal portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981);
third, managerial compensation and non-pecuniary rewards are related to firm
size (for example, Murphy, 1985, 1986; Rosen, 1982, 1992; Jensen and
Murphy, 1990); and finally, managers may benefit from the power and prestige
associated with managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Such
activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency
cost model.
The effect of a separation of ownership and control depends on the extent to
which managers and owners' interests differ and the effectiveness of
constraints, if any, on managerial discretion. Corporate governance' structures
such as the board of directors, ownership monitoring, the market for corporate
control and executive remuneration may limit tendencies to diversify.
However, in an environment of weak corporate governance, managers will
over-invest in diversification (i.e. invest in projects whose net present value -
NPV - is less than zero). Jensen (1986) suggests this is a particular problem for
multi-output firms located in mature but profitable industries, which generate
cash flows in excess of those needed for reinvestment ("free cash flow
hypothesis"). Managers can use these funds to finance managerially preferred
diversifications without resorting to the external capital market, which can
monitor and discipline them. As a result they may maintain a diversification
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strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. Furthermore, under this
analysis managers will reduce diversification only if pressurised to do so by
internal or external monitoring mechanisms. The agency view therefore
predicts a negative relationship between diversification and firm value.
Managers pursuing shareholder value maximisation, may also diversify if their
expectations differ from those of shareholders. This may occur if managers are
overoptimistic about their ability to manage assets across industries.
Consequently, they will (mistakenly) assign a higher equilibrium value to their
firm than is really the case and will therefore diversify beyond their optimum.
This is essentially Roll's (1986) 'hubris' hypothesis of corporate takeovers.
This appears applicable to managerial behavior in the 1960s and 1970s when
diversification was a relatively new phenomenon and especially confident
managers were encouraged to diversify.
In summary, there exist a variety of theoretical models drawn from the
economics, finance and strategic management literature. The explanatory
power of each one is limited because of their neglect of equally important
motives for diversification. An integrative perspective would help to
accommodate the complex web of reasons that induce a firm to diversify and
may impel future efforts to examine more closely the underlying rationale for
diversification. (This is beyond the scope of the current study).
27
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Diversification
This section aims to consider the empirical research on diversification and to
provide a systematic review of the literature. The literature review is organised
into four main sections corresponding to important features of the empirical
work. The first section is an examination of the various approaches adopted to
measure diversity. Second, empirical studies on the extent and nature of
diversification are reviewed. The third section examines the empirical literature
on the determinants of diversification. Finally, we focus on the empirical
modeling of the consequences of a diversification strategy. The summary will
include a discussion of possible directions for future research.
2.3.1 Measurements of Diversity
Previous empirical research has focused on three different measurements of
diversification, namely, the extent (i.e. more or less), direction (i.e. relatedness
or unrelatedness) and mode (i.e. acquisition versus internal development) of
diversification. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the variety of approaches
adopted to measure diversity and illustrative examples (see Ramanujam and
Varadarajan, 1989, for details). While the three approaches are related,
individual studies have not examined them simultaneously. Studies that
examine the extent of diversification from an industrial organisation
perspective generally employ a count measure or continuous measure. Count
measures are normally based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
or US Census Bureau information to identify the number of businesses that a
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firm operates in and this number is then used to capture the extent of firm
diversification. Continuous measures have been adopted to take into account
both the number and relative size of industries operated in by a given firm (see
for example Berry, 1975; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1986).
Figure 2.1. Approaches to the Measurement of Diversity
Measurement of Diversification
Extent and Direction Mode
Objective Subjective Objective
A - Binary D - Binary F - Binary
B - Multi-Category E - Multi-Category G - 3 Categories
C - Continuous H - Continuous
Level of
Measurement Illustrative Examples
A Conglomerates v non-conglomerates (e.g. Beattie, 1980)
B Broad and narrow spectrum (e.g. Varadarajan, 1986)
C Herfindahl and Berry indices (e.g. Jacquemin and Berry, 1979)
D Product and market diversity (e.g. Ward, 1976)
Diversifiers v non-diversifiers (McDougall and Round, 1984)
E Relatedness-based measures (e.g. Rumelt, 1974)
F Internal v acquisitive diversifiers (Pitts, 1977)
G Internal growth, acquisition-based growth, mixed mode
H Diversifying acquisition ratio (pitts, 1978)
Source: Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989
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The direction of diversification builds on the nature of relatedness among a
firm's various activities. In these studies, generally originating in the strategic
management literature, subjective categories for diversification have been
employed and have generally followed Rumelt's (1974) relatedness-based
categories. However, more recently, corporate-level relatedness is stressed as a
more important determinant than operational relatedness. If the firm is viewed
as a collection of resources and capabilities rather than as a collection of
products (Penrose, 1959; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), then existing measures of
diversification may be inadequate and further empirical work will be needed to
develop a more appropriate metric for diversification. However, this would be
difficult to operationalise since it is a cognitive concept and is likely to have
only a limited applicability in future empirical work (Grant, 1988).
The mode of diversification refers to the approach adopted to diversify into
different product markets. The two alternative approaches are internal
development and acquisition. Porter (1987) suggests that the latter has been the
most popular. It is very difficult to obtain information on activities generated
internally and consequently the majority of the work in this area has
concentrated on measuring acquisition. In some studies, categorical measures
are employed (e.g. conglomerates and non-conglomerates, as in Beattie, 1980),
while other studies use a continuos measure (e.g. Pitts, 1978).
To summarise, the concept of diversification is not straightforward to measure
and this may account for the relative neglect of research on refocusing. One of
the difficulties with defining diversification is to assess the degree to which a
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firm spreads its operations over different activities. If the boundaries between
different products, markets and industries are narrowly defined then the greater
the apparent diversification. This particular measurement problem implies that
the evidence on the extent of diversification must be treated with caution, since
it is sensitive to the definition of markets used. In addition, a number of studies
make little attempt to discriminate between vertical integration and
diversification proper, so that both forms of multi-industry operation are
treated as diversification, overstating the extent of diversification. Given that
there exists a variety of measures of diversification, the choice of which
measure to adopt should be guided by the research question at hand (Pitts and
Hopkins, 1982). This study employs multiple measures of diversification in
order to establish the robustness of findings to the choice of measure (see also
Markides, 1995a).
It has also traditionally been easier to obtain activity data for manufacturing
industries, especially in the UK context. Therefore, the majority of UK studies
have measured diversification by manufacturing firms. Given that
diversification appears to be a widespread phenomenon, it is important to
obtain activity data in industries outside manufacturing, otherwise the extent of
diversification will be underestimated. In this study the extent of diversification
within and across a number of industries is examined.
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2.3.2 The Extent and Nature of Diversification
In both the US and the UK empirical studies of diversification have shown a
marked increase in the extent of diversification over the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s regardless of the diversification measure adopted (see for example,
Rumelt, 1974; Utton, 1977; Arney, 1964; Gorecki, 1975; Hassid, 1975). The
pattern of development in both countries has also been broadly similar
(Chandler, 1962 for US; Hannah, 1976 for UK). For example, Rumelt (1974)
reports that the proportion of single companies in the US Fortune 500 fell from
22.8 percent in 1959 to 14.8 percent by 1969. Hannah (1976) for a large
sample of UK firms found that 25 per cent of firms were classified as
diversified in 1950, 45 percent in 1960, and 60 per cent by 1970. Utton (1977)
examined the trend of diversification for manufacturing firms in the UK across
120 industries and found that the employment of firms operating in more than
one of 51 two-and-a-half-digit industries was 53 percent in 1958, 68 percent in
1963 and 72 percent in 1968. The majority of diversification that took place
over this period was unrelated to the core business.
A large proportion of this increase in diversification can be accounted for by
the increase in the number of diversifying mergers. A number of studies have
examined the extent of diversification over the period by examining data on
diversification by merger (for example, Goudie and Meeks, 1982 for UK; Reid
1968 for US). These studies show a rise in the importance of conglomerates in
both the UK and US since the 1960s whereby firms are acquiring activities
outside their main line of business. For example, Goudie and Meeks (1982)
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analysed 1,481 UK mergers over the period 1949 to 1973 and found that the
proportion of diversifying mergers (defined as a merger between firms
classified to different industry groups) had increased from 9 percent in 1949-53
to 47 percent of mergers in 1969-73. For the US, Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1987) document that 36 per cent of all acquisitions between 1964 to 1972 and
32 per cent between 1973 to 1977 were conglomerate in nature. Thus mergers
played a major role in the process of corporate growth over this period.
The takeover wave in the 1980s has been substantially different with a
predominant increase in the importance of refocusing or de-diversification,
primarily through the divestment of activities unrelated to the core business.
An analysis of this phenomenon will be examined in detail in the following
chapter of this thesis.
To summarise, diversification has increased over the post war period. A large
proportion of this can be accounted for by the increase in the number of
diversifying mergers. The measure of the extent of diversification depends
crucially on the level of aggregation used, and differences in the measures
adopted and in the level of aggregation can account for some of the apparent
differences across studies. Due to the nature of official data, most studies in the
UK are on manufacturing companies and relate to diversification within
manufacturing industries. This may be an important omission where
manufacturers buy non-manufacturing companies (for example, cigarette
companies acquisition of insurance companies). It also excludes wider forms of
conglomerate activity in non-manufacturing sectors.
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2.3.3 The Determinants of Diversification
In contrast to the extent of research devoted to developing measures of
diversity, inadequate attention has been given to direct examinations of the
motives underlying the diversification decision. One of the determinants of
diversification that has been widely examined is the relationship between firm
performance and diversification. With regards to the performance-
diversification relationship there are two viewpoints; diversification may be a
result of either poor or superior performance in the core businesses (e.g. Gort,
1969; Berry, 1975; Rhoades, 1974). As outlined in Section 2.2.3, poor
performance may encourage firms to diversify to exploit profitable
opportunities elsewhere. However, by the same line of reasoning, poor
performance may encourage firms to reduce their level of diversification. In
practice, the performance effect has been difficult to disentangle. This IS
particularly problematic in studies that adopt cross-sectional techniques.
Another factor which has been found to determine the level of diversification is
firm size. Empirical studies, including Gort (1962, 1969) and Arney (1964),
widely support a strong positive association between diversification and firm
size. However, the failing of Utton's (1977) study to find a strong direct
relationship between diversification and firm size within a sample of the largest
enterprises suggests that beyond a certain level there may be little further scope
for successful diversification. Firm size has also been shown to be an important
determinant of the likelihood of acquisition. It has been found that acquiring
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firms on average are larger than firms they acquire and larger than average
firms in their industry (see for example, Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981).
The life cycle theory of the firm suggests that firms will diversify when they
have reached maturity in their primary industry. A number of studies have
examined the relationship between diversification and firm or industry growth.
Whilst some studies (e.g. Gort, 1969) find a negative relationship between
diversification and firm growth, others (e.g. Gorecki, 1975) have failed to find
a strong link. The evidence on diversification and growth therefore remains
largely inconclusive.
A number of studies have attempted to examine the relationship between a
firm's underlying resource endowment and the pattern of diversification. At the
industry level, Lemelin (1982) found that similarities between origin and
destination industries' distribution and marketing channels were significant
predictors of the industries into which a firm would diversify. At the firm level,
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) found that excess physical resources, most
knowledge-based resources and external financial resources are associated with
related diversification. Similarly, Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) for
manufacturing and Ingham and Thompson (1995) in the case of financial
services, report that diversifying activity is not a purely random process but
follows firm-specific and product-specific characteristics. The limited number
of profitable opportunities has also meant that related diversifications tend to
be more successful than unrelated ones (Lang and Stulz, 1994).
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With regards to technological knowledge and diversification there exists two
viewpoints. First, R&D is primarily determined by technological opportunities
and diversification takes place in response to innovations generated by R&D.
Second, diversified firms are better able to make use of innovations than
specialised firms so that greater diversification provides an incentive for
greater R&D. Evidence from both UK and US manufacturing studies
consistently suggest a positive correlation between R&D (see Gort, 1962 for
the US; Arney, 1964; Gorecki, 1975; Grant, 1977 for the UK) and
diversification. However, within the existing studies it is difficult to
disentangle the two effects and determine the direction of causation.
There are very few studies that examme the relationship between
diversification and tax. Turk and Baysinger (1989) remark that there is no
current research examining changes in individual tax rates on diversification
levels. With regards to corporation tax, Hayn (1989) found tax attributes as
determinants of shareholder gains in corporate acquisition. However, from the
1980s onwards some of the corporate tax advantages have been reduced.
There are also relatively few studies on the effect of uncertainty on the decision
to diversify. Miles (1982) examined diversification by tobacco firms in the US
and found that demand uncertainty (i.e. in response to health reports) acted as
an incentive to diversify. Supply side uncertainty may also lead to some
diversification, as exemplified by Buckley (1989), where domestic firms have
to compete with foreign suppliers with lower average costs.
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More recently, empirical research has started to test the agency explanation for
diversification and provide empirical support for arguments that managers
diversify to increase their own private benefit (for example, Amihud and Lev,
1981; Morek, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). A number of studies report a
negative relationship between diversification and management equity
ownership (e.g. Denis et al., 1997; Servaes, 1996). This result is consistent
with the idea that managers prefer to diversify when they do not suffer
financially. Firms with low concentrations of outside ownership may also be
susceptible to excessive diversification because effective monitoring cannot be
pursued by diffuse owners (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990).
Some attempts have been made to empirically test Jensen's (1986) free-cash
flow hypothesis (defined earlier as cash flow in excess of that needed for
profitable reinvestment). A study on tender offers by Lang et al., (1991) found
that bidder returns are negatively related to the acquirer's free cash flow. This
result is stronger for firms with a low tobin's q and is consistent with Jensen's
characterisation of firms pursuing ill-founded diversification.
In summary, a large number of studies have shown that firms do not diversify
in a random manner but neither is diversification totally predictable. The
pattern of diversification is generally related to a firm's resource base. The
existing evidence on the determinants of diversification shows a link between
diversification and research intensity and management control. However, there
are a number of limitations to the existing studies. The majority of research
only addresses a small sub-set of variables of interest and utilises industry and
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not firm level data, and is therefore limited to assess issues such as those
relating to firm-specific resource bases. Moreover, a number of studies refer
only to manufacturing firms, although diversification attempts may also occur
across industrial sectors. The adoption of cross-sectional techniques makes it
difficult to disentangle the direction of causation between diversification and
its hypothesised determinants (e.g. the diversification-performance
relationship).
2.3.4 The Consequences of Diversification
The most extensively researched effect of diversification is the relationship
between diversification and subsequent performance. Performance has
generally been defined as a measure of firm profitability and/or a measure of
risk. Studies in the economic and strategic management literature have
primarily focused on accounting-based measures of performance (i.e. return on
assets, return on equity, or return on capital) and have examined the
relationship between a firm's total level of diversification and its overall
performance. In contrast, work in the agency-theoretic tradition has largely
used risk-adjusted market measures (shareholder wealth gains as measured by
abnormal returns assessed using a market model) to test the extent of risk
reduction achieved by diversification from an investor's point of view. These
studies focus on changes at the margin, rather than an evaluation of a firm's
diversification as a whole.
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The majority of studies which examine the relationship between firm
performance and diversification, and a host of industry structure
characteristics, report a neutral or negative relationship between diversification
and performance (e.g. Rhoades, 1974; Vtton, 1977; Montgomery, 1985;
Palepu, 1985). With respect to industry concentration, the available evidence
suggests that diversification and the creation of large, multi-product firms does
not generally increase concentration (e.g. Clark and Davies; 1983; Berry, 1974;
Caves, 1981). The failure to find a positive relationship between diversification
and concentration does not support the market power view of diversification.
Findings from studies which examine the link between the direction of
diversification and performance are largely consistent with the view that
related diversification results in superior performance (e.g. Rumelt, 1982;
Bettis, 1981; Palepu, 1985; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987).
Although there are some findings to the contrary (e.g. Carter, 1977; Rhoades,
1973; Grant et al., 1988), the existence of a negative relationship between
diversification and firm performance can be explained by the agency view
which suggests that diversification is undertaken for reasons other than value
maximisation. It is also consistent with the resource-based view which suggests
that the average diversification-performance relationship reflects the
underlying heterogeneity of firms' resources. Thus, firms with more specific
resources find it optimal to diversify less than firms with less specific and less
valuable resources.
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One explanation for these mixed findings is the modeling framework adopted.
The majority of studies use a cross-sectional framework which makes it
difficult to evaluate the performance effects of diversification and determine
with accuracy the direction of causation. Problems resulting from cyclical
and/or outlier observations are circumvented by typically averaging several
years performance data and then examining diversification at one point in time
as a determinant of the (implicit) long-run equilibrium level of profitability.
Subsequent diversification occurring during the interval of data averaging is
typically ignored. Under these circumstances it is difficult to disentangle the
effects of diversity on performance over time frames because diversification
profiles are likely to change quite abruptly due to acquisitions and divestments.
Moreover, if profitability adjusts sluggishly to the firm's changed
characteristics - and the literature on profitability dynamics suggests that it will
(see for example, Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988) - the impact on average
profits across any interval will depend upon the timing of such changes. Thus
there is a definite need for longitudinal studies in this area.
Some of the differences across studies can also be explained purely by the
different time periods adopted. The motivations for diversification may differ
across time periods. For example, in the 1960s managers were able to pursue
their own self-interests due to the existence of weak governance mechanisms
(Jensen, 1986). However, due to for example, capital market innovations in the
1980s, managerial activities became closely scrutinised, restricting the extent
of unprofitable diversification. This will inevitably affect the performance
outcome of diversification attempts. Consideration of whether the
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diversification-performance relationship is generaliseable over time remains a
relatively under-researched area. The limited number of studies on temporal
stability that do exist have found that the relationship varies over the business
cycle (e.g. Hill, 1983). The implication is that the relationship is not time-
invariant and makes direct comparisons between studies difficult.
The diversification-performance relationship is more apparent from the
evidence available from studies on mergers and acquisitions. This research
adopts an event study approach and examines the capital market's response to
acquisition and merger announcements. Despite the inherent measurement
problems of studies of this kind, the evidence from the wealth of studies comes
to a common conclusion; on average, target firms realise substantial benefits,
whilst the impact of mergers on the profitability of the acquiring firm is on
average nil to negative (see Hughes, 1993 for a review of the literature). One
noticeable exception is a study by Matsusaka (1993) who finds positive bidder
returns at the announcement of conglomerate acquisition in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Thus, contrary to expectations, experience with diversification
through merger for the acquiring firm is disappointing. This result is consistent
with the view that managers undertake mergers for personal benefits rather
than maximisation of shareholder returns. Studies that differentiate between the
type of acquisition and performance, generally find that bidding firms in
related acquisitions tend to gain higher returns than bidding firms in unrelated
acquisitions (e.g. Morek, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).
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There are a number oflimitations to the event study approach. One limitation is
the usual treatment of acquisition as an isolated event, however acquisition
attempts usually occur as part of a larger expansion programme extending over
a number of years. Moreover, if the capital market is efficient then the share
price on anyone day would be expected to fully reflect the expansion value
inherent in its resource base. Thus an acquisition program could have a
substantial impact on firm value but only register a marginal adjustment to the
share price on the day of a specific announcement (e.g. Schipper and
Thompson, 1983).
Studies examining performance differences between internal diversifiers and
acquisitive diversifiers are virtually non-existent. This is an important omission
with regards to support for the resource-based view of the firm that suggests
that the highest profits can be generated by leveraging resources from existing
businesses. One exception is a study by Lamont and Anderson (1985) which
reports that, on average, internal diversifiers are more profitable. Most studies
have limited themselves to a comparison of the performance between
conglomerates and non-conglomerates. The majority of these studies find that
conglomerates are less profitable than non-conglomerates (e.g. Prosper and
Smith, 1971), although once again, the results are inconclusive.
2.4 Summary
To summarise, diversification has been an important element of corporate
development over the post-war period. Despite difficulties in measuring
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diversification, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that firm
diversification increased substantially throughout the 1950s to the 1970s. The
largest proportion of this increase can be accounted for by merger activity.
From the theoretical literature, diversification makes sense and should be
profitable up to a limit. There exists a series of complementary theories to
explain diversification which include economies of scope, resource
heterogeneity, risk reduction, poor performance, tax incentives, weak corporate
governance and market power explanations. The empirical evidence generally
supports both the agency-theoretic (managerial motives and hubris hypothesis)
and resource-based views of diversification (firms that diversify around
specific resources tend to be more profitable than firms that diversify more
widely). However, there is little evidence in support of the market power view
that diversified firms attain the sort of market power that leads to increased
profit and concentration. There appears to be a need for a more integrated
theory of diversification and further work as to why the market values
diversification differently over time, and why diversification works for some
firms and not others (see Gertner et ai, 1994; Matsusaka and Nanda, 1994).
However, this is beyond the scope of the current study.
An evaluation of the empirical research points to successive refinements in the
measurement of diversification. However, difficulties still occur over the
assessment of the degree to which a firm spreads its operations over different
activities. One implication is that the existing evidence on diversification must
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be treated with caution, since it is sensitive to the exact definition of markets
used. This may account for some of the inconsistencies across studies.
The evidence on the determinants of diversification shows considerable
diversity. The factors that influence diversification include firm performance,
firm size, resource endowment, technology base and the market for corporate
control. However, the majority of studies only address a small sub-set of these
variables. Much of the existing research is bivariate in nature, although more
recently some studies have begun to examine more complex inter-relationships.
Since a number of studies use industry and not firm-level data, they are limited
to assess issues such as those relating to firm-specific resource bases. The
contradictory findings may also be attributable to unlike methods or underlying
non-linearities in the performance-diversification relationship.
Studies attempting to demonstrate the effects of diversification on performance
remain largely inconclusive. Previous work has either employed a cross-
sectional regression model to examine the profitability effects of diversification
or an event study to isolate the stock market impact of diversifying
acquisitions. Neither approach is particularly satisfactory. The event study
approach assumes an efficient capital market in which fads and bubbles play no
significant role. However, it is clear that the market initially favoured and then
turned against conglomerate mergers. The use of a cross-sectional design is
problematic here since the researcher is looking at the impact of (possibly
endogenous) structural change on performance, which is difficult to evaluate in
the context of a long-run equilibrium. This approach is also disconcerting given
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that diversification is a dynamic process and diversification effects typically
take a long time to reach reasonable levels of effectiveness. In addition,
profitability levels are strongly influenced by firm-specific factors which
cannot adequately be controlled for in cross-sectional work. Despite difficulties
in their design and execution, longitudinal studies of diversification must be
attempted. This is a vital but unmet stream of the research.
Overall, the evidence presented suggests that, on average, diversification has
not been beneficial for diversifying firms. The expectation of the 1960s and
1970s that conglomerate mergers would increase profitability has not
materialised. The profit of diversifying firms did not improve on average and a
substantial amount of acquisitions were subsequently divested. It is argued that
firms from the mid-1980s onwards have been attempting to reduce their level
of diversification and focus on the core businesses primarily, though not
necessarily, through divestments. The following chapter of this thesis examines
in detail the theoretical explanations and the empirical evidence for this
reduction in diversification or refocusing activity.
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Notes
'Economies of scope exist when for all outputs of yl and y2, the cost of joint
production is less than the cost of producing each output separately; C(y 1, y2)
< C(yl, 0) + C(O, y2)
2We follow Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in viewing corporate governance as
dealing with: "the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure
themselves of getting a return on their investment." Therefore we denote as
corporate governance characteristics those variables which would appear to
determine the power of shareholders with respect to managers.
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3. CORPORA TE REFOCUSING
3.1 Introduction
It is widely perceived that since the 1980s there has been a dominant trend
towards de-diversification or refocusing by large UK companies, primarily but
not necessarily achieved through major divestments. This emphasis on
specialisation has been conjectured to have reversed the formerly dominant
tendency towards increasing levels of diversification which had dominated
business development for several decades (see Chapter 2 for a discussion).
The aim of this chapter is to examine the existing theoretical explanations of
corporate refocusing and to review the literature in this field. There are a series
of complementary hypotheses which seek to explain refocusing activity and
these are discussed in detail in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reviews the empirical
evidence on corporate refocusing. The literature review is organised around
three broad themes: the extent and nature of refocusing; the determinants of
refocusing and the consequences of a refocusing strategy. Section 2.4
concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Explanations of Corporate Refocusing
The prevailing explanation for refocusing was that firms are getting rid of so
called 'bad' acquisitions from the ·1960s.However this explanation is not very
plausible and contradicts much of the existing evidence (for example,
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Montgomery and Wilson (1986) report that of the 434 US acquisitions made
between 1967-69, more than 67 percent were still in place in 1982). It is
difficult to see how investments that have lasted over 20 years are now being
classified as bad and even harder to understand how and why so many firms
came to the same realisation that these acquisitions were mistakes at the same
time.
Following an established literature in the US (Bhagat et aI., 1990; Hoskisson
and Turk 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1990 and Markides, 1995a, b), corporate
refocusing may be referred to as an attempt by firms to reverse their excessive
levels of diversification, most of which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. This
explanation implies two things: first, that there exists some limit to the extent
to which a firm may diversify without adversely affecting its performance; and
second, if refocusing became a widespread phenomenon from the 1980s, as
Bhagat et al. (1990), Markides (1995a, b) etc. suggest for the US and is argued
here for the UK, then a large number of firms must have found themselves in
breach of this optimum during the period in question. Consequently, the
profitability and market value of over-diversified firms will suffer and the issue
of de-diversifying becomes worthwhile. These propositions will be examined
in tum.
3.2.1 An Optimal Limit to Diversification
The existence of a limit to which a firm can diversify is still a subject of debate
in the economics literature (for example, see Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Mueller,
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1987; Williamson, 1967). Transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Teece,
1982) and the resource-based theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984 and Ingham
and Thompson, 1995) emphasise the benefits which may accrue when a firm
diversifies to exploit its under-utilised, imperfectly imitable specific assets (see
Chapter 2 of this thesis for details).However, the benefits of diversification may
be strictly limited and easily exhausted. Moreover, the resource-based
approach suggests that surplus capacities are unlikely to be uniform across
firm-specific assets and significant economies of scope will only be present
under fairly stringent conditions.
Other benefits to diversification cited in the literature include market power
advantages (e.g. Gort, 1962; Rhoades, 1973), tax benefits and other financial
advantages (e.g. Lewellen, 1971), benefits associated with growth (e.g. Guth,
1980) and various other benefits associated with reductions in agency problems
(e.g. Aron, 1988). These benefits to diversification tend to decrease as firms try
to exploit their excess assets further and further away from their core
businesses (e.g. Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988), implying a downward-
sloping marginal benefit (MB) curve.
In addition to the above benefits, research has identified certain costs
associated with diversification. For example, as Penrose (1959) described in
the case of managerial resources, a constraint on internal expansion is
generated through recruiting, training and assimilating new managers. Surplus
capacities are unlikely to be uniform across firm-specific assets and bottlenecks
will occur, particularly in the availability of managerial resources, causing
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organisational costs to rise with further expansion. Also, size and diversity
increase the informational and monitoring problems that internal hierarchies
need to address. The seminal work of Williamson (1967) on the organisation of
firms argued that control loss problems' associated with transferring
information across hierarchical levels limit the viable height of organisational
hierarchies, while intra-firm transactions may inhibit hierarchical decomposition.
Other types of costs to diversification emphasised in the literature include co-
ordination and control costs in the expansion of the firm's hierarchical
structure as a result of limited managerial spans of control (e.g. Keren and
Levhari, 1983, Sutherland, 1980); managerial X-inefficiencies arising when
managers continue to apply their existing "dominant logic" to newly acquired,
strategically dissimilar activities (e.g. Prahalad and Bettis, 1986); and the costs
created when a "detached" corporate staff makes inappropriate interventions in
the operations of the divisions (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). It is
suggested that such costs increase as a firm diversifies, implying an upward-
sloping marginal cost (MC) curve.
The optimal limit to diversification will occur where the marginal benefits and
marginal costs to diversification are equal (i.e. where the MB and MC curves
intersect, at equilibrium point D* in Figure 3.1):
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Figure 3.1 The Optimal Level of Diversification
MC
~--MB
D·
Diversification Level
A firm can diversify profitably up to D* SInce marginal benefits exceed
marginal costs, however, beyond D· the costs to diversification exceed the
benefits and the firm will incur a loss. This implies a curvilinear relationship
between diversification and profitability. A number of studies have shown
support for this relationship (for example, Grant and Thomas, 1988 for the UK
and Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990 for the US).
Figure 3.2 The Relationship between Diversification and Profitability
Profitability
D Diversification Level
51
In Figure 3.2 maximum profits are achieved at the optimal level of
diversification D* (where MC = MB). Beyond D* any further increases in
diversity will reduce profitability since marginal costs to diversification exceed
marginal benefits. Thus, whilst poor performance may lead to diversification in
the first place, if firms diversify beyond their optimal level, it will result in
poor returns which may lead to restructuring divestments (Ravenscraft and
Scherer, 1987). This perspective predicts that refocusing will have a positive
impact on the performance of over-diversified firms.
3.2.2 The Existence of "Over-Diversified" Firms
The foregoing discussion suggests that diversification brings performance
benefits to the firm and hence value gains to its owners, but that such benefits are
subject to decreasing returns as organisational costs rise. That is, ceteris paribus,
the value of the firm (V) is a concave function of the level of diversification (D):
V = V(D). Allowing that any particular firm at time t has an optimal level of
diversification determined by its current resource endowment and its external
environment does not however, help to explain why many firms apparently
came to find themselves in breach of this optimum. If refocusing became a
widespread phenomenon in the UK from the 1980s, then some firms must have
found themselves in the region beyond D*. A number of explanations why
firms may be over-diversified have been put forward:
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Principal-Agent Reasons
Following Mueller (1969), Jensen (1986) and others, over-diversification is
seen as a consequence of the agency relationship between the firm's owners
and managers. Jensen (1986), for example, suggests that managers typically
derive more personal benefit from diverting free cash flow (i.e. cash flow in
excess of those needed for profitable reinvestment) to unprofitable expansions
rather than maximising dividend pay-outs. He suggests this is a particular
problem for multi-output firms located in mature but profitable industries,
which generate cash flows in excess of those needed for reinvestment.
Much of the available empirical evidence appears to support Jensen's free cash
flow hypothesis. The theory suggests that the marginal rate of return on
projects financed by retained earnings will be lower than those financed by
new capital. Several studies on the rates of return on investment finance,
support this prediction and imply that in the absence of external discipline,
firms in mature industries will tend to over-invest in diversification (e.g. see
Baumol et aI., 1970;Brealey et aI., 1976).
This suggests that we would expect to find some firms that systematically over-
diversify even if doing so reduces shareholders' wealth. Under the agency cost
hypothesis, managers will generally only reduce their scope of diversification
if pressurised to do so by either internal or external monitoring mechanisms
(Denis et al., 1997). Thus it appears reasonable to expect that both V andDenter
the managerial utility function (U): U = U(V, D).
S3
Therefore whilst the maximisation of shareholder value would yield an optimal
diversification D*, unconstrained firms, in an environment characterised by slack
capital market discipline, would arrive at an over-diversified equilibrium such as
DJ in Figure 3.3:
Figure 3.3 The Relationship between Diversification, Profitability
and Managerial Preferences
Finn Value
Diversification Level
Capital Market Signals
Markides (1995a, b) and others have pointed out that even those managers
motivated by shareholder value maximisation may over-diversify if the capital
market supplies an incorrect signal to diversifying expansions. There is
considerable evidence that the capital market took an unjustifiably optimistic
view of conglomerate mergers in the 1960s and 1970s (Morek et al., 1990;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), providing an incentive for firms to engage in
diversifying activities. When ex post diversification did not prove as profitable
as expected, the capital market reversed its previous stance and started to prefer
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more tightly focused firms in the 1980s (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988;
Morek, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). This phenomenon certainly helps to
explain in part the timing of the reversal of the trend towards ever-greater
diversification.
A number of explanations have been offered for the capital market
systematically "overvaluing" diversifying acquisitions. In particular, growth
companies whose stock is selling at a high multiple and acquire companies
with a low price-earnings (PIE) ratio will experience an increase in their
earnings per share (EPS). The market applies the higher multiplier on the new
EPS, and hence the stock price of the firm increases. This makes further
acquisitions attractive.
However, this does not explain why the market continued to apply the high
multiple on a company that is made up of non-growing acquired parts. Jacoby
(1969) argues that it is because promoters and bankers take advantage of the
public's optimism during stock market booms to generate profits for
themselves. The existence of sophisticated investors who knowingly buy an
overvalued stock can be explained within the framework of an efficient capital
market by the speculative bubble argument; investors knowingly pay more for
a stock in the belief that they can pass it on for even more. Once the public
recognises that there is no growth in the operating earnings of the acquired
companies, the PIE ratio will fall to a normal level, making further acquisitions
unattractive.
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Whatever the reasons for overvaluing conglomerate mergers, its effect has
been to encourage firms to engage in excessive diversification. Markides
(1995a,b) notes that even managers motivated purely by shareholder value
considerations could therefore find themselves with an over-diversified firm in
these circumstances, for example at D, rather than at D* in the following
diagram:
Figure 3.4 The Effect of CapitalMarket Signals on the
Diversification-ProfitabilityRelationship
Firm Value
Diversification Level
Hubris Hyoothesis
Managers pursumg shareholder value maximisation, may also consistently
over-diversify if their expectations differ from those of shareholders. This may
occur if managers are over-optimistic about their ability to manage assets
across industries. Consequently, they will (mistakenly) assign a higher
equilibrium value to their firm than is really the case and will therefore
diversify beyond their optimum.
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This is essentially Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis. This appears applicable to
managerial behaviour in the 1960s and 1970s when diversification was a
relatively new phenomenon and confident managers were encouraged to
diversify. Ex post, organisational learning occurred as more information
became available. The occurrence of refocusing from the 1980s may signify
that some managers have learned from their mistakes and are now rectifying
them. The decision to refocus is taken because managers have realised that the
firm is over-diversified and this causes diseconomies that harm the firm's
profitability (see for example, Mueller, 1987).
Change in the Optimal Level of Diversification
Finally, even firms that were optimally diversified will find themselves in
disequilibrium if there has been a change in their optimal level of
diversification. Markides (1995a) argues that over the past twenty years,
changes in both the product and financial markets have reduced the optimal
level of diversification for firms. This will occur if the marginal benefits of
diversification decrease or the marginal costs increase, resulting in an inward
shift of the MB and MC curves with a new lower equilibrium value, n,' in
Figure 3.5:
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Figure 3.5 Shift in the Optimal Level of Diversification
MC,MB
MC' MC
D*1 D* Diversification Level
It has been hypothesised that many firms experienced a reduction in the
optimal level of diversification in the 1980s as a consequences of the decline in
the comparative advantage of the multidivisional form of organisation.
Williamson (1975) attributed to the internal capital market of the multiproduct
M-form considerable informational advantages over the external capital
market. For example, the M-form organisation can reallocate funds from slow
growth divisions to finance high growth activities without resorting to the
external capital market for funding and disclosing sensitive information. In
addition, due to asymmetric information managers have an information
advantage over outside investors in allocating funds, as well as evaluating and
disciplining divisions. (See Cable, 1988 for a review of the supporting
evidence on the M-form hypothesis).
However, Bhide (1990) and others have argued that countervailing innovations
in the external capital market has attenuated the informational advantages of
the M-form's internal capital market. It can be argued that corporate
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diversification may have been a substitute for portfolio diversification in the
past, allowing investors to diversify their risk. However, increasing
competition in the capital market has meant that portfolio diversification has
become a simpler alternative, reducing one of the benefits of corporate
diversification. In addition, the growth of the contracting out of supply and
support functions within the private sector attests to the fall in transaction
costs. Survey evidence (e.g. Geroski and Gregg, 1994) confirms the reduced
popularity of the M-form among large UK firms.
Overall, the rising sophistication of the external capital market has weakened
the advantages of corporate diversification, reducing the optimal level of
diversification. Arguments such as these point to a backward shift in the value-
diversification function, illustrated in Figure 3.6:
Figure 3.6 The Effect on the Diversification-Profitability Relationship
of Capital Market Innovations
Firm Value
Diversification Level
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Also Jensen (1986) and others have argued that capital market innovations -
including debt-financed takeovers, the use of hostile bid advisers and the
emergence of venture capitalists to finance management buyouts - have increased
the effectiveness of the market for corporate control', prompting some firms to
reduce their diversification levels and realign their interests with those of
shareholders (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Denis et aI., 1997). Thus, for
example, the rise of a large venture capital industry permits business units to be
divested via management buy-outs, enabling decentralised control and
specialised investor monitoring (Wright and Robbie, 1996). Informational
advantages have also been eroded due to firms being forced to disclose more
information about their activities. This in turn, it is suggested, has not merely
reduced the ability of managers to divert free cash flow to preferred - but
unprofitable - diversifications, but encouraged them to divest and disinvest in
loss-making activities.
Reductions in the level of diversification may also be attributable to other
disciplinary forces such as block purchases and management turnover. These
disciplinary events can reduce agency costs and explain why some of the firms
that over-diversified in the 1960s and 1970s are the same firms that refocused
during the 1980s. For example, Fama (1980) suggests that the managerial
labour market disciplines agents to maintain value-enhancing strategies.
Product market competition may also act as a disciplinary device to managers
(Hart, 1983). Such an effect is equivalent to constraining managers to maintain a
value of V· in the following diagram and hence reducing diversification from DI
to D2 in Figure 3.7:
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Figure 3.7 The Effect ofMarket Disciplineon Diversification
Finn Value
u
Diversification Level
The marginal costs to diversification may also have increased over recent years
as a result of globalisation and a more volatile and uncertain economic
environment (Markides, 1995a; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Mueller, 1972). If
this is indeed the case, external volatility would accentuate the costs of
diversification outlined above. For example, Liebeskind and Opler (1993)
suggest that globalisation and its effect on competition may have forced firms
to focus more on their core business. Also, it is argued that environmental
uncertainty and volatility in the 1980s have increased the information and
control loss problems associated with the steep hierarchies of diversified firms,
increasing the relative value of a refocusing strategy.
A number of other explanations have been advanced to explain the occurrence
of refocusing. The optimal position of an operation may be breached when
economies of scope become exhausted or when there are opportunities for
capital gains by divestment to a more synergistic or related acquirer than the
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vendor. If this is the case, externalising the transaction by divestment to form
an independent entity (e.g. MBO) or to another organisation becomes
worthwhile (Wright & Thompson, 1987). According to the life-cycle
hypothesis (Stigler, 1951) divestment may be expected during the expansionary
stage of decreasing cost activities so as to allow for maximum scale economies.
Performance of the vendor company may be expected to improve post
divestment due to the elimination of negative synergies with the divested asset
or increased efficiency arising from better allocation of management time and
other resources in the more focused firm. The performance of independent buy-
outs (e.g. MBOs) may be expected to increase due to more effective
monitoring, improved decision making and increased managerial incentives.
In summary, there exists a series of complementary explanations why firms
diversify and why some firms consequently found themselves to be over-
diversified and hence in need of refocusing. Taken together they suggest that
de-diversification will enhance internal efficiency and improve the
performance of over-diversified firms (Shleifer &Vishny, 1991; Hoskisson &
Turk, 1990).
3.3 Empirical Evidence on Corporate Refocusing
As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, corporate refocusing primarily, but not
necessarily, occurs through major divestments. The majority of the literature on
refocusing therefore relates to divestment activity. In reviewing the existing
empirical evidence in this area it is convenient to divide the analysis into three
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broad themes: the extent and nature of refocusing activity, the determinants of
refocusing and the consequences of a refocusing strategy.
3.3.1 The Extent and Nature of Corporate Refocusing
It is widely perceived that refocusing primarily occurs through divestment.
Divestment can be categorised into two broad groups: voluntary and forced
divestments. Forced divestments refer to situations where a change of
ownership is forced upon the firm, usually by government regulators.
Voluntary divestments are based on strategic decisions to partially withdraw or
exit from a market. The latter type accounts for the vast majority of divestment
activity and is the focus of this study.
Table 3.1 (adapted from Coyne and Wright, 1986) summarises the different
types of divestments. Divestments, in contrast to acquisitions, is usually
initiated by the selling firm and normally deals with one or a limited number of
buyers. Divestment may occur to another organisation or to form an
independent entity (e.g. MBO). In terms of divestment to another organisation,
by far the most important form of divestment is a sell-off. This involves the
sale of an asset to a separate company and the asset remains a division or
subsidiary of the buyer (also referred to as parent-to-parent divestment). A
spin-off occurs when some of the existing assets of a firm are set up as an
independent entity. This form of divestment usually, but not necessarily, still
involves a strong trading relationship between the demerged companies. An
asset swap requires a mutual agreement on the valuation of two sets of assets in
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a barter arrangement between firms. This arrangement is often difficult to
achieve in practice and is most noticeable in recent years in the UK brewing
industry. Franchising normally involves some kind of competition for the
exclusive right to produce a firm's product or service in a particular area for a
given period. Contracting-out has similarities to franchising, however, the
distinction is that contracting-out involves the provision of a specific good or
service to the parent company.
Table 3.1 Types of Divestment
Type Ownership New Ownership
Severance Form
Sell-off Complete; usually permanent Subsidiary
Spin-off Splitting rather than severance; Quasi-
may involve dilution of independent
Ownership; usually permanent
~anagementnleveraged Usually complete and Independent
!Investor Buy-outlBuy- Permanent; parent may retain
III equity interest
Franchising Complete; limited period Subsidiary or
Independent
Contracting out Complete; trading relationship Independent
Remains
Asset swap Complete, but exchange Subsidiary
Involved so size of parent
Maintained
A major development in the market for corporate control has been the
management buy-out (MBO) where existing managers become equity holders
in the newly acquired divested unit (see Wright et al., 1997). Conversely, in a
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management buy-in (MBI) a new management team obtains a significant
equity stake in the newly formed company. In both cases, the remaining funds
are usually provided in the form of loans and quasi-equity so that the new
company is highly leveraged. Servicing the debt will foster better asset
utilisation, resulting in greater efficiency in the firm and in an appropriate
focus on cash generation. The rationale is that company will benefit from
reduced agency costs following the realignment of ownership and control
(Jensen, 1989). The rise of a large venture capital industry in the UK has
permitted divestment via management buyout and facilitated specialist
monitoring (Wright and Robbie, 1996) and initiated the more recent investor-
led buy-outs (mOs).
Divestment activity may be a single event or more typically, a multiple event as
part of a major and continuing restructuring programme. A restructuring
programme may also involve the simultaneous acquisition and divestment of
activities. Here, divestment may be seen as a convenient way of disposing of
those parts of a recently acquired group that are peripheral to the main activities
of interest (also known as 'unbundling'). The existing evidence suggests that the
existence of firms engaging in divestment and acquisition activity within the
same period is quite widespread (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Markides,
1995a). This issue will also be examined in the context of the current study in the
later empirical chapters.
The extent of divestment activity in the UK since the 1980s was examined in
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1. In terms of the overall pattern of corporate
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restructuring, divestments to other organisations and management teams
accounted for 73 per cent of the volume and 33 per cent of the value of all
mergers and acquisitions in the UK in 1995. Divestment has therefore become an
important and permanent feature of the corporate scene. They are no longer
regarded as an admission of mistake or failure, nor are they just recession-related
(see below). Divestment is a positive aspect of the restructuring process and is
expected to remain a major means of adjusting merger and acquisition activity to
shifts in corporate strategy and changing economic conditions. However, whilst
attempts have been made to examine the extent of divestment activity in the UK
context, the extent of refocusing in general has not been systematically
examined. The current study will address this important omission in the existing
literature. The following sections review the empirical studies on refocusing.
3.3.2 The Determinants of Corporate Refocusing
Figure 3. 1 illustrates the major factors hypothesised in the literature that lead to
refocusing and its outcomes (Johnson, 1996). The dashed lines indicate the
interrelations that may exist between the several alternatives within the two
sections of the model (for example, see Hoskisson et al., 1994; Smart and Hitt,
1994). An examination of the factors that influence divestment indicates that
the literature can be divided into five main streams: performance, corporate
strategy, governance, environmental and financial restructuring explanations of
divestment.
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Figure 3.8 Model of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Refocusing
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Performance to Corporate Refocusing
Performance represents one of the most researched antecedents of corporate
refocusing. An overwhelming number of single divestment studies have found
that poor performance at both the business unit and corporate level is a major
factor preceding the divestment decision (e.g. Duhaime and Grant, 1984,
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, Hamilton and Chow, 1993). The majority of
research has found that it is poor performance relative to industry counterparts,
rather than relative to past performance, that prompt firms to refocus. The only
exception is the case of spin-offs. For example, Rosenfeld (1984) found that
spin-offs took place after a period of positive abnormal returns. It is possible
that spin-offs are used for pro-active reasons rather than reactive. For example,
Ito (1995) argues that Japanese firms commonly use them to achieve growth
and reduce transaction costs associated with managing large diversified firm.
However, refocusing generally encompasses a programme of divestments
intended to return to the core business, rather than a single divestment.
Evidence on multiple divestments suggests that firms who engage in refocusing
may not do so simply because business unit performance is poor. For example,
Singh and Chang (1996) find that turnover may be prompted by poor
performance, but this may relate more to the lower growth of a unit as opposed
to financial ratios. Studies examining corporate refocusing find a number of
factors that lead to refocusing, some of which are stronger than firm
performance. Hoskisson et al. (1994) suggest that firm performance moderates
and mediates many of the antecedents of refocusing activity. This result
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implies that focusing on firm performance as a primary criterion may inflate
the effect on the decision to sell.
Finally, many refocusing firms are outperforming their industry pnor to
refocusing, suggesting that other factors in addition to poor performance are
driving a firm's decision to refocus. For example, Johnson et al. (1993) find
that whilst an average firm's return on assets (ROA) was below industry
average, one third of the sample was performing at or above industry levels
before initiating refocusing. Similarly, Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) found
that those firms making acquisitions during refocusing exhibited higher
performance than those just divesting.
Business Strategy to Corporate Refocusing
An equally important factor that may pre-empt a firm's decision to refocus is
business strategy. As argued earlier in this chapter, there exists an optimal limit
on the extent to which a firm can diversify without adversely affecting its
performance. One explanation for refocusing therefore is that a large number of
firms have over-diversified, prompting the decision to divest. A number of
studies provide evidence that refocusing firms are characterised by high levels
of diversification relative to their industry (for example, Markides, 1992,
1995a;Hoskisson et al., 1994).
In addition, high levels of debt may encourage firms to refocus, not least
because sell-offs can be used to payoff debt and reduce this constraint on
managerial discretion (Lee and Cooperman, 1989; Jensen, 1986). The
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contention that high leverage determines divestment is supported in a number
of studies (for example, Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Bergh, 1997). Markides
(1992b); Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and, Liebeskind and Opler (1993)
find that firms are less likely to refocus if the core business has a high level of
R&D expenditure, which is consistent with the literature on diversification
detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis (for example, Lemelin, 1982). Researchers
have found that firms in these industries will tend to diversify to exploit firm-
specific technological know-how and expertise (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel,
1990).
Markides (1992b) finds that firms are more likely to refocus if they have an
attractive core business, in terms of high performance, size, concentration ratio
and advertising intensity. However, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that
high market share is viewed as strategically advantageous, inhibiting sell-off.
Therefore the effect of these market structural characteristics is ambiguous.
Focusing on firm-specific factors to explain divestment activity is not sufficient
because motives (and outcomes - see next Section) also depend on unit
specific characteristics. The strategic motives for refocusing varies across
studies and can be classified into two categories: (1) the refocusing category,
and (2) financial goals. The need to focus on core activities is often cited as a
reason to divest (for example, Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Kaplan and
Weisbach, 1992). A number of studies suggest that unrelated and ill-fitting
operations are more likely to be divested (Duhaime and Grant, 1984;Markides,
1995a; Wright and Robbie, 1996; Bergh, 1995). Ravenscraft and Scherer
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(1987); Porter (1987) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that a significant
number of unrelated units brought into the firm through acquisition are later
divested. Thus, in general, studies suggest that firms are inclined to, and
probably better off, staying close to their core competencies.
However, there is also evidence that subsidiaries which have a trading
relationship with the parent may be divested if a managed market relationship
improves efficiency (Wright, 1986). In two surveys covering MBOs during the
early 1980s (Wright, 1986; Wright et al., 1990), a percentage of MBOs were
linked to the parent company. These findings help to explain the occurrence of
related divestments. A study by Bergh (1995) reported that 43 per cent of US
firms sold related assets, suggesting that sell-offs are motivated by economic
benefits of competitive resource allocation efficiencies.
In contrast, financial goals emphasise either short-term performance targets or
fund raising to pursue other objectives such as growth. For example, Hamilton
and Chow (1993) find that firms use proceeds to reinvest in the core business
and fund future acquisitions. Lang et al. (1995) report that managers sold assets
when doing so provided the cheapest funds to pursue managerial objectives.
Governance to Corporate Refocusing
Weak corporate governance has been suggested as a rationale for corporate
refocusing. It is widely argued that weak or inadequate corporate governance
allows managers to divert free cash flow to unprofitable expansions (Jensen,
1986), resulting in high levels of diversification and poor strategy formulation
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(Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson et aI., 1994). Following Mueller
(I969) and Jensen (1986), diversification confers size benefits on managers,
since their personal wealth and employment risk is linked more to firm size
than performance. Inadequate governance may be the result of diffusion of
shareholdings, the characteristics of managers and board members, or board
passivity.
In a comprehensive study by Hoskisson et al. (1994) the most important
governance influence on the divestment decision was blockholder equity (also
found in study by Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). There was marginal
significance for the proportion of outsiders on the board but a failure to find
any significant results for outside or inside equity holdings on divestment.
Bergh (1995) examines the size and relatedness of a unit sold and finds that
where ownership concentration is the highest, companies sell unrelated and
small units, to refocus on the core business and to enable them to achieve
benefits of internal cooperation among related businesses. On the other hand,
when outside director equity is low, firms sell more related and larger units.
This result suggests that managers favour diversity over size and use sell-ofTs
to achieve economic benefits of competitive resource allocation.
An early case study by Gilmour (1973) on major divestment decisions found
that replacement of top management preceded each divestment study. In a later
study, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) also report that a recent change in top
management increases the probability of divestment. These results are
consistent with the view that a radical change in the strategy of the firm is
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usually undertaken when a new management team arrives either because they
have a weaker emotional commitment to the old activities or because the
changes indicate deeper shareholder dissatisfaction (e.g. Gabarro, 1985).
A firm's decision to divest may also be influenced by the threat of take-over.
Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990) present
evidence that the market for corporate control accounts for a substantial
amount of restructuring during the 1980s. For example, Gibbs (1993) and
Denis et al. (1997) find that refocusing is positively related to corporate control
threats. These findings suggest that firms facing the threat of take-over either
considered themselves as likely candidates for a repeat offer and thus realised
the need for change, or were pressurised by their board or blockholders to
reorganise. Thus reductions in agency problems through market disciplinary
forces increases divestment activity (Berger and Ofek, 1995).
Environment to Corporate Refocusing
The fourth rationale for engaging in refocusing is changes in the business
environment. Suggestions include changes in US tax policy (e.g. Hoskisson
and Hitt, 1990) and/or antitrust policy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991) that have
made certain types of restructuring more attractive. In addition, the advent of
junk-bond financing in the US and the growth of the venture capital market in
the UK. during the 1980s has removed size as a deterrent to takeover (Bhide,
1990) and opened management to monitoring and discipline from the external
capital market (Jensen, 1994). Others have argued that increases in global
competition have prompted firms to specialise by refocusing on their core
73
businesses (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). These explanations certainly help to
explain the timing of refocusing.
Research on divestment during recession has yielded mixed results. For
example, Duhaime and Grant (1984) did not find any significant differences in
divestment decision frequency among the economic cycle phases. In contrast,
Hamilton and Chow (1993) find that the general economic environment was
relatively important in influencing the divestment decision. However, the
economy was in decline during the study period and is therefore expected to
influence the results. Research on MBOs indicates an increase in the number of
buy-outs of failed firms during periods of recession (see for example, Robbie et
al., 1993).
Financial Restructuring to Corporate Refocusing
Finally, financial restructuring may be an antecedent to corporate refocusing.
Financial restructuring may lead to refocusing if firms engaging in the former
end up divesting units to increase efficiency and reduce the level of debt (Seth
and Easterwood, 1993, provide evidence to suggest that this is often the case in
leveraged buy-outs). In addition, financial restructuring may occur
simultaneously with refocusing, for example, via stock repurchases and
recapitalisations.
To summarise, existing attempts to analyse divestment activity appear
methodologically unsatisfactory in that they typically employ the same
hypotheses which have been used to explain prior levels of diversification to
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analyse subsequent changes in the same variable, or some proxy for it. Thus, for
example, the agency problem between shareholders and managers is widely
assumed to generate higher equilibrium levels of diversification than would be
justified by shareholder value maximisation. Researchers then contend that
corporate governance variables, intended to capture shareholder power with
respect to managers, are expected to decrease diversification and hence increase
divestment. However, in the absence of any change in these variables, the same
characteristics presumably have already acted to depress levels of diversification
before any exogenous shock. Therefore it is unclear why such shareholder
dominated firms should display higher rates of divestment than, say, firms which
are more weakly controlled but which have had the corresponding opportunity to
diversify more widely.
Also, as argued in detail in Chapter 2, a majority of studies only examine the
direct relationship between divestment and individual hypothesised influences.
These relationships are likely to entail more complex combinations. One
noticeable exception is a study by Hoskisson et al. (1994), which adopts a
structural equation framework to examine the interrelationships between
combinations of influencing factors. The study finds that firm performance
moderates and mediates many of the antecedents, suggesting that focusing on
firm performance as a primary criterion for refocusing may inflate the effect on
the decision to sell. A very few studies focus on the fit between the divested
unit and the parent (Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991;
Bergh, 1997).
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The most common approach adopted in all these studies is to test pooled
longitudinal data with OLS regression analysis by focusing on changes in
observations between two points in time. This approach is problematic and the
results may be vulnerable to bias if regression towards the mean effects are not
controlled for or correlation between the change and initial measurement of a
variable is ignored. The dynamic aspects of the data are therefore typically
neglected and as such, previous research which examines the causes of
refocusing may be subject to specification bias and inefficient estimates of
relationships. Many studies also fail to include time-related change as a
structural component or as a factor in the model, to test the stability of
relationships over time. For example, managerial motivations differed between
the 1970s and the 1980. In the former period, managers were better able to
pursue their own self-interests due to weak governance (Jensen, 1986).
However, in the later period, managerial activities were more closely
scrutinised; mistakes could lead to takeovers, more acquisition targets became
available and, owners and boards became more actively involved in corporate
affairs (Gibbs, 1993; Jensen, 1988).
3.3.3 The Consequences of Corporate Refocusing
The existing research on the outcomes of corporate refocusing can be separated
into three broad streams: performance, strategy and employee implications:
Corporate Refocusing to Performance
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The effect on performance of a refocusing strategy has received the most
attention in the literature. The majority of research has taken a relatively short-
term measure of performance by adopting an efficient market methodology to
examine the share price effect around the time of a refocusing announcement.
The two primary modes of refocusing researchers have identified are sell-offs
and spin-offs. This research overwhelmingly indicates that selling firms exhibit
an improvement in the share price at the time of the announcement, which
suggests that refocusing creates market value (for example, Jain, 1985;
Rosenfeld, 1984;Klein, 1986,Hite et al., 1987;Alexander et aI., 1984).
These returns to refocusing have shown to be moderated by several factors. For
example, Rite and Owers (1983) found that spin-offs undertaken for strategic
reasons earn positive abnormal returns, whereas spin-offs as a response to
regulatory issues earn negative returns. Montgomery et al. (1984) find that
non-strategic sell-offs are negatively valued by the market. Both Klein (1986)
and Sicherman and Pettway (1992) show that non-disclosure of the divestment
price results in non-significant returns. This result is consistent with the
inferences made by Milgrom (1981) that failure to disclose may convey
unfavourable information to shareholders and therefore an unfavourable
reaction from shareholders. In addition, firms whose credit rating has been
downgraded (Sicherman and Pettway, 1992), firms who announce they will
retain the proceeds from an asset sale (Lang et al., 1995), and focus-decreasing
transactions (John and Ofek, 1995) have been found to earn lower returns.
Markides (1992a) found that refocusing announcements earned positive and
significant abnormal gains, with 'overdiversified' firms in particular generating
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an average gain of about 4 per cent in shareholder value. Sell-otTsare therefore
seen as firm-specific events, whose etTects depend on the various underlying
strategic motivations.
The characteristics of the unit sold may also moderate the returns to refocusing.
For example, Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) for spin-otTs and Klein (1986) for
sell-otTs found that firm returns are associated positively with the size of the
sale. With regards to the relatedness of unit sold, drawing from the resource-
based view of the firm, firms selling unrelated assets should have higher ex-
post performance than those selling related assets. A study by Bergh (1995)
finds that the relatedness of unit sold is associated negatively with selling
company's post-sell-otT performance. This is consistent with the view that
selling a related business may threaten a seller's source of competitive
advantage. If firms are selling related businesses than this may account for
some of the lack of findings regarding performance. Kaplan and Weisbach
(1992) examine the relationship between acquisitions and divestments, and find
that abnormal returns from divestment are lower for unsuccessful acquisitions
(those which are sold at a loss or those stated by the business press at the time
of the divestment as being a mistake) than corresponding returns for successful
divestments.
There are a number of studies that look specifically at the announcement
etTects of buy-outs. The available evidence generally supports the view that
buy-outs improve performance. In a survey study by Amihud (1989)
substantial excess stock market returns are reported for buy-outs, which appear
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to exceed any gains made by downgrading senior debt (e.g. Jensen, 1989) or
from tax benefits (KKR, 1989). Divestment of a unit by MBO may enable the
profitability of the disposed unit to increase, partly due to the change in
incentive structure post restructuring (Kaplan, 1989, Smart & Waldfogel,
1994). In an attempt to discriminate between different incentive changes in
buyout transactions, a study by Thompson et al. (1992) using a sample of 31
UK MBOs between 1984 and 1989 demonstrates that managements' equity
share emerges as the dominant determinant of performance improvements,
supporting the view that value gains from corporate restructuring result
primarily from increasing managerial motivations (Jensen, 1989).
There are a number of limitations associated with event studies (Halpern, 1983,
Brown and Warner, 1980; Hite, 1986). One particular problem is the isolation
of single divestments as a single news announcement. Many divestments occur
typically as part of a programme of disposals and therefore it is difficult to
disentangle any overlapping effects. Denning and Shastri (1990) examine firms
making single, large divestments with no other announcements in the relevant
period and fail to report any significant announcement effects. There is also
very little public information about a divested business, especially in terms of
performance. The potential for selection bias is also a problem if only the
financial press is used to collect data, as only a sub-set of announcements are
reported through this medium.
More recently, researchers have begun to study the longer-term performance of
divesting firms. Most research examines the impact on performance one to
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three years post refocusing. Initial research indicates that refocusing is
associated with profitability improvements. Montgomery and Thomas (1988),
examining single divestments, found that industry-adjusted ROA improved
post-divestment but that it was significantly lower than matched non-divesting
firms over the same period. Comment and Jarrell (1995), based on a sample of
US firms, found that firms that refocused during the 1980s experienced an
upward trend in net-of-market wealth, whilst those that reduced focus
experienced a decline. John and Ofek (1995) and Hoskisson and Johnson
(1992) also report that ROA improved following asset sales and refocusing
respectively.
Markides (1995b) found a large and statistically significant refocusing effect in
an ex post analysis of the profitability consequences of reduced diversification.
However, there is some variance in these observations. The earlier the firm's
refocusing activity (i.e. 1981-1983) the greater its impact on subsequent
performance, whereas middle and late refocusers did not exhibit performance
improvements. One interpretation of these results is that the gains from
refocusing may take time to realise. Bergh (1996) suggests that it may take up
to two years post sell-off before performance improvements are realised.
There is also considerable evidence that MBOs improve short-term real
operating profit post-buyout (see Palepu, 1990 for a review of US studies and
Wright et al., 1992 for a review of UK studies). However, the longer-term
performance effects of MBOs are ambiguous. More rigorous studying is
required, however there is an inherent censoring problems associated with the
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reversion to quoted status or the sale to a third party (Kaplan, 1991). Moreover,
it tends to be the larger and more successful MBOs that return most rapidly to
the stock exchange, so that long-term performance may be biased downwards
as strong performers exit from the sample. There may also be a possible
selection bias in that firms without satisfactory performance may have
difficulty in obtaining funding to finance a buy-out.
There are, however, a number of important limitations with cross-sectional
performance studies on refocusing. As Bergh (1997) points out, it is difficult to
evaluate the performance effects of divestment in a cross-sectional context,
since it may take up to two years post-sell-off before performance
improvements are realised. To circumvent problems resulting from cyclical
and/or outlier observations, most researchers average several years' data and
then examine prior divestment as a determinant of the (implicit) long-run
equilibrium level of profitability. However, subsequent divestment occurring
during the interval of data averaging is typically ignored. This is a particular
disadvantage if there is a relatively high level of divestment activity across the
sample. Moreover, if profitability adjusts sluggishly to the firm's changed
characteristics - and the literature on profitability dynamics (e.g. Geroski and
Jacquemin, 1988) predicts that it will - the impact on average profits across any
interval will depend upon the timing of such changes.
Corporate Refocusing to Business Strategy
One of most commonly stated goals of refocusing is to change firm strategy
(e.g. to increase fit, restore competitiveness or improve efficiency). High levels
81
of diversification have been linked to lower R&D intensity. If refocusing
reduces diversified scope, then we may expect managerial risk-taking to
increase through R&D expenditures (Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992). However,
Hitt et al. (1996), using structural equation modeling, found that acquisition
and divestment intensity lead to an emphasis on financial controls, which has a
negative impact on internal innovation (see also Kose, Lang and Netter, 1992).
Corporate refocusing implies that firms narrow the scope of their activities by
concentrating on related businesses. Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) support this
proposition and find that the majority of US firms who had completed
restructuring had focused on related businesses. Similarly, Chang (1996)
reports that any acquisitions made following restructuring are more related and
allow existing knowledge and skills to be transferred.
Hatfield et al. (1996) and Liebeskind et al. (1996) examme the effect of
refocusing on industry specialisation and concentration respectively.
Experience with refocusing in the US indicates that industry specialisation has
not been affected by refocusing activity during the 1980s. Similarly, average
industry concentration levels have changed little in the economy as a whole.
These studies suggest that the goal to produce a population of specialised firms
in response to global competition has not materialised. Whether this is also the
case in the UK remains to be established.
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Corporate Refocusing to Employment
The popular business press abounds with examples of mass layoffs in
conjunction with asset sell-offs. However, the effect on employees is one of the
least examined aspects of restructuring. Kose et at. (1992) find that 43 percent
of refocusing firms cut the number of employees by 5 percent and 50 percent
replaced some senior management. Brown et al. (1994) report a smaller but
still significant 34 percent replacement of CEOs when refocusing was initiated
by firms in default.
Johnson et al. (1990) argue that "psychological shock" associated with low
morale, fear of layoff and a higher level of turnover may result in a period of
post-restructuring drift. Hitt and Keats (1992) suggest that while one of the
goals of restructuring is to enhance competitive advantage, the actual outcome
may be degenerative and dysfunctional. Another strand of the literature
suggests that survivors are more likely to translate feelings into increased work
motivation (e.g. Brockner et al. (1993).
With regards to MBOs and employment there are mixed findings. A number of
studies report a sharp decline in employment after the buy-out (for example,
Wright and Coyne, 1985; Jensen, 1989). Whilst there is evidence that
employment appears to fall immediately after a buy-out, the subsequent
employment record appears to outperform the industry average in the US
(Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990) and show some absolute recovery in the UK
(Wright et al., 1993). Since there is an indication that buy-outs occur in
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relatively weaker sectors, the effect of the buy-out may be to prevent further
adverse changes in employment.
3.4 Summary
To summarise, the prevalent explanation for refocusing in the 1980s is that
overdiversified firms are reducing their level of diversification in an attempt to
improve profitability and market value. It is argued that a large number of firms
found themselves overdiversified in the 1980s due to a downward displacement
in their optimal level of diversification, during the period in question. At least
three inter-related explanations for this downward displacement have emerged
from the literature. First, Jensen (1989) and others have argued that the optimal
level of diversification has declined due to an increase in the effectiveness of the
market for corporate control. Second, capital market innovations have weakened
the informational and control advantages of the internal capital market,
attenuating the benefits from diversification. Third, the capital market reversed its
previous optimistic stance on conglomerate mergers and started to prefer more
tightly focused firms in the 1980s.
Corporate refocusing typically, hut not necessarily, involves major divestments.
Divestment as a corporate strategy tool has grown in importance in the UK over
the past IOta 15 years. An important contributor to this increase has been the
development of management buy-outs. However, despite the evidence on
divestment activity, there is still little systematic evidence on the extent of
refocusing in general (e.g. Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Liebeskind and Opler,
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1993). Nor do we know the nature of refocusing firms and the exact reasons
why they divest. The ex post effect of divestment on profitability is also an
under-researched area.
Compared to merger activity,which continues to receive extensive scrutiny in the
industrial organisation and finance literatures, this situation appears anomalous.
The underlying issues which motivate so much work on mergers - namely the
effectiveness of the market in corporate control and the efficiency consequences
of altering the boundaries of the firm - would appear to apply with equal force to
refocusing activity.
A review of the recent literature on corporate divestment reveals a number of
qualifications: first, the published studies are limited mainly to US data and to
manufacturing industries. Given that divestment has also been predominant in
the UK and has had an impact across all industrial sectors, it would be
insightful to analyse divestment activity using UK data across sectors. A
further limitation of previous research concerns the coverage of the type of
divestment used to measure the dependent variable in regression equations.
Collecting data on divestment is fraught with difficulties both in terms of the
number of subsidiaries/divisions which are sold and their value. The
transaction price may not be disclosed, while comprehensive tracing of the
number of disposals may also be difficult especially for smaller loss making
subsidiaries. Given that some enterprises may engage in extensive divestment
programmes, these divestments may collectively represent a quite significant
proportion of a parent company's assets. There are also indications that while
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previous studies have focused on parent-to-parent divestments (sell-offs), less
attention has been paid to sales of subsidiaries to management (management
buy-outs and buy-ins). This is a potentially important omission as the number
of divestments which result in buy-outs is of the same order of magnitude as
parent-to-parent sell-offs (CMBOR, 1997).
There are also a number of qualifications concerning the methodology adopted
in previous studies. The existing literature can be divided into two broad
strands: event studies and cross-sectional studies. The limitations of these
approaches have been discussed in detail both in this chapter and Chapter 2.
Briefly, event studies rely on the identification of a single divestment, yet for
larger firms multiple divestments are typically part of larger restructuring
programmes. There are also problems regarding lack of performance
information for the divested unit and possible selection bias if only the
financial press is used to identify divestment announcements. Also much of the
previous evidence is limited because of its use of cross-sectional models to
examine longitudinal relationships (Bergh and Holbein, 1997). This is an
important issue in the case of divestment, given the dynamic nature of the
conditions which may prompt firms to dispose of assets and the persistent
nature of profitability effects following divestment. As such, previous research
may be subject to specification bias and inefficient estimates of relationships.
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Notes
'Control loss occurs because "only a fraction of the intentions of a superior are
effectively satisfied by the subordinate" (Williamson, 1967, p. 127).
2The market for corporate control has been defined as "a market in which
alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate
resources" (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
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4. SAMPLEANDDATACHARACTERISTICS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the sample of publicly quoted UK companies which is
used in the empirical parts of the study (Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 of this thesis).
Section 4.2 outlines the approach adopted and relates it to the objectives of the
study. Section 4.3 considers the dating, sampling method and data sources
involved. Section 4.4 examines the characteristics of the sample and defines the
study variables.
4.2 The Nature and Purposes of the Study
The purpose of the study is to examine refocusing activity for a sample of
publicly quoted UK companies, over the period 1985-1993. The period was
chosen principally to correspond with the widespread perception that refocusing
was a dominant business strategy over this period. Following the review of the
literature, we attempt to investigate the following research questions in the UK
context:
1. What is the extent and nature of corporate refocusing?
2. What are the characteristics of refocusing firms?
3. What are the prior determinants of the divestment decision?
4. What is the impact of divestment on firm performance?
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The more specific questions will be elaborated In the individual empirical
chapters in Part III of this thesis.
In order to test these research questions, data were collected from a number of
published and unpublished sources. A discussion of the estimation techniques
adopted to analyse this data will be left until the following chapter of this thesis.
This data collection approach was chosen in preference to a questionnaire
survey for a number of reasons: First, in many cases the initial adoption of a
programme of refocusing would have taken place a number of years before the
study. A questionnaire would require a company representative to comment on
events going back into the company's history and possibly pre-dating the
representative's association with the company. A possible bias could therefore
be introduced if they were unable to identify true reasons for refocusing.
Second, during the period of investigation, takeover activity and bankruptcy
lead to significant changes in the population of quoted companies. Since any
questionnaire approach must be made to extant companies it would omit such
cases entirely and may entail some bias in the sample. And finally, some of the
questions could only be answered by referring to data available from public
sources; for example, in the case of examining changes in industry concentration
levels.
Some of the disadvantages of the data collection method include obtaining less
precise conclusions regarding refocusing than would be the case with insider co-
operation, and the variation in quantity and quality of information between
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firms. The data limitations of using published sources in the context of this
study are discussed in detail in Section 4.3.3.
4.3 Dating, Sampling and Data Sources
4.3.1 Dates
The period chosen to investigate refocusing activity by quoted UK companies
was 1985-1993. The main criteria for choosing this period was that it
corresponds with the perceived move towards more tightly focused firms. The
starting date also coincides with the commencement of publication of the most
comprehensive coverage of divestment and acquisition information -
Acquisitions Monthly.
4.3.2 The Sample
The criterion for inclusion in the sample was an appearance in the leading 500
companies in the "Times 1000" in 1988-89 - a convenient midpoint in the study
period. The population of FT500 firms was selected because, as for US data
(for example, Markides, 1995a), it is expected to be primarily the larger firms
who engaged in refocusing activities. Since refocusing was expected to impact
across industrial sectors, the sample was not restricted to manufacturing
companies. However, the following companies were excluded:
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a) Unquoted companies.
As it was intended to use share pnce measures, only publicly quoted
companies were included in the target sample. This meant that private
companies and UK subsidiaries of foreign-based multinationals were
dropped from the population.
b) Financial companies - including banks, insurance companies, etc.
Financial companies were excluded from the population, because it is very
difficult to make output and input comparisons between financial and
manufacturing firms. All financial companies were therefore excluded,
despite the existence of extensive restructuring within this industry.
c) Commodity traders, import/export merchants, etc.
Commodity traders were excluded because despite their large turnover, they
typically have a very small workforce and asset base. This meant that their
accounts were not comparable to those of other firms.
These exclusions are unlikely to introduce bias into the results, given their
relatively small appearance in the FT500 list.
The resulting random sample of firms used is 158 publicly quoted UK
companies. Table 4.1 shows the number of firms within each industrial sector,
classified at the l-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. Since a
substantial number of firms are highly diversified, they were classified according
to the SIC in which they had the majority of their sales. The single largest
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classification is manufacturing, which contains 97 firms (i.e. 61 per cent of the
sample).
Table 4.1 Industrial Classification for Firms in Sample
Industrial Sector No. of Firms
Manufacturing 97
Distribution, Hotels & Catering 35
Construction IS
Transport 7
Business Services 4
Total 158
The sample was unbalanced in the sense that firms were allowed to enter and
exit the sample at random, and was therefore not restricted to those firms that
remain in existence throughout the entire period. An unbalanced sample allows
for a much larger sample to be analysed and reduces the impact of self-selection
of individual cross-sectional units. Selection bias is inherent in a balanced
sample since highly unsuccessful firms would have disappeared through
takeover or bankruptcy. The balance of the panel is given in Table 4.2. As
shown, 77 per cent offirms survived intact over the study period.
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Table 4.2 Balance of the Panel
No. of Years No. of Companies
2 1
3 1
4 12
5 6
6 5
7 6
8 6
9 121
Total 158
4.3.3 Data Sources
Data on the sample was collected from a number of sources to compile a unique
data set to analyse corporate refocusing activity. This is the largest database on
UK divestments ever collected. The principal sources are as follows:
a) Acquisitions Monthly
This provided the most comprehensive coverage of parent-to-parent
divestments and acquisitions for the companies in the sample. The principal
collections used were at 'The Centre for Management Buyout Research'
(CMBOR) at the University of Nottingham. Prior to 1989 no library held all
copies and therefore information was provided direct from Acquisitions
Monthly.
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b) CMBOR database
Information on divestment by management buy-out and buy-in was supplied
by CMBOR at the University of Nottingham. The CMBOR database itself is
compiled from various sources including regular surveys of financial
institutions, local press and circulars which companies are obliged to issue
to shareholders when disposals involve directors.
c) Popular business press
Acquisition and divestment data were supplemented by a search through the
popular business press. This enabled us to identify especially small
transactions. This source was also used to identify take-over bids or bid
rumours over the sample period.
d) Datastream database
The majority of firm-level accounting data was constructed from
Datastream. Datastream also provided some analysis of firm sales by
business activity. A Datastream programme was also used to calculate
industry figures.
e) Fame database
Fame was consulted mainly for a description of a firm's activities and
corresponding SIC codes.
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f) Company Reports
Company reports provided the most comprehensive record available for
managerial shareholdings, the number of executive and non-executive
directors, blockholder share ownership and the analysis of firm sales by
activity. The principal collection used was at the University of Warwick.
g) Business Monitor
The Report on the Census of Production (Series PAI002) contained
industry sales information for manufacturing enterprises and the proportion
of industry sales accounted for by the 5 largest firms, both classified at the
3-digit SIC level.
h) OEeD Trade Sources
Information on imports and exports at the 3-digit SIC level are calculated
from the OECD trade database and was kindly supplied by the Department
of Economics at the University of Nottingham.
The data set was compiled by cross-referencing against different sources, as no
single source contained all the relevant information. There are a number of data
limitations using the above sources. For example, the Business Monitor only
contains industry information on manufacturing companies and therefore did not
provide information for some of the firms in the sample. Some company reports
provided more detailed information than others. This problem is particularly
evident prior to requirements for full disclosure in the accounts of certain
company information, for example, managers' equity interests. There was also
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the problem of consistency with the reporting of substantial interests, which
changed definition in 1990. Finally, there is an additional problem of data
omissions, especially regarding sales price information on divestments. This
latter data limitation is a well-recognised issue in US studies on divestment (see
for example, Hite, 1986).
4.4 Characteristics of the Sample
The full sample consisted of 158 UK publicly quoted firms randomly selected
from the FT500 list (see section 4.3.2 for exclusions). Since much of the
empiricalwork involves panel data estimation, data was collected for each firm,
for each year, from 1983 through to 1993. A search through Acquisitions
Monthly and the business press produced 2,001 divestments and 2,599
acquisitions for the sample firms over the 1985-93 period. All divestments were
screened to isolate only those undertaken voluntarily (i.e. not forced upon
companies by regulatory issues). Involuntary divestments in any case were an
insignificant part of the UK market until 1989 when "divestment deals" were
introduced as part of the change in merger policy. Table 4.3 shows divestment
activity by companies in the sample. The figures support the view that
divestment is likely to be a multiple event, associated with a major and
continuing restructuring programme (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). Of the
sample, 86 per cent of firms which divested in the period 1985 to 1993 engaged
in more than one divestment, with 43 percent undertaking at least 11 sales of
subsidiaries. Table 4.4 lists the most intensive divestors in the sample over the
period 1985 to 1993. As shown, there appears to be no industry-specific
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characteristics for the most frequent divestors. As with US data (for example
Singh, 1993; Markides 1995a), the impact of refocusing through divestment
appears to be felt across all industrial sectors.
Table 4.3 Divestment Activity by Companies in the Sample
Number of No. of Companies Percentage
divestments
0 13 8%
I_Sa 45 29%
6-10 32 20%
11-15 23 15%
16-20 14 9%
20-30 18 11%
30 or more 13 8%
Total 158 100
Notes: 9 firms undertook one divestment
Table 4.4 Most Active Divestors in the Sample
Vendor Name No. of Divestments
1985-1993
Hanson 87
British Petroleum 64
Grand Metropolitan 63
I.C.I. 57
ThomEMI 50
T.I. Group 50
Unilever 40
Beecham 37
B.T.R. 37
B.E.T. 36
Allied Lyons 36
Guiness 35
Lex Service 33
Table 4.5 shows the number and value of divestments by year for the sample
firms. Divestment activity increases steadily form 1985 and reaches a peak in
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1989 (1988), in terms of the number (value) of divestments by year. Whilst
divestment declines after this date, the number and value of sell-oft's is at a
higher level in 1993 than at the start of the study period, reinforcing the general
trend of divestment as an increasingly positive aspect of the restructuring
process (see Section 1.2, Chapter 1 of this thesis).
Table 4.5Divestments by Year
Year Number Value(a)1 Value(b)2
i£OOO'~ _(£OOO'~
1985 159 1,801,150.00 1,805,922.00
1986 183 5,096,707.47 5,152,742.47
1987 203 6,553,075.47 6,707,107.47
1988 319 12,449,497.40 12,561,745.40
1989 329 11,110,016.47 11,341,308.47
1990 259 9,385,957.47 9,603,093.47
1991 175 3,294,812.00 3,503,647.00
1992 196 5,078,341.47 5,253,564.47
1993 178 5,798,043.93 5,984,432.93
Total 2001 60,567,601.68 61,913,563.68
Notes:
'value of divestments with reported sales price
\ralue of divestments assuming unpriced divestments have a value of 0.1 per cent of market
value of that finn
4.4.1 The Variables
(i) Divestment variables
Number of divestments. The number of business units divested is a count of the
total number of divestments (defined to include demergers, spin-oft's, sales to
third parties and disposals via management buy-outs) by a firm during a one
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year period. In the UK, by far the majority of these transactions involve sales to
third parties (sell-offs) and management buy-outs/buy-ins, with the total
numbers and values of each being fairly even (CMBOR, 1998). From Table 4.1
the mean number of divestments is 1.54 and ranges from zero to 20 (undertaken
by Hanson in 1989).
Proportion of assets divested. The proportion of assets divested is calculated as
the sales price of a divested unit divided by the market value of the firm in the
year before the divestment. These percentages are summed over the year to
obtain a total proportion of assets divested by a firm during a one year period.
This procedure is similar to existing studies (for example, Hoskisson et al.,
1994) except that due to a lack of information on the actual sales of the divested
unit, the sale price is used as a proxy for the market value of the divestment.
In the cases where a sales price was not reported the following procedure was
adopted: first, using a subgroup of 45 companies over the period 1985 to 1991
we plotted the frequency distribution for the proportion of assets divested based
on 627 divestments. This represents 72.5 percent of the total 865 divestments
reported over the period, implying 27.5 per cent failed to report a price (22.75
percent for the whole sample of 158 companies). Various cut-off points were
selected and assigned to divestments with an unobserved value. The results
appeared insensitive to the allocation rule selected. Even at the 25 percent
value, the value of divestments was 0.2 percent of the firms market value. We
would expect the unreported values to represent small and/or under-performing
divestments and hence a small proportion of total divestments. Therefore, this
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potential bias is unlikely to be important. Assigning a proportion of O.1 per cent
of market value to divestments with no sales price, the average proportion of
assets divested is 4 per cent.
The rationale for using separate measures rests on both methodological and
practical reasons. The number of recorded divestments relates more obviously to
any control problems associated with diversity. Furthermore, this approach is
advantageous in so far as value data are inevitably unobtainable for some smaller
divestments. Divestment expressed as a proportion of the firm's initial assets
represents a measure of the importance of divestment activity over the period.
(ii) Refocusing variables
To measure the extent of refocusing activity we need an index of diversification,
since refocusing essentially refers to a reduction in the level of diversification. A
variety of measures have been used in previous studies on diversification and
exhibit a fair amount of correlation. We adopt two measures:
Number of SICs. The number of SICs in which a firm operates is calculated at
the 2-digit SIC level. This measure is based simply on a count of the number of
business segments in which a firm operates and as such, weights all segments
equally. Diversification is categorised as related if a firm diversifies within the
same 2-digit SIC and unrelated otherwise.
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The sole use of this measure may lead to incorrect inference to the extent of
diversification. For example, a firm may operate in five SICs but these may all
be steel. A count of the number of SICs would therefore lead to an incorrect
inference that the firm is highly diversified. Moreover, a firm operating in n
segments each with a lin share of the firm's total sales is more diversified than a
firm also operating in n segments but with one segment representing, say, 90
percent of the firm's sales.
It was noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis that many of the inconsistencies in
results may be due to the use of business count measures of diversification. A
count of the number of SICs is not appropriate for examining firm specific
variables among diversified firms and therefore a second continuous measure of
diversification is employed to address strategic differences.
Entropy Index. A more complex diversification measure is the entropy index of
diversification [Palepu (1985)] and is defined as:
DT = ~ P; In (lIP;)
where P; is the share of the ith segment in the total sales of the firm and In(lIP;)
is the weight for each segment i. The entropy index is a continuous measure
and takes into account both the number of segments in which a firm operates
and the relative importance of each of the segments in total sales. The closer
DT is to zero, the more concentrated are a firm's sales within a few of its
industry segments. The index only measures product diversification and does
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not capture geographic diversification. The entropy index has an additional
benefit of separating total diversification into its related and unrelated
components.
The diversification index is calculated for each firm by treating (SIC) codes at
the 3-digit level as the industry segments and SIC codes at the 2-digit level as
industry groups. The index was calculated using data from Datastream and
company accounts (analysis of turnover by activity). Given the nature of
disclosure in company accounts, it is not possible to disaggregate a firm's sales
to the 4-digit level. It is recognised that constructing firm-level diversification
measures is inevitably problematic: First, the firm's description of its activities is
subjective and mapping these into the SIC is not always straightforward.
Further, in the cases where a unique SIC code was not assigned to an activity,
an upper bound estimate of two industry segments was assumed. For both these
reasons, the extent of firm diversification will tend to be underestimated.
Further, where it was impossible to match discontinued operations back to a
specific activity they were categorised as miscellaneous and the above allocation
rule was assigned. Although this is not a satisfactory procedure, it appears to be
the only practical alternative. However, given the small number of cases where
this occurred, it is expected to have very little effect on the results.
Refocusing is represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm refocused
over the period 1985-1993 and 0 otherwise. A firm was classified as refocused
in one of three ways: first, firms were classified as refocused if their entropy
index of diversification (DT) fell by more than -0.05 between the years 1985
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and 1993 (denoted classificationA). Second, each firm's DT was calculated for
the years 1985, 1989 and 1993. Following Markides (1992b), firms whose DT
decreased by more than -0.05 over the period and whose DT(93-89) was
smaller than +0.05 were classified as refocused. In addition, firms whose
DT(89-85) was between -0.05 and +0.05, and whose DT(93-89) decreased by
more than -0.08 were also classified as refocused. This ensures that any
inconsistent refocusers are not included in the sample (B). Finally, firms were
classified as refocused if their DT reduced in the period 1989 to 1993 and
DT(1993-1985) fell over the period. This captures firms who refocused in the
latter part of the study period (C). These classifications correspond to those
used by Markides (1992, 1995) in studies of refocusing activity by a sample of
US firms.
Although the level of firm diversification is measured using a continuous
measure, refocusing is classified using a dichotomous variable for three main
reasons. First, although the index is able to tell us which firms are more
diversified than others, the numerical difference in DT between firms has little
specific meaning (palepu, 1985). Second, as mentioned above, the index takes
into account both the number of segments in which a firm operates and the
relative importance of each of the segments in total sales. Consequently, the
index can change not only as a result of diversificationmoves on the part of the
firm but also when the firm changes its investment in a particular industry, or
following demand-side changes. Thus large changes in the index are more
accurate indicators of refocusing activities.
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Finally, calculating the index for a number of years allows us to examine both
the direction and the magnitude of any changes, enabling a more accurate
classification of refocusing firms. For example, a firm whose DT(89-85)
decreased by -0.20 but whose DT(93-89) increased by +0.15 would not be
classified as refocused even though its index over the whole period decreased.
(iii) Financial variables
In this study, both accounting-based and market-based measures of performance
are adopted. Previous studies have generally focused on one or the other and
this may account for some of the inconsistencies in existing evidence.
Accounting data have been subject to substantial criticism in recent years,
although it has generally been felt that they can be used with caution to analyse
company performance. Fisher and McGowan (1983) and Benston (1985) give
several reasons why accounting profits are incorrect measures of economic
performance. However, whilst accounting data is subject to error (as is also the
case with market data), as long as errors are unsystematic or uncorrelated with
the phenomenon under study, then there will be no serious biases. Moreover, it
is argued that account measures are more appropriate since managers rely most
heavily on accounting-based performance in formulating diversification strategy
(Holzman et al., 1975).
Accounting performance. Accounting-based performance is calculated using
four different measures taken from Datastream: return on capital employed
(ROCE), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and trading profit
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margin (TPM). ROCE is measured as pre-tax profit plus interest charges
divided by the sum of capital employed, total intangibles, borrowings repayable
within one year minus future income tax benefits (multiplied by 100). ROE
equals earned for ordinary divided by equity capital and reserves plus deferred
tax minus total intangibles (multiplied by 100). ROS is operating profit divided
by sales (multiplied by 100). TPM is calculated as trading profit divided by sales
(multiplied by 100).
These performance measures will differ systematically from industry to industry
due to different input structures. In addition, in the case of firms who. are active
divestors and acquirers, their industry composition will change dramatically and
as a result may affect accounting ratios. To remove such biases, each firm's
performance must be adjusted by industry.
To calculate industry-weighted performance figures for each firm, for every
year, the following procedure is followed: first, a Datastream programme was
used to identify all firms assigned to a Datastream industry. The Datastream
industry is the most detailed level of data on a sector and is roughly equivalent
to a 3-digit SIC. To calculate industry ratios, the constituents of the ratios were
summed for all firms within an industry and then the ratio was calculated on the
summed values. For example, an aggregation ofROS represents the sum of all
operating profit of companies in a sector divided by sum of all sales of same
companies. This method improves accuracy because the aggregation is not
distorted by extreme values within a single company. Where year ends differ,
the year covering the maximum amount of the accounts in that year is taken as
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the year end. The industry-weighted ROS for each firm in the sample is then
calculated by subtracting the industry's ROS from firm ROS. Similarly, for
industry-weighted RaCE, ROE and TPM.
Adjusting each firm's performance by its industry-weighted performance, allows
for cross-sectional variation across industries to be directly comparable.
Industry-adjusted performance also allows for comparisons between a company
and the sector to which it belongs. It is important to adjust for industry effects
as poor performance may be indicative of the industry as a whole, and therefore
some relative measure is required. However, there are a number of limitations in
this approach. First, Datastream only covers public quoted companies and
therefore industry figures may not be precise. This is compounded by the fact
that Datastream only identifies existing companies. The further back in time the
more difficult it is to identify companies that have left the Datastream sample
(i.e. through merger), so sector information becomes less accurate. However,
since industry ratios are used as a benchmark, we do not think there is any
serious problem in adopting this approach. Also, it is difficult to conceive any
easier and more accurate alternative.
Market performance. Market performance is measured as the ratio of market
value to book value of assets (an approximation to Tobin's q).
Shareholders Return. Both total shareholder return and total shareholder return
relative to the market are calculated. Shareholder return for each company is
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extracted on an annual basis from Datastream. The Returns Index (RI) IS
calculated as follows:
RI = Pt- Pt-f + d / Pt-f
where P, is price of the share in t, P t-f is the price in t-l and d is dividend per
share. To calculate shareholder return relative to the market, the returns index
for the FT Allshare is subtracted from the firm's returns index.
Firm leverage. Firm leverage is measured as the ratio of debt to total assets and
the ratio of debt-to-equity, both measured as book values. Where debt to total
assets (or capital gearing ratio) equals preference capital plus subordinated debt
plus total loan capital plus borrowings repayable within one year, divided by the
sum of capital employed, total intangibles, borrowings repayable within one
year minus future income tax benefits (multiplied by 100). Debt-to-equity (or
the borrowing ratio) is measured by subordinated debt plus total loan capital
plus borrowings repayable within one year, divided by equity capital and
reserves plus deferred tax minus total intangibles. Again, industry-adjusted
figures are obtained using the same approach as that outlined above.
(iv) Corporate Governance Variables
Management equity interests. Management equity interests, in line with
previous research (for example, Johnson et al., 1993) is calculated as the
percentage of total beneficial and non-beneficial ordinary shares owned by the
107
directors of the firm. The total interests of the directors is calculated from the
company accounts and divided by the issued and fully paid ordinary shares of
the company.
Blockholder ownership. Prior to 1st June 1990, companies were required to
disclose in their annual accounts, information on holders of five per cent or
more of the ordinary capital of their company. On the 1st June 1990, company
law changed so that holders of 3 per cent or more of the issued ordinary capital
were now requested to disclose their interests in a company. In order to
maintain consistency across the sample period, in this study a blockholder is
defined as an owner of five per cent or more of a firm's ordinary share capital.
This definition has also been adopted by previous researchers (for example,
Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). Blockholder ownership is measured as a
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was a blockholder during the year and
o otherwise.
Board composition. Representation of outsiders on the board of directors is
calculated as the ratio of non-executive to executive board members. This
measure has been used in previous studies (see for example, Hoskisson et al.,
1994). Non-executive directors are defined as directors with no personal
relationship with a firm other than the position of director. Executive directors
are current or former managers of the firm. Information was obtained directly
from the company reports.
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Change in top management. A change in top management is measured as a
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was a change in Managing Director
during the year and 0 otherwise. This information was checked on a yearly basis
in the company accounts. Any change in the name of the Managing Director
from the previous year was reported as a change in management in that reported
year.
Takeover threat. Takeover threat is measured as a dichotomous variable equal
to 1 if there was an actual takeover bid or bid rumour during the year, and zero
otherwise. Take-over bids and bid rumours were identified in Acquisitions
Monthly and by announcements in the business press.
(v) StrategY Variables
Diversification level. It is necessary to select a diversification measure from the
wide range of indices available. In the event we found that the principal
alternative measures, including the Herfindahl, were highly intercorrelated and
the entropy measure was employed for comparability with earlier work. This is
consistent with Markides 1995b. The entropy index is calculated as (see
definition above and Palepu, 1985): entropy index = LP; In (lIP;), where P; is
the share of the ith segment in the total sales of the firm and In(llP;) is the
weight for each segment i. The index was calculated using sales data and SIC
codes for each of the principal segments of the company at the 3-digit level. In
the cases where it was not possible to assign a unique SIC code to a segment,
the sales were split evenly between two SIC codes assigned to that segment.
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Firm size. Firm size is calculated by taking the book value of total assets, total
sales, and the number of employees. All measures are highly correlated.
Although the use of the FT500 biases the sample towards larger firms, there is
still considerable variation in firm size within the sample.
Core business. The core business is calculated as the 2-digit SIC in which a firm
has the largest percentage of its sales (Markides, 1992). This was calculated for
each year. This is a rather crude measure given the involvement of firms in a
number of industries but it is the only practical alternative.
Industry. An industry variable was calculated as the industry in which a firm
operates the largest percentage of its sales calculated at the 2-digit level.
Represented by dichotomous variable equal to 1 if operates in a particular
industry and 0 otherwise.
Acquisition. Acquisition is measured as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there
was an acquisition by a firm during the year and 0 otherwise.
Market share. Market share is calculated in the standard manner as total firm sales
divided by industry sales. Industry sales were available from the Business Monitor
for manufacturing firms. In addition, a Datastream programme was used to
identify all firms assigned to a Datastream industry (see above for details). To
calculate industry sales, the sales for all firms within an industry was summed.
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Concentration. The five finn concentration ratio was taken from Business Monitor
PAI002 (Report on the Census of Production - Summary Tables) which calculates
the concentration measure as the percentage of sales accounted for by the top five
enterprises within a 3-digit SIC. However, as noted above, this source only covers
the manufacturing sector and concentration within an industry was also measured
using the Herfindahl index of concentration which is calculated as the sum of the
squared market shares, Si, of the firms in an industry:
where Si is the market share of the ith finn measured as the sales of the ith finn
divided by total sales. H takes values between zero and one. The closer H is to one,
the more concentrated is the industry. This is a standard measure in many studies on
industry concentration (for example, Liebeskind et al., 1996) Again, a Datastream
programme was utilised to identify all firms within an industry and their reported
sales.
Import Intensity. Import intensity was measured as imports divided by total
domestic sales in each 3-digit SIC industry. The value of imports was calculated at
the 3-digit SIC level for manufacturing firms from the source tapes of the OECD.
The reported values were converted from US dollars using the end of year dollar-
sterling exchange rates obtained from Datastream.
III
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables in the sample are
presented in Table 4.6. The number of observations vary for different variables
due to the data limitations discussed in Section 4.3.3 and consequently different
sample sizes will be utilised in the empirical chapters of this thesis.
Table 4.6 The Descriptive Statistics for the Continuous Variables in the Study
Study Variable Mean S.D. N
No. of divestments 1.54 2.40 1292
Proportion of divestments 0.04 0.14 1285
Entropy index 0.83 0.50 1258
Number of SICs 3.16 1.66 1258
Firm-level ROCE 19.14 9.58 1264
Firm-level ROE 17.21 27.39 1264
Firm-level ROS 8.63 5.60 1264
Firm-level TPM 11.43 6.65 1264
Tobin's q 1.44 0.93 1261
Shareholder returns 0.02 0.36 1211
Debt-to-assets 32.80 19.01 1264
Debt-to-equity 0.70 7.40 1264
Management equity 0.04 0.10 1049
Board composition 0.69 0.51 1236
Total assets 1314511.2 2763429.97 1264
Total sales 2156891.6 4152325.20 1264
No. of employees 30173.80 37171.36 1264
Size of core 0.73 0.22 1258
Market share 0.76 1.65 709
Concentration 38.79 19.20 714
Imports 1242788.6 1332905.34 630
Exports 1244421.1 1199460.75 630
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5. METHODS
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the statistical techniques adopted to
analyse the data described in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Four separate techniques
are used to examine the different aspects of corporate refocusing activity: first,
linear static cross-sectional models. Second, linear static panel data models.
Third, nonlinear cross-sectional and panel data models with discrete dependent
variables (logit, Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions); and finally,
dynamic panel data models. The econometric analysis is performed using the
statistical packages LIMDEP (Greene, 1994) and DPD (Arellano and Bond,
1991) for the case of dynamic panel estimation.
5.2 Cross-SectionalModels
The basic econometric technique used to analyse refocusing activity IS a
multiple regression model using cross-sectional data. A cross-sectional data set
refers to the collection of data on a number of individual units at one point in
time. The parameters of regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), that is, the relationship between the dependent variable and the
regressors is estimated by minimising the sum of the squared errors from the
following regression equation:
...(5.1)
113
where i = 1,2, ...,N, Yi is the dependent variable, and Xi represents a vector ofk-
1 explanatory variables. The stochastic component, s., is assumed to be
normally distributed and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables with a zero mean, E[Ei] = 0, constant variance, varjs.] = 0&2 and
covariance, cov( Ei,En) = 0. a and Ware the parameter estimates from the
regression model. Under these classic conditions, OLS provides consistent,
best-linear unbiased and asymptotically efficient estimates of the regression
parameters a and 13.
The individual regression coefficients, 13, can be interpreted as measuring the
partial effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, holding all
other variables constant. The coefficient of determination (or R-squared) of the
fitted regression model measures the proportion of variability of the dependent
variable explained by its linear dependence on the explanatory variables and is
calculated as follows:
...(5.2)
where ESS and TSS are the explained sum of squares and total sum of squares
respectively from the regression equation.
The assumption that the disturbances are normally distributed ensures that the
OLS estimators are normally distributed and that the hypothesis testing
procedures are valid. To test the statistical significance of the individual
coefficients, the following test statistic is calculated:
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...(5.3)
where f3. is the parameter estimates from the regression equation and S.E. is its
respective standard error. The test statistic follows a t distribution with (n-k-l)
degrees of freedom (d.o.f.). The null hypothesis is rejected if the above test
statistic is greater than the critical value of the t-statistic in the tables. To test
the overall significance of the model (i.e. to test the null hypothesis that taken as
a group the independent variables do not linearly influence the dependent
variable) the following F statistic is calculated:
F = (RRSr - RRSu)/r
RSSu/(n-k-l)
...(5.4)
where RRSr and RRSu are the residual sum of squares obtained from the
restricted and unrestricted models respectively and follows a F distribution with
(r, n-k-l) d.o.f.. (R-squared may be used in replace of RSS if this is more
convenient.) As above, the null is rejected if the test statistic is greater than the
critical value for the F statistic.
One potential problem with linear static cross-sectional models is that they
provide estimates that characterise a long-run equilibrium. If the data represent
a process of adjustment then the estimated coefficients will be unreliable. One
option is to average the data over an extended time interval. However, this
approach only provides a limited solution. Another particular problem of using
cross-sectional data is that it is unable to control for heterogeneity (i.e.
unobservable individual specific effects). The consequence is a possible
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specification bias, making inference in a cross-sectional model problematic (see
Moulton, 1986, 1987). Therefore, the analysis using cross-sectional data is
supplemented by a panel data approach.
5.3 Panel Data Models
The panel approach combines dimensions of cross-sectional and time series data
(for example, see Greene, 1993). This can be achieved by surveying a sample of
individual units and following them over time, thus providing multiple
observations on each individual in the sample. The problem when using this data
to estimate a relationship, is to specify a model that adequately allows for
differences in the behaviour over cross-sectional units as well as any differences
in behaviour over time for a given cross-sectional unit. The adoption of panel
estimation in this study is an attempt to address one of the major weaknesses of
previous research on corporate refocusing which is limited by its cross-sectional
design (see Chapter 3 of this thesis for more details).
For research purposes, panel data possess a number of benefits over
conventional cross-sectional or time series data sets (for example, see Hsiao,
1986; Baltagi, 1995). First, panel data sets usually provide additional, more
informative data due to the large number of data points. Second, the number of
degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity between the variables is
reduced since the cross-sectional dimension adds a lot more variability resulting
in more efficient parameter estimates. Third, unobservable individual-specific
effects can be controlled for and finally, panel data is well suited to analyse the
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dynamics of the adjustment process. It should be noted that there are a number
of limitations of panel data, including data collection problems (see Kasprzyk et
al., 1989), measurement errors, selectivity problems and possible attrition bias.
Measurement errors may arise because of memory errors, faulty responses to
unclear questions, deliberate distortion of responses, inappropriate informants,
misrecording of responses and interviewer effects (Kasprzyk et al., 1989).
Selectivity problems include self-selection and non-response. However, many of
these problems are not unique to panel data.
In the following sections the estimation techniques and hypothesis tests for
misspecification in specific models will be discussed in the context of one-way
models (i.e. where the individual effects vary over individual cross-sectional
units only), since this is the approach adopted in the study. The relevant issues
for choice between the fixed and random effects models are examined, followed
by a brief discussion on unbalanced or incomplete panels.
5.3.1 A Basic Model
Using i subscripts to identify cross-sectional units and t subscripts for time, the
basic panel framework involves estimating relationships of the following form:
...(5.5)
where t = 1,2, ...,N and t = 1,2, ...,T, Yit is the dependent variable, and X,
represents a vector of k-l explanatory variables. As in Section 5.2, the error
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term, Cit, is assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero and constant variance. As it
stands this model is a classical regression model with OLS providing consistent
and efficient estimates of the regression parameters a. and ~ which are assumed
constant over time and individuals.
In many circumstances the assumption of constant coefficients is too restrictive.
In this study we consider a more general case where the slope coefficients, ~,
are constant and the intercept varies over individuals. A varying intercept is
assumed to capture differences across cross-sectional units and may be thought
of as capturing the effect of unobservable time-invariant individual effects. The
error term for this model can be written as:
Cit = J..l.i+ Uit ...(5.6)
where J.li represents the unobservable individual effects and Uit denotes the
remaining disturbances. J.li is time-invariant and accounts for any individual
specific effect that are not included in the model. Substituting the disturbances
given by (5.6) into (5.5) the model becomes:
Yit = a. + WXit + J..l.i+ Uit ...(5.7)
The choice of an appropriate estimation technique depends on what
assumptions are made about the individual effects. The variation across cross-
sectional units J..l.i, can be fixed or random. If J..l.i are fixed, or random and
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correlated with Xit, the dummy variable model is appropriate while if J..li are
random and independent of Xit then the error components model is adopted.
5.3.2 Fixed Effects Model
The fixed effects model assumes that the unobservable variable J..li, is non-
stochastic and the remaining disturbances are i.i.d. random variables with zero
mean and constant variance. Each intercept is a fixed parameter to be estimated
along with the slope coefficients, W:
...(5.8)
where Uit = (ex. + J..li) is the intercept for the ith individual.
To estimate equation (5.8) dummy variables for each cross-sectional unit, i, can
be included in the regression and the model is estimated without the constant
term by performing OLS. This is known as the least squares dummy variable
(LSDV) model and can be conveniently written as:
...(5.9)
where Djt are dummy variables which take the value 1 if j = j and 0 otherwise.
Thus there is a dummy variable corresponding to each individual and the
dummy variable that corresponds to individual j will take the value one for
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observations onj and zero for observations on other individuals. Alternatively,
the model can be reformulated to include a constant term and N - 1 dummy
variables. In both instances, the model can be estimated as a multiple regression
by OLS.
Although there are no practical problems involved in obtaining parameter
estimates from this model, there could be some numerical problems if, as is
typical, there are many cross-sectional units. When N is large, (5.9) will include
too many individual dummies and may aggravate the problem of
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Under these circumstances, it
is convenient to express each variable in terms of deviations from individual
means and perform OLS on the transformed variables to obtain parameter
estimates. This approach eliminates the individual effects and the resulting
transformed model is:
- - -
Yit - Y i = f3(Xit - x i) + (Uit - U i) ...(5.10)
-
where Y i, x i and U i denote the individual means of the variables. Because
(5.10) utilises the variation of the variables within each individual, it is often
referred to as the within-group regression.
Of particular interest is whether the model would be adequate if it were simply
assumed that all intercepts are identical (i.e. there are no individual fixed
effects). If this is the case, then there is no basis for differentiating the time-
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series/cross-sectional nature of the data. A simple F-test that compares the
restricted and unrestricted residual sum of squares can be performed to test for
fixed effects. Under the null hypothesis, the intercepts are assumed equal for all
individuals (i.e. the individual effects are the same) against the alternative that
the intercepts are not all equal. The relevant test statistic is given by:
F = (RSSr - RSSu)/(N-I)
RSSu/(NT -N-K)
...(5.11)
where RSS is the residual sum of squares, u indicates the restricted or pooled
model with a single overall constant and r refers to the unrestricted model, (N-
1) is the number oflinear restrictions and (NT-N-K) is the number of degrees of
freedom in the unrestricted model. Under the null, the test statistic has an F
distribution with [(N-I),(NT-N-K)] degrees of freedom. Rejection of the null
confirms the existence of intercept heterogeneity.
5.3.3 Random Effects Model
Alternatively, the random effects model assumes that the individual effects, ~i,
are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero and constant variance, and
independent of the ua. In addition, it is assumed that the explanatory variables
are uncorrelated with J.1i and Uit. This is also referred to as the error components
model.
In the random-effects model the error term no longer satisfies the classical
assumptions of serial independence as there is within-individual correlation
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through time. The structure of the model is such that, for a given individual, the
correlation between the disturbances over different time periods is the same.
Moreover, the correlation is not only constant over time but it is also identical
for all individuals. Therefore, OLS is not appropriate for estimation purposes
and Generalised Least Squares (GLS) is best linear unbiased (see for example,
Greene, 1993).
If all the u, = 0 then the random effects do not exist and the least squares
estimator in the fixed effects setting is best linear unbiased. To test this
hypothesis, Breusch and Pagan (1980) derived a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test
based only on the restricted residual sum of squares and is given by:
...(5.12)
Under the null of no random effects, A. is asymptotically distributed as chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. Rejection of the null is
evidence in favour of the error components model in Section 5.3.2.
Another basic assumption of the random effects model is that the individual
effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables Xit (i.e. corrlu., Xit] = 0). If
there is correlation between the individual effect and regressors GLS will not be
valid. The following Hausmann (1978) statistic can be used to test the null
hypothesis of zero correlation between ~i and X,;
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-- -- 1--W = (b -{3)' [var(b -{3)r (b -{3) ...(5.13)
where b is the GLS estimate and P is the LSDV estimate. Under the null W is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared distribution with K degrees of
freedom. The basic idea of this test is under the null, both OLS in the fixed
effects model and GLS are consistent, although the former is inefficient. In this
case, the two estimates should not differ systematically. Under the alternative
case where Ili and Xit are correlated, OLS estimates are consistent but GLS
estimates are not. Rejection of the null suggests the dummy variable estimator is
the most appropriate one.
5.3.4 Fixed versus Random Effects
Given the distinction between fixed and random effects models, an inevitable
question is which specification should be used in a particular case. One criterion
may be the following: if the focus is on a specific set of N individuals and
inference is restricted to the behaviour of these sets of individuals, the fixed
effects model is an appropriate specification. Alternatively, the random effects
model is appropriate if N individuals are drawn randomly from a larger
population. However, this approach may not always give clear guidance in
selecting an estimation procedure.
One disadvantage of the fixed effects model is the loss in degrees of freedom by
using dummy variables for each i. This has an effect on the quality of the
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estimates obtained. However, the fixed effects model has one considerable
advantage in that there is no need for treating the individual effects as
uncorrelated with other regressors, as is assumed in the random effects model.
The regression estimates from the random effects model may therefore be
inconsistent due to an omitted variable misspecification and the GLS estimator
will be biased. As seen in Section 5.3.3 if there is correlation between the
individual effect and the regressors, then the OLS estimates from the fixed
effects model will be consistent but GLS estimates will not. Under theses
circumstances, the fixed effects estimator will be best linear unbiased.
However, there are two possible undesirable effects of using the fixed effects
estimator when lJ.i and Xit are correlated. First, if the regressors contain time-
invariant measureable variables, it is impossible to separate these variables from
the dummy variables. In the within regression they will be eliminated. This
problem does not arise in the random effects model but in this case, the
estimates are biased and inconsistent as mentioned previously. Second, the
within estimator may be less efficient than alternative consistent estimators that
exploit information on the nature of the correlation relationship and do not
ignore sample variation across individuals.
In this study, both estimation procedures are utilised and the approapriate test
statistics are reported in determining which estimator to rely on.
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5.3.5 Unbalanced Panels
Since the data in this study is in the form of an unbalanced panel, it is
appropriate to consider the differences between unbalanced and balanced panel
techniques. An unbalanced panel refers to a data set where the individual cross-
sectional units are not observed throughout the entire study period i.e. they are
allowed to enter and exit the sample at random. For example, it is not unusual
for some firms to exit the market (e.g. through take-over, merger or
bankruptcy) or for new entrants to emerge. A particular advantage of using this
approach is that it allows for a much larger sample and reduces the impact of
self-selection of individual cross-sectional units. The basic difference in
estimation technique, is that in the unbalanced case, the weights used in GLS
are dependent on the lengths of the time series available for each cross-sectional
unit. As for the balanced case, the OLS and GLS estimates will be consistent.
5.4 Models with Discrete Dependent Variables
The third method adopted to examine refocusing activity is models with discrete
dependent variables. Specifically, the study utilises a logit model approach and
count data models (see Section 5.4.2).
5.4.1 Logit Model
The logit model is adopted to estimate relationships when the dependent
variable is in the form of a dichotomous variable. In the study, refocusing is
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measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reduced its level of
diversification over the period and 0 otherwise. Given the nature of the
dependent variable, OLS estimation would be inefficient in this case since it can
give estimates which imply predictions outside its possible range (i.e. higher
than one and lower than zero) and it assumes normally distributed errors. Given
the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable the error structure is likely to
be bimodal.
The relationship between the dependent variable and the regressors is estimated
by the following regression model:
... (5.14)
where i = 1,2, ... N, Xi represents a vector of k-I explanatory variables, Ei is the
error term and Yi* is an underlying latent variable which we do not observe.
Instead a variable, Yi,can be observed which takes the value one when y*>O and
zero otherwise. In this study, Yiis taken from the diversification data; that is Yi
equals one when a firm refocuses and zero otherwise. The logit model assumes
that the distribution of the error term is logistic. It estimates the probability that
the dependent variable will have a value of one as a function of the explanatory
variables whose coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood techniques
i.e. a positive coefficient implies the variable increases the probability of
refocusing activity.
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5.4.2 Basic Poisson Model
The count data method is applied when the data features a number of events
occurring in a given interval. The count data approach is used to model the
determinants of divestment since the observations on divestment are in the form
of repeated counts. That is, the dependent variable, divestment, is calculated as
the number of sell-offs in a given time period. Although the count data
approach has been widely used in applied econometrics (see for example,
Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984, in an application to the patents-R & 0
relationship), it has not been previously adopted to examine refocusing activity.
Thus, this approach offers a novel and improved method to modeling
divestment activity in that it makes full use of the divestment data without
having to assign ad hoc procedures or exclude missing observations, such as for
the case of a missing sales price.
The count data approach is based on the Poisson distribution which captures the
discrete and non-negative nature of count data, and allows for the non-
negligible probability of zero as a natural outcome. Inference in the model is
drawn on the probability of the event occurring and the parameter estimates are
obtained by the method of maximum-likelihood (ML). The method of ML
consists in estimating regression parameters in such a manner that the
probability of observing the given values of the dependent variable is as high (or
maximum) as possible. This involves finding the maximum of the likelihood
function by differentiation. (Details of the likelihood function are given below.)
In comparison, the usual normal probability model for which OLS is the
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maximum likelihood estimator, admits of fractional as well as negative integers,
and does not represent the true data generating process underlying non-negative
counts. Application of the normal distribution to analyse non-negative counts
will therefore produce inefficient parameter estimates and biased inference.
In this study, the number of divestments, Yi, is modeled as being generated by
the following Poisson process:
...(5.15)
where Yi = 0,1,2, ... , i = 1,2, ... ,N and ~ is the conditional mean and variance of
the Poisson distribution. The most common formulation for Ai is to assume that
it is log-linearly dependent on a set of explanatory variables, Xi, as follows:
...(5.16)
where Xi is a vector of regressors. This parameterisation ensures the non-
negativity of A. The log-likelihood function for the sample of firms can be
written as:
...(5.17)
Parameter estimates are obtained by solving the first order condition using, for
example, Newton's iterative techniques:
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8L
- =L (y. - )...)X, = 08~ I I I ...(5.18)
Global concavity of the log-likelihood function ensures rapid convergence to a
unique solution. This property follows from the negative-definiteHessian matrix
of the likelihood function:
...(5.19)
Estimates of the asymptotic variances of the ML estimates, which are needed
for hypothesis testing, are obtained from the negative inverse of the above
matrix.
5.4.3 Negative Binomial Model
One restriction of the basic Poisson model is the imposition of an equal
conditional mean and variance. In many economic applications, it is not
uncommon to find that the variance of Yi exceeds the mean, implying
'overdispersion' in the data. Overdispersion, or extra-Poisson variation, occurs
if there is unobserved heterogeneity or interdependence between events, for
instance, prior events influencing the probability of future occurrences of the
same event (see for example, Heckman and Borjas, 1980 in the context of
unemployment spells). The latter cause of overdispersion is to be suspected in
many economic phenomena. An important consequence of fitting overdispersed
data to the Poisson model, is that the estimated covariance matrix will be biased
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downwards, producing spuriously small estimated standard errors of the
parameter estimates and overstated z-statistics. The presence of overdispersion
has consequences similar to those for heteroscedasticity in the classical linear
regression model i.e. the estimated standard errors are inconsistent and
invalidate hypothesis testing.
A solution to the problem of overdispersion is to use a distribution that allows
for a less restricted variance function. Within these generalisations the negative
binomial model has been proposed as a useful alternative to the Poisson model
(e.g. Cameron & Trivedi, 1986). The negative binomial model allows for
unobserved heterogeneity in the mean function by introducing an additional
stochastic component to A.i:
...(5.20)
where Ei captures unobserved heterogeneity and is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. The model can be derived by assuming A.i to be
distributed randomly and follow a gamma distribution of the form:
...(5.21)
By choosing the particular form of gamma distribution given above, one obtains
a model which has the same conditional mean as the Poisson model but admits
of overdispersion since:
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...(5.22)
Since the mean equals the variance when Yi is Poisson distributed, the natural
basis for testing the adequacy of the Poisson model is to propose tests of the
form ce= O.
5.4.4 Count Data in a Panel Context
The above can be extended with minor modifications to the case of analysing
panel data where the observations are in the form of a count. For this case, the
fixed effects Poisson model is: In Ait = Ui + Xitf3, where Ui is a firm-specific
effect. The model is estimated by conditioning separately the count distribution
of each firm on the total sum of outcomes over the observed years. This
removes the fixed effect from the resulting distribution, which is then estimated
by maximum likelihood techniques. The random effects Poisson model is given
by: In Ait = Xitf3 + ui, where u, is a random effect for the ith group such that eui is
distributed as gamma. Thus, eui has mean 1 and variance 1/8 = u. The model
can then be derived by integrating out the random effect and estimating by
maximum likelihood the parameters (B,«) of the resulting distribution.
For the fixed effects negative binomial model: In Ait = <Xi+ Xitf3 + Eit which with
minor modifications is the estimating framework for the Poisson model with
random effects, as above. The random effects negative binomial model is: In Ait
= Xitf3 + Ui + Eit, where Eit captures unobserved heterogeneity and is
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uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. As above, u, is gamma distributed
with parameters (8i,8i), which produces the negative binomial model with a
parameter that varies across groups. Then, it is assumed that 8/(1 +8i) is
distributed as beta(C\n,bn), which layers the random effect onto the negative
binomial model. Once again, the approach is to integrate out the random effect
and estimate by maximum likelihood techniques.
5.5 Dynamic Panel Models
The final technique to be considered is dynamic models where lagged values of
the dependent variable appear as regressors in an estimating model. In the
context of this research it is reasonable to assume that past firm performance
will be a significant determinant of present performance and should be included
in a model which analyses the performance consequences of a refocusing
strategy. The inclusion of past measures of performance captures the persistent
nature of profits (see for example, Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988) and allows for
the lagged response of performance to changes in its determinants.
One of the obvious advantages of dynamic models over cross-sectional models
is that they explicitly consider the behaviour of a variable over time whereas
cross-sectional models generally analyse a static or equilibrium relationship.
This approach is plausible for many economic situations since it is reasonable to
assume that not all responses to change will be instantaneous (see for example,
Arellano and Bond, 1991 on a dynamic model of employment). A particular
advantage of using a dynamic panel model over time-series analysis is that it
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allows for an improved understanding of the dynamics of the adjustment process
and can be used where the number of time periods, T, is short.
The dynamic panel data model can be written as follows:
...(5.23)
where i = 1,2, ... ,N and t = 1,2, ...,T, Yitis the dependent variable, Yit-lis a lagged
dependent variable, A and 13 are parameter estimates, Xit is a vector of k-I
regressors and Uitis the stochastic component and assumed to follow the error
structure in the one-way error component model outlined in Section 5.3.3, such
that:
Uit= ~i +Vit ...(5.24)
where ~i is i.i.d. with zero mean, E[~i] = 0, constant variance, varlu.] = 0fJ-2, and
Vitis i.i.d. with E[Vit1= 0 and var[~it] = ov2. As in the basic panel data model, ~i,
refers to the individual specific (fixed or random) effects.
The basic problem of the introduction of a lagged dependent variable is that the
error term and the lagged dependent variable are correlated. This is because
since Yitis a function of the individual effect, ~i, and ~i is not time dependent, Yit-
I must also depend on Jli. The OLS and GLS estimates will therefore be biased
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and inconsistent even ifvit is serially uncorrelated. For this reason an alternative
estimation technique needs to be adopted.
One solution is to first difference the model to remove the individual specific
effect:
...(5.25)
where L\Yit= (Yit- Yit-l),L\Yit-l= (Yit-l- Yit-2),.1Xit= (X, - Xit-1) and L\Vit= (Vit- Vit-l).
The error term, L\Vit,is a moving average (MA) process of order one with unit roots.
The result of first-differencing is to eliminate the fixed effect, since (J.!.i- J.!.i)drops
from the equation. Although the regressor-disturbance correlation in the original
model (i.e. J.!.i)is removed, the transformed error term and L\Yit-lare now correlated
(Nickell, 1981). However, one solution is to estimate the differenced equation using
instrumental variable techniques.
A potential instrument is any variable which is highly correlated with the lagged
dependent variable and uncorrelated with the error term. A particular problem of
this technique is that such a variable may be difficult to find in practice. An obvious
candidate is to use lags beyond one of the dependent variable as instruments as these
will be uncorrelated with the differenced error in the absence of serial correlation in
the error process. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest using the second difference
of Yit (i.e. L\Yit-2= Yit-2- Yit-3)or simply Yit-2as an instrument for L\Yit-l.These
instruments are correlated to L\Yit-lbut will not be correlated to the error term as
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long as the Vit themselves are not serially correlated. This method will produce
consistent estimates of the dynamic regression equation. However, the estimators
will not necessarily be efficient since this technique does not make use of all the
available moment conditions (see for example, Ahn and Schmidt, 1995).
An extension of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) has been developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) which utilises the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure
to accommodate the inclusion of further lagged variables as instruments. Additional
instruments can be obtained by utilising the available orthogonality conditions that
exist between the lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances.
Thus the further advanced the panel, the greater the number of instruments
available. For example, if we were estimating an eight year panel from year three
through year eight, year three's estimation would use variables dated year one, year
four's would use variables dated years one and two, etc. The advantage of this
procedure is that it allows both the cross-section and time-series elements of the
data to be exploited in constructing valid instruments. The resulting estimates are
claimed to offer significant gains in efficiencywhere T is small relative to N. It is this
approach that is adopted in this study.
In order to illustrate this procedure consider the following dynamic panel model
with no regressors:
...(5.26)
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To obtain a consistent estimate of A the model is first differenced to eliminate the
individual effects:
...(5.27)
Since one period is lost due to a lag in the data and another due to first differencing,
the first period this relationship is observed will be at t = 3. Therefore, at t = 3 the
following equation is estimated:
...(5.28)
In this instance, a valid instrument for LlYit-1would be Yil since it is highly
correlated with (Yi2 - Yil) but uncorrelated with the residuals as long as the Vit are
not serially correlated. In the second period (i.e. t = 4) the estimating equation
IS:
...(5.29)
Here, both Yil and Yi2 are valid instruments, since both are correlated to (Yi3 - Yi2)
but not correlated to (Vi4 - Vi3). By adding an extra instrument with each
additional observed period, the set of valid instruments becomes (YiJ, Yi2,· .. , YiT-
2). Denoting the matrix of instruments (for each i) as Z, the orthogonality conditions
can be expressed as E[Zi'LlVitl = O.The one-step consistent estimator of A can be
obtained by pre-multiplying the differenced equation by Z':
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...(5.30)
and performing GLS. The optimal weighting matrix W is:
...(5.31)
which is unknown. However, it can be obtained via the first-step estimator by
setting W as:
...(5.32)
where G is the covariance matrix. To operationalise the optimal GMM estimator,
~ Vit is replaced by the differenced residuals obtained from the one-step estimation
procedure. The resulting estimator is the two-step Arellano and Bond (1991)
GMM estimator.
The legitimacy of this econometric approach depends critically on two features:
first, the validity of the instrument set; and second the success of the
instrumentation process in purging the estimates of second-order serial
correlation. These characteristics are examined using the Sargan statistic and a
robust test for second-order serial correlation, respectively. The Sargan test of
instrument validity is adopted to test the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the
instrument set and is calculated as follows:
...(5.33)
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where Av are the residuals from the two-step estimation and Z is the matrix of
instruments. The J-statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with (P-k-l) d.o.f,
where p refers to the number of columns of Z and k is the number of regressors. The
null is rejected if the I-statistic is greater than the critical value of the chi-squared
distribution. In this instance, an alternative set of instruments will be required.
The assumption of a lack of serial correlation in the error is essential for the
consistency of the estimates. This can be tested by utilising a robust N(O,1) test for
the presence of second order serial correlation in the error term. A test on the joint
significance of all the regressors in the model, is calculated using a Wald test as in
Section 5.3, which follows a chi-squared distribution.
As a final note on dynamic panel models, the parameter estimates would improve (at
least theoretically) if all the moment restrictions implied by the assumptions of the
model were exploited. However, there are at least two points to consider here: first,
the more moment restrictions employed the more likely the model will be
misspecified; and second, in finite samples the growth of the set of instruments is not
necessarily a good thing (see Bowden and Turkington, 1984).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, the statistical methods adopted in the study have been outlined.
Similar to previous studies, cross-sectional models are used to investigate
refocusing activity. However, the limitations of these studies influenced the
decision to supplement conventional cross-sectional models by utilising a panel
138
data approach. The adoption of panel data techniques constitutes an improved
approach to examining refocusing activity. For research purposes, the particular
advantages of using panel data models include controlling for unobserved
individual effects and overcoming the problems of causation and
multicollinearity which plague much cross-sectional work in this area. Panel
estimation also allows for the measurement of the dynamic effect of corporate
refocusing rather than having to assume that some cross-sectional variation
represents a long-run equilibrium result. The use of an unbalanced panel
removes the sample bias inherent in restricting firms to those which survived
intact until the end of the study period. Finally, the adoption of count data
techniques offers a new approach to modeling divestment activity. The results
from using these techniques will be presented in the following chapters of this
thesis.
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Notes
IThis is only one of a number of possible parameterisations of the gamma
distribution
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6. CORPORATE REFOCUSING IN THE UK
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed examination of corporate
refocusing activity in the UK over the period 1985 to 1993. In so doing, it will
answer research questions 1 and 2 from Chapter 4 of this thesis. There is a
widespread perception in the business press that over the past 15 years or so, a
number of firms have reduced their level of diversification by refocusing on the
core business. Whilst there exists limited empirical research on this phenomenon
for the US, there is a paucity of evidence on refocusing by UK firms. At the
most basic level, there is very little systematic evidence on the extent of
refocusing. Nor do we know the exact nature of refocusing and the
distinguishing characteristics of refocusing firms. This chapter will attempt to
address these issues by employing a large sample of UK quoted companies
randomly selected from the FT500 list over the period 1985 to 1993.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 examines the
extent and nature of corporate refocusing across the sample. Section 6.3
attempts to identify the characteristics of refocusing firms. Finally, a conclusion
follows in Section 6.4.
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6.2 The Extent and Nature of Corporate Refocusing
This section examines the change in diversification across the sample of firms at
the beginning and end of the study period. To date, there has been very little
systematic evidence on the extent of corporate refocusing. Part of the reason is
that it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of diversification (see Chapter 2 of
this thesis for a discussion). In this study, we have attempted to examine the
extent of refocusing by using activity data on companies, taken from
Datastream and company accounts on a yearly basis from 1985 to 1993 (see
Chapter 4 of this thesis for a discussion of the problems using this data). Two
measures of diversification are employed: first, a count of the number of
industries a firm operates in and second, the entropy index of diversification.
The entropy index is widely used in diversification studies and has been shown
to be a robust objective measure (Hoskisson et aI., 1993). Markides (1995a)
finds little difference in the results concerning refocusing measured by the
entropy index and the results using alternate measures. The entropy index
differentiates between diversification within and between major industry groups,
and takes into account the relative importance of each of the segments in total
sales. It is calculated as: DT = ~ Pi In(llPt) where Pi is the share of the ith
segment in total sales of the firm and In(llPi) is the weight for each segment i.
The diversification index is calculated for each firm by treating SIC codes at the
3-digit level as an industry segment (see Chapter 4 of this thesis for a detailed
discussion on the construction of this index). Alternative continuous measures
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of diversification were tried (e.g. the Berry-Herfindahl index) but the entropy
measure was highly correlated with these and allowed for comparisons with
other refocusing studies, especially Markides (1995a). Some previous research,
especially in the US context, has used a discrete classification scheme following
Rumult's (1974) relatedness-based categories to measure diversification.
However, the use of a continuous measure, as is adopted here, appears
preferable in a quantitative study primarily concerned with analysing changes in
diversification.
Table 6.1 reports the mean level of diversification for the sample, calculated
using the entropy index, in 1985 and 1993. Also shown is the average number
of industries in which a company operates calculated at the 2-digit SIC level.
The two measures indicate a reduction in total diversification across the sample
over the period. The entropy index of diversification declined by 8 per cent
(from 0.87 to 0.80) and the mean number of industries in which companies
operated declined by 11 per cent (from 3.39 to 3.02). Only the second measure
of diversification reported a weakly significant decline in diversification over the
study period (I = 1.1757 and 1= 1.8416 respectively).
Table 6.1 Level of Diversification, 1985 and 1993 - Unbalanced Sample
1985 1993 Difference z-statistic
Diversification level 0.8717 0.7998 0.0719 1.1757
Number of industries 3.39 3.02 0.37 1.8416-
n= 143 n= 125
Notes: * = p<O.lO
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The reported reduction in diversification across the sample period is not merely
a reflection of the exit of diversified firms from the sample due to takeovers.
When the sample is restricted to firms that survive intact over the period 1985
to 1993 there is still a reduction in diversification over the period (see Table
6.2). For the 121 firms that remained intact over the period, the entropy index
of diversification fell by 10 per cent (from 0.91 to 0.82) and the mean number of
industries operated in fell by 14 per cent (from 3.54 to 3.04). Once again, only
the latter measure reports a significant reduction in diversification over the
period.
Table 6.2 Level of Diversification, 1985 and 1993 - Balanced Sample
1985 1993 Difference z-statistic
Diversification level 0.9127 0.8153 0.0974 1.5140
Number of industries 3.54 3.04 0.5 2.304··
n = 121 N= 121
Notes: ** = p<O.05
The literature in Chapter 3 of this thesis implies the existence of a curvilinear
relationship between diversification and performance. This suggests that firms
can diversify profitability up to their optimum level of diversification but their
profitability and market value will suffer if they go beyond this optimum. If we
examine diversification in a dynamic way, then we would expect to find profit-
maximising firms below their optimal level of diversification increasing their
diversification and overdiversified firms reducing their diversification i.e.
refocusing. The following examines the distribution of changes in diversification
over the study period.
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Table 6.3 shows the distribution of changes in diversification over the period
1985 to 1993 for the whole sample. According to this measure, 79 companies
reduced their level of diversification while 79 increased it (includes 17 with no
change). A firm was classified as reducing its diversification level if its entropy
measure of diversification declined over the period 1985 to 1993.
Approximately 50 percent of firms in the sample reduced their level of
diversification between 1985 and 1993. This percentage easily dominates those
which diversified further in the period (i.e. 39 percent). The two groups appear
to have changed their level of diversification by similar degrees. For example, 66
per cent of refocusers decreased their level of diversification by less than 0.5.
The corresponding number for diversifiers is 68 per cent (after excluding those
who reported no change in diversification level). A similar result emerges when
diversification is measured using the number of 2-digit SICs that firms are
operating in. As shown in Table 6.4, 63 companies decreased their
diversification, 40 increased it, and 55 experienced no change.
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Table 6.3 Distribution of Changes in Diversification, 1985 to 1993
DT93-DT85 Number of firms
-1.00 - -00 3
-0.9 - -0.99 1
-0.8 - -0.89 2
-0.7 - -0.79 2
-0.6 - -0.69 3
-0.5 - -0.59 9
-0.4 - -0.49 7
-0.3 - -0.39 10
-0.2 - -0.29 11
-0.1 - -0.19 11
-0.00 - -0.09 20
Total refocused 79
0-0.091 33
0.1 - 0.19 12
0.2 - 0.29 6
0.3 - 0.39 8
0.4 - 0.49 4
0.5 - 0.59 4
0.6 - 0.69 4
0.7 -0.79 2
0.8 - 0.89 3
0.9 - 0.99 1
1.0 - +00 2
Total diversified 79
Total number of firms 158
1Includes 17 no change
Table 6.4 Distribution of Changes in SIC, 1985 to 1993
SIC93-SIC85 Number of firms
-8 1
-5 : -7 0
-4 2
-3 10
-2 16
-1 34
0 55
1 19
2 18
3 3
4 0
Total 158
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This data suggests strictly limited support for the popular view that the 1980s
and beyond is a period characterised by intensive corporate refocusing.
Individual firms may be refocusing but this is counterbalanced by diversifying
firms, and on average, there is a small and weakly significant reduction in
overall diversification for our sample. This finding can also be examined by
calculating the concentration ratio for each firm in the sample in 1985 and 1993.
If most firms are refocusing then we would might aggregate concentration
ratios to increase. Concentration is calculated using the Herflndahl index, which
is the sum of the squared market shares in an industry:
where Si is the market share of the ith finn measured as the sales of the ith finn
divided by total sales. H takes values between zero and one. The closer H is to one,
the more concentrated is the industry (see Chapter 4 of this thesis for a description
of the construction of this variable). The mean level of concentration in 1985 for
our sample of firms was 0.35. This fell to 0.31 by 1993 (t = 1.772). Thus, it
would appear that corporate refocusing had little effect on overall concentration
across industries in our sample. If anything, aggregate concentration fell over
the period.
The distribution of changes in diversification indicates that some firms reduced
their diversification level substantially over the period whilst others increased
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theirs. To examine within-sample changes, we separated firms into those that
refocused and those that moved towards increasing levels of diversification,
using the classification scheme detailed in Section 4.4.1, Chapter 4 of this thesis.
A firm was classified as refocused in one of three ways: first, firms were
classified as refocused if their entropy index of diversification (DT) fell by more
than -0.05 between the years 1985 and 1993 (denoted classification A). Second,
each firm's DT was calculated for the years 1985, 1989 and 1993. Following
Markides (1992b), firms whose DT decreased by more than -0.05 over the
period and whose DT(93-89) was smaller than +0.05 were classified as
refocused. In addition, firms whose DT(89-85) was between -0.05 and +0.05,
and whose DT(93-89) decreased by more than -0.08 were also classified as
refocused. This ensures that any inconsistent refocusers are not included in the
sample (B). Finally, firms were classified as refocused if their DT reduced in the
period 1989 to 1993 and DT( 1993-1985) fell over the period. This captures
firms who refocused in the latter part of the study period (C).
Table 6.5 presents the mean values of diversification in 1985 and 1993 for
refocusing and diversifying firms, according to the different classifications. Also
reported is the mean change in diversification and the corresponding t-statistic.
The t-value tests the hypothesis that there is no significant change in
diversification for each group. As shown in Table 6.5, there is substantial
divergence within the sample as some firms move towards increasing levels of
diversification and others apparently refocus.
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Table 6.5 Level of Diversification for Refocusers and Diversifiers, 1985 and
1993
1985 1993 Change t-value_(nl
Refocusers (A) 1.11 0.73 -0.38 4.821··· (70)
Diversifiers (A) 0.68 0.86 0.18 2.169" (88)
Refocusers (B) 1.11 0.67 -0.44 4.915"'(48)
Diversifiers (B) 0.77 0.86 0.09 1.223 (110)
Refocusers (C) 1.07 0.69 -0.38 4.795··· (63)
Diversifiers (C) 0.74 0.88 0.14 l.745* (95)
Notes: *=p<O.l; **=p<O.05; ***=p<O.Ol
There is a significant change in diversification for both groups regardless of the
classification scheme adopted. Among the 70 firms which reduced their level of
diversification according to classification (A), the mean entropy measure fell by
approximately 0.38 to 0.73. Similarly, the other refocusing classifications (B)
and (C) reported a fall in mean entropy value by 0.44 and 0.38 respectively.
These results indicate that some firms experienced a substantial reduction in the
scope of their activities. However, also reported in Table 6.5 is the mean change
in diversification for firms who moved towards increasing levels of
diversification. From the table, the majority of firms either increased or left
unchanged their levels of diversification. The change in diversification ranged
from an increase of between 0.09 and 0.18, depending on what classification
was adopted.
It is widely believed that the nature of refocusing activity is the divestment of
unrelated assets and the acquisition of activities related to the core business.
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The result is that firms will be operating In fewer but related businesses.
Markides (1995a) finds evidence to support this proposition using a sample of
100 US firms over the period 1981 to 1987. To assess whether this is the case
for the UK, all divestments and acquisitions were identified over the period for
the full sample of 158 companies. This data set was compiled from
'Acquisitions Monthly', 'The Financial Times' and the CMBOR database at the
University of Nottingham for the years 1985 through to 1993. Overall, there
were 4,600 transactions, made up of 2,001 divestments and 2,599 acquisitions.
This represents, on average, 13 divestments and 16 acquisitions per firm.
Once the list was compiled, activities where classified as related if there was a
match between the divested or acquired activity, and the core business at the 2-
digit level and unrelated otherwise. The unrelated activities were then assessed
to see if they had anything in common with the core, for example if they shared
the same distribution requirements, etc. If a relationship existed, the transaction
was reclassified as related. The results are shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.6 Methods of Refocusing
Divestments Acquisitions
Related 841 1,550
Unrelated 1,160 1,049
Total 2,001 2,599
Refocusing ratio = unrelated divestments + related acquisitions = 1.43
related divestments + unrelated acquisitions
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From a total of 2,001 divestments, the majority of divestments (58 per cent)
were unrelated to the core business and 60 percent of acquisitions were related
to the core business. Given that refocusing is perceived to be a widespread
problem, these figures do not appear particularly high. Markides found a similar
figure (60 per cent) of unrelated divestments for his sample of 100 firms over
the period 1981 to 1987. Following, Markides (1995a) the 'refocusing ratio' is
defined as the number of unrelated divestments plus related acquisitions, divided
by the number of related divestments plus unrelated acquisitions. For the whole
sample this equals l.43 which indicates that firms are refocusing by the logic
described above. (This is a similar result to that reported by Markides 1995a,
who calculated a value of 1.38 in his study on US firms over the period 1981 to
1987.) The results also reinforce existing evidence that divestment and
acquisition activity is often conducted simultaneously as part of an unbundling
or corporate restructuring process (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).
In summary, a closer examination of diversification levels, has shown that
refocusing is a real phenomenon and not merely an invention of the business
press. However, its extent must not be overstated. Even though a substantial
number of firms reduced their level of diversification (approximately 50 per cent
of the sample) over 1985 to 1993, a large number of firms continued to
diversify (39 per cent) or experienced no change (11 per cent). The net effect of
some firms refocusing and some diversifying was a relatively small change in
average diversification and concentration over the period in question. The
average firm was still involved in 3.02 2-digit SIC industries at the end of the
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period, down from 3.39 in 1985. With regards to concentration levels, the
experience in the UK appears to be similar to that in the US (e.g. Hatfield et al.,
1996; Liebeskind et al., 1996). The conjecture that refocusing will lead to
higher concentration levels has not materialised in practice.
Using the classification scheme outlined in section 4.4.1, at most 44 percent of
the sample firms refocused (using classification scheme (A) and at least 30
percent (i.e. just under a third of the sample) refocused following Markides'
(1995b) classification scheme (B). (Markides, 1995b reports a result of 42
percent for US firms that refocused over the period 1981-1987.) Therefore it is
possible to conclude that corporate refocusing is not a myth but has been
undertaken by a substantial minority of UK firms over the period 1985 to 1993.
Thus whilst it is not widespread in the sense that not all firms are refocusing,
there is evidence to suggest that it is an important phenomenon as exemplified
in the business press.
Firms refocused primarily by divesting unrelated businesses and acqumng
related ones. For our sample, the total number of acquisitions dominated
divestments by 2,599 to 2,001 over the period 1985 to 1993. Of these 60
percent of acquisitions were related to the firm's core business, whilst 58
percent of divestments were unrelated to it.
152
6.3 The Characteristics of Refocusing Firms
Whilst Section 6.2 examined the extent and nature of corporate refocusing, it is
still unclear what the distinctive characteristics of refocusing firms in the UK
are. Table 6.6 reports the mean levels of some of the study variables for the
refocusing and diversifying firms, in 1985 and 1993 following the classification
scheme (B) (a similar pattern of results emerges for the remaining refocusing
classifications).
Table 6.7 Refocusers versus Diversifiers, 1985 and 1993
1985
Variable Refocusers Diversifiers t-test
Industry-adjusted ROCE -0.12 1.26 0.995
Tobin's q 1.25 1.52 1.470
Diversification 1.11 0.77 ···4.026
Assets 836,136 725,269 0.323
Concentration 0.41 0.32 ··2.430
Market share 0.31 0.20 ·1.681
Size of core business 0.65 0.76 ···2.7866
1993
Refocusers Diversifiers t-test
Industry-adjusted ROCE 2.56 0.10 1.342
Tobin's q 1.64 1.50 0.869
Diversification 0.67 0.86 ··2.007
Assets 1,885,388 2,082,529 0.242
Concentration 0.34 0.29 1.260
Market share 0.26 0.21 1.106
Size of core business 0.77 0.71 1.334
n=66 n=84
Notes: *=p<O.I; **=p<O.05; ***=p<O.OI
153
As can be seen in the table, the refocusing firms are those whose mean level of
diversification and firm size (calculated using the book value of total assets) are
highest at the beginning of the period (a t-test for the difference between the
means for refocusing and diversifying firms is significant only for the former of
these two variables). As might be expected, these firms also suffer, on average,
from lower relative performance as indicated by industry-adjusted accounting
performance measure ROCE and market measure, Tobin's q (however, neither
report a significant t-statistic). It would appear that it is the larger, more
diversified and less profitable firms in the sample who undertook most of the
refocusing in the study period, and as such, are exactly those firms who have the
most to gain from refocusing.
The refocusing firms also have, on average, higher concentration and market
share figures in their primary industry at the beginning of the period (both report
a significant difference for refocusing and diversifying firms). This provides
some evidence in support of the argument that firms will refocus if their core
market is attractive, as indicated by high market share and concentration
measures (Markides, 1992b). Refocusing firms are also characterised by a
smaller core business, suggesting that they are able to exploit growth prospects
in their core business. The table also shows initial evidence that refocusing has a
positive impact on firm performance. The average level of profitability for
refocusing firms increases over the period and in 1993 it exceeds the level for
diversifying firms. This relationship will be examined in detail in Chapter 9 of
this thesis when we estimate the performance consequences of divestment.
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Also reported is the mean value of these variables at the end of the period. At
the start of the period, diversifying firms' mean level of diversification was
lower than that of refocusing firms and their relative performance was higher.
These results imply that profitability drives diversification. It is exactly these
more profitable firms that decided to diversify further over the period and by
1993 they were the most diversified. However, their performance fell over the
period, whilst refocusing firms' mean performance increased and outweighed
diversifying firms at the end of the period.
Whilst the above summary statistics provide some indication of the differences
between refocusing and diversifying firms, the approach is supplemented by
cross-sectional OLS and logit models to examine more precisely the
characteristics of refocusing firms. The analysis was performed on those firms
who survived as a public corporation over the study period, 1985 to 1993 (i.e.
121 companies). After the omission of7 firms due to incomplete data coverage,
the final sample size is 114 firms.
The literature review in Chapter 3 of this thesis provided a comprehensive
examination of the likely characteristics of refocusing firms. If, as is widely
argued (e.g. Williamson, 1967; Penrose, 1957), there exists an optimal limit to
which a firm can diversify without adversely affecting its performance, then
profit-maximising firms who find themselves in breach of this optimum will
attempt to reduce the scope of their activities in an attempt to improve
performance. This line of reasoning implies that refocusing firms will be
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characterised by high levels of diversification and poor performance relative to
their industry counterparts. Reasoning from the strategic literature also suggests
that larger firms are more likely to have breached some Penrose (1959) type
constraint on expansion and are more likely to refocus.
Another characteristic that may influence the firm's decision to change the
scope of its activities is their level of debt. Jensen (1986, 1989) and others have
argued that debt constrains managers' capacities to allocate free cash flow to
unprofitable diversification. The incentive effects associated with highly
leveraged firms foster better asset utilisation, not least because it forces the
company to sell divisions to repay its debt (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) and
reduce this constraint on managerial discretion. It is therefore expected that
refocusing firms will be characterised by a high level of debt.
If corporate refocusing is a reversal of pnor managerial empire-building
stimulated by a slack market for corporate control (Jensen, 1986), then we
would expect refocusing firms to be characterised by low levels of management
equity ownership. It will be the managers of these firms that have been able to
indulge managerial preferences in the past. Preliminary evidence of this is given
in Table 6.8 which shows that firms with a lower level of managerial ownership
are more diversified (measured alternatively as the number of SIC industries a
firm operates in and as the entropy index of diversification) than managers of
firms with high levels of ownership. However, this does not necessarily imply
that managers of firms with low levels of insider ownership will respond quickly
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in the event of a dis-equilibrium level of diversification. On the contrary, we
may expect firms with high levels of insider ownership to be more responsive
and divestment to be more likely under conditions of reduced managerial
discretion (this relationship will be examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis).
Table 6.8 Mean Levels of Diversification by Equity Ownership of Managers
Insider Ownership SIC Entropy Index N
<1% 3.67 1.006 71
1-10% 3.58 0.775 28
>10% 3.20 0.698 15
Total 114
We would not expect a firm to refocus on its core business if that business was
stagnating or unprofitable. High values of concentration and market share in a
firm's core market and the size of the core business, simultaneously raise its
profitability whilst reducing the potential for core expansion. These are precisely
the conditions which may drive diversification into new activities and may be
expected to discourage managers from undertaking a programme of refocusing.
However, Markides (1995a) argues conversely that core market conditions such as
concentration, market share and a large core business determine the attraction of a
refocusing strategy. Thus the higher the attractiveness of the core industry the
higher the likelihood that a finn will refocus. Which of these two effects will
dominate cannot be determined ex ante, so the relationship between refocusing and
market structural characteristics is ambiguous.
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Finally, it is also suggested in the literature that corporate reorganisation may be
associated with the introduction of a new management team. For example,
Gabarro (1985) argues that a radical change in the strategy of the firm is usually
undertaken when a new management team arrives: either because they have a
weaker emotional commitment to the old activities or because the changes
indicate deeper shareholder dissatisfaction (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987;
Markides 1995a).
Given the discussion above on the factors that influence the decision to refocus,
our model is specified as:
Refocus = a. + P1PERF; + P2DIVERSE; + P3SIZE + P~EV; + PsINSIDE
+ P6MS;+ p,CON; + P8CORE; + P9NEWMD; + E; ... (1)
Where i subscripts denote firms, BI is an (i.i.d) error term, (PERF) is
performance, (DIVERSE) is firm diversification, (SIZE) is firm size, (LEV) is
leverage, (INSIDE) is insider ownership, (MS) is market share, (CON) is
concentration, (CORE) is size of the core business and (NEWMD) is a change
in management. The definitions and methods of construction of the variables are
given in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The predicted signs of the explanatory
variables are given in Table 6.9.
Since the phenomenon to be explained is corporate refocusing, the dependent
variable is alternatively calculated as a change in diversification and as a
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dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm reduced its level of diversification
and zero otherwise. Two measures of diversification are adopted: first, the
entropy index of diversification and second, the number of industries in which a
firm operates (full details are given in Chapter 4 of this thesis). The change in
diversification is calculated as the level of diversification in 1993 minus the level
of diversification in 1985. Using the entropy index, 63 firms reduced their
diversification and 51 increased or showed no change. When diversification was
measured by the number of industries, 54 firms reduced and 60 firms increased
or experienced no change.
In the first model, equation (1) is estimated using OLS techniques. In the
second case, given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, equation (1) is
estimated as a logit model. OLS estimation would be inefficient in this case
since it can give estimates which imply predictions outside its possible range
(i.e. higher than one and lower than zero) and it assumes normally distributed
errors. The logit model assumes that the distribution of the error term is logistic.
It estimates the probability that the dependent variable will have a value of one
as a function of the explanatory variables whose coefficients are estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques i.e. a positive coefficient implies the variable
increases the probability of refocusing activity.
In both instances, the independent variables are calculated in 1984 thereby
avoiding any spurious correlations. Both methods are adopted to test the
sensitivity of the results to the specification of the dependent variable.
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The regression results from estimating equation (1) are given in Table 6.10.
Columns (la) and (lb) report the results when the dependent variable is
measured as a change in diversification using the entropy index and the number
of industries in which a firm operates, respectively. The results from the logit
model when the reduction in the entropy index and the number of industries is
represented by a dichotomous variable are given in columns (2a) and (2b)
respectively.
In a number of cases, alternative versions of the independent variables were
generated: firm size was alternatively measured as the logarithms of total
employees, total assets and total sales; leverage as the debt-to-assets and debt-to-
equity ratios and; firm and industry-adjusted accounting performance as return on
capital employed (ROCE), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and
trading profit margin (TPM). In each case the alternatives were highly correlated.
The reported results in Table 6.10 use industry-adjusted ROCE as the firm-specific
performance measure, debt-to-assets as the leverage variable and log of the number
of employees as the firm size indicator. The alternative measures yielded very similar
estimates.
The regression diagnostics in Table 6.10 reveal that the overall significance of
the models is satisfactory. The results show some consistency across
specifications and are in accord with some of our prior expectations. In both
models, the start of period level of diversification has a significant coefficient. In
the OLS model, a change in diversification is negatively related to its start of
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period value. This result suggests that highly diversified firms are more likely to
reduce their diversification level over the subsequent period. In the logit model,
a positive coefficient implies that diversification increases the probability of
refocusing activity. These results are consistent with strategy-type arguments
that the more diversified firms have the most to gain from refocusing. The
coefficient on firm size is insignificant across all specifications.
The coefficient on Management equity interests is negative and significant in the
logit model and positive in the OLS model. This suggests that firms with low
levels of equity ownership are more likely to refocus over the subsequent
period. This result is robust to the choice of the diversification measure.
Core industry characteristics produced mixed effects. Core concentration was
insignificant across all specifications. The size of the core business and market
share both carried a negative coefficient in the logit model and a positive
coefficient in the OLS model. Only size of core showed any level of
significance. This implies that firms are more likely to refocus if their core is a
small proportion of industry sales. This result suggests that refocusing firms are
able to exploit growth prospects in the core business. In contrast, Markides
(1995a) found that US firms are more likely to refocus the higher the
attractiveness of the core business as measured by core size, concentration and
advertising intensity.
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In both specifications, firm performance failed to attract a significant coefficient.
It had been conjectured that refocusing firms would be characterised by poor
performance relative to their industry counterparts. However, no alternative
measure of performance approached any level of significance. Dropping the
market structural variables, equivalent to employing a reduced-form version in
which market structural effects work through performance alone, did nothing to
change these results. Similarly, firm leverage and a change in management failed
to provide any significant estimates. The regressions were additionally estimated
using changes in the independent variables prior to the study period but again
this had little affect on the results.
Before rejecting the existence of a link between refocusing and performance in the
UK context we are mindful of one particular caveat: the estimation approach in this
section uses a cross sectional design in which the explanatory variables are measured
prior to the start of the period of investigation to avoid problems of simultaneity
bias. It is possible that the implied lag between the variables' measurement and the
subsequent period of refocusing was simply too long - i.e. adjustment may occur
quite rapidly - and averaging the effects across a nine year time interval may
introduce unnecessary contamination. Panel techniques were not adopted since we
were examining the existence of refocusing activity by firms over the period 1985 to
1993. A finn's level of diversification can fluctuate upwards or downwards on a
yearly basis without implying that a finn was necessarily refocusing over the period.
Thus, examining changes on a yearly basis would have included inconsistent
refocusers in the sample.
162
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
Using firm level activity data, we calculated that approximately 50 percent of
our sample firms reduced their level of diversification over the period 1985 to
1993 and the remaining 50 percent either reduced or had no change to their
diversification level (calculated using the entropy index of diversification). The
net result, across the sample as a whole, was a small and insignificant reduction
in the level of diversification. This reduction in diversification did not materialise
as an increase in aggregate concentration across industries in our sample.
Within-sample changes indicate that some firms reduced their level of
diversification substantially over the period whilst others increased theirs. These
changes were found to be significant for refocusing and diversifying firms.
Using the classification scheme outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, at most 44
per cent (classification scheme (A)) and at least 30 per cent (classification
scheme (B)) of the sample refocused. Thus, we can conclude that corporate
refocusing was an important phenomenon over the period in question and not
just an invention of the business press. Over the period 1985 to 1993 a
substantial minority offirms in our sample refocused.
Using summary statistics it was shown that refocusing firms were more
diversified, larger, lower performers and had a more attractive core business at
the start of the period than firms who diversified further. Controlling for other
factors, the results from cross-sectional regressions using OLS and logit
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techniques show that refocusing firms are characterised by high diversification,
low insider ownership and, to an extent, by an attractive core on which to
refocus. Rather surprising, in view of the US evidence (Markides, 1995a), UK
refocusing firms were not characterised by low levels of performance. However,
this result should be treated with caution since it is possible that the cross-
sectional design influenced this outcome by requiring performance to be
measured too far ahead before the actual refocusing programme begun.
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Table 6.9 Predicted Coefficient Signs of Explanatory Variables
Variable Predicted Sign
Performance
Diversification
Firm size
Leverage
Management equity
Market share
Concentration
Size of core business
Management change
+
+
+
?
?
?
+
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Table 6.10 Dependent Variable equals (1) the Change in Diversification and (2)
the Probability of Refocusing
(la) (lb) (2a) (2b)
Constant -0.210 0.462 -0.674 -l.259
(0.460) (0.242) (0.862) (0.455)
Firm performance 0.008 -0.009 0.003 0.059
(0.125) (0.339) (0.166) (1.349)
Diversification level -0.284 -0.355 0.261 0.342
···(3.667) ··(1.965) *(1.756) *(1.854)
Firm size
-0.023 -0.002 0.091 0.022
(0.540) (0.313) (0.355) (1.510)
Firm leverage 0.029 0.311 0.025 0.599
(0.694) 0.018) (0.091) (0.933)
Management equity 0.819 0.734 -0.681 -0.627
• • (2.200)
·0.785) **(2.115) ··(1.988)
Concentration
-0.398 -0.319 0.538 0.440
(0.845) (1.046) (0.198) (0.966)
Market share 0.060 0.010 -0.294 -0.198
(1.559) (0.620) (1.188) (0.410)
Core size 0.339 l.719 -1.340 -1.993
···(2.885) ···(3.506) ·(1.708) ··(2.509)
Change in management
-0.087 -0.461 0.106 0.196
(0.875) 0·106) (0.177) (0.328)
X2 · · ·31.33 ·· ·30.22
F-test · · ·5.00 ·· ·3.91
R2 0.21 0.20
Notes: n = 114; r-statistics appear in parentheses: • = p<0.1, • •= p< 0.05, • • •= p < 0.01.
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7. THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DIVESTMENT FOR
UK FIRMS: CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the determinants of corporate divestment
by UK firms over the period 1985-89, a period chosen to pre-date any recession-
induced changes of the early 1990s (see Geroski and Gregg, 1997). This chapter
begins from the position adopted by recent American researchers (e.g. Hoskisson
and Turk, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 1994 and Markides, 1995a) that widespread
voluntary divestment is consistent with some exogenous environmental change
which lowers the optimal level of diversification across the population of large firms.
However, it is suggested here that existing attempts to explain intra-sample
variations in the extent of divestment are methodologically unsatisfactory insofar as
they typically employ the same hypotheses which have been used to explain prior
levels of diversification to analyse subsequent changes in the same variable, or some
proxy for it. For example, following in particular Mueller (1969) and Jensen (1986),
it is widely considered that non-equity holding managers will have a preference for
diversified expansion which may be realised in an environment of strong cash flow
and weak corporate governance. In an apparent extension of this argument,
researchers exploring divestment typically hypothesise that corporate governance
variables, intended to capture shareholder power with respect to managers, should
decrease diversification and hence increase divestment. However, in the absence of
any changes in these variables - and characteristics such as board composition and
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managerial shareholdings tend to be stable in the medium term - the same factors
presumably have already acted to depress levels of diversification before any
exogenous shock. Therefore it is unclear why such shareholder dominated firms
should display higher rates of divestment than, say, firms whose managers enjoy
greater discretion but which have had the corresponding opportunity to diversify
more widely.
This chapter treats divestment as an adjustment process through which the finn
attains its optimal level of diversification. It allows that one or more of several
factors may induce an initial downward shift in the optimal level of diversification.
However, since divestment involves the transfer of real productive assets across
markets where the number of potential buyers is typically small it is likely to involve
transaction and dislocation costs, which are themselves influenced by the pace of the
adjustment process. Therefore it appears unlikely that firms will make a full
instantaneous response to any shock. Instead it is hypothesised that there exists
some form of partial adjustment mechanism. This implies that the observed
divestment across some interval following the shock depends upon two factors:
first, the impact of the shock itself on the optimal level of diversification; and
second, the speed of adjustment which determines the extent of any potential change
which is achieved over the observed interval. It is hypothesised that the potential
change is largely determined by strategic factors within the finn whilst the speed of
adjustment depends critically upon those performance and corporate governance
characteristics which determine the firm's degree of insulation from capital market
pressures.
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The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.2 provides
the background to the model estimated later in the chapter. Section 7.3 outlines
the data set used for the empirical part of the analysis. Section 7.4 presents the
empirical model to be tested and discusses the a priori expectations of the
results. Section 7.5 shows the results for the proportion of assets divested and
for the number of divestments. Finally Section 7.6 gives some conclusions of the
analysis.
7.2 Theoretical Considerations
7.2.1 The Causes and Timing of Divestments
It has been widely established in a US context [e.g. Bhagat et al., (1990), Hoskisson
and Turk, (1990), Shleifer and Vishny, (1991), Markides, (1995a,b), and Denis et
al., (1997)] and conjectured in a UK one, that corporate refocusing, via voluntary
divestment, has become a commonplace strategy since the early 1980s. An
explanation for the existence, timing and extent of such a phenomenon requires an
examination of two propositions: first, that each finn possesses an optimal level of
diversification; and second, that substantial numbers of firms found themselves to
have breached this optimum, during the period in question, with the corresponding
need to reduce the spread of their activities. These propositions are examined in tum
(see Chapter 3 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion):
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First, in an environment of non-zero transaction costs, multi-output firms may be
considered to exist to economise on the costs of using markets. Williamson (1975)
described the benefits of bringing vertically related activities under common
ownership. More recently, transaction cost economics (Teece, 1982) and the
resource-based theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Ingham and
Thompson, 1995) have emphasised the gains that may accrue when a firm diversifies
to exploit under-utilised, imperfectly imitable specific assets. However, expansion
brings with it organisational costs. Informational transfers across hierarchical levels
generate control loss problems that limit the viable height of organisational
hierarchies, while intra-firm transactions may inhibit hierarchical decomposition. In
general, increasing firm size will require decentralisation of decision-making, as
exemplified in the M-form described by Williamson (1975). Furthermore, as Penrose
(1959) demonstrated, the very indivisibilities in factor supply which generate the
potential for economies of scope also constrain internal expansion. Surplus
capacities are unlikely to be uniform across firm-specific assets and bottlenecks will
occur, particularly in the availability of managerial resources, causing organisational
costs to rise with further expansion.
The foregoing discussion suggests that diversification brings performance benefits to
the firm and hence value gains to its owners, but that such benefits are subject to
decreasing returns as organisational costs rise. That is ceteris paribus the value of
the firm (V) is a concave function of the level of diversification (0). However,
agency theory suggests that senior managers may derive direct benefits from
diversification in at least two ways: first, because it will reduce the variability of a
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finn's earnings thus lowering the risk attaching to the managers' firm-specific human
capital [Amihud and Lev (1981)]; and second, because, following Mueller (1969)
and Jensen (1986), it has been seen as a means of facilitating growth in firms whose
core activities have a strictly limited potential for expansion. Jensen (1986), for
example, argues that firms in mature but profitable industries, which generate cash
flows in excess of those needed for reinvestment, will systematically over-diversify.
Thus it appears reasonable to expect that both V and D enter the managerial utility
function.
At least three inter-related arguments' have been advanced in the literature to
explain downward displacement in optimal diversification levels since the early
1980s: First, Jensen (1986, 1989) and others have argued that capital market
innovations - particularly including debt-financed takeovers, the use of hostile bid
advisers, the emergence of venture capitalists to finance management buyouts etc. -
have increased the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. This in turn, it
is suggested, has not merely reduced the ability of managers to divert free cash flow
to preferred - but unprofitable - diversifications, but encouraged them to divest and
disinvest in loss-making activities.
Second, a combination of capital market innovations and the lowering of transaction
costs may have reduced the comparative advantage of the multidivisional form of
organisation. It has been argued by Bhide (1990) and others that external capital
market evolution has attenuated the informational advantage of the M-form's
internal capital market, as described by Williamson (1975). In addition, the growth
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of the contracting out of supply and support functions within the private sector
attests to the fall in transaction costs. Survey evidence [e.g. Geroski and Gregg
(1997)] confirms the reduced popularity of the M-form among large UK firms.
Arguments such as these point to a backward shift in the value-diversification
function.
Third, there is growing evidence that the capital market itself came to take a more
negative view of diversified firms during the 1980s. It appears that an optimistic
stance with respect to conglomerate mergers in the 1960s and 1970s [Morek et al.,
(1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1991)] gave way to a more pessimistic viewpoint as
the evidence accumulated [Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)], leading to a preference
for more narrowly focused firms in the 1980s [Wemerfelt and Montgomery
(1988il Markides (l995a,b) notes that even managers motivated purely by
shareholder value considerations could find themselves with an over-diversified firm
in these circumstances.
7.2.2 Divestment as a Process of Adjustment
Assume that the managers of firm t are operating with an equilibrium level of
diversification when some exogenous change occurs in the firm's environment which
causes a shift in desired diversification from D, to n-, Since this analysis is primarily
concerned with corporate divestment as an adjustment to such a change we remain
agnostic, for the moment, about its proximate cause. However, following on from
the previous discussion this could involve either an increase in the effectiveness of
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the capital market as a disciplinary device or a downward revision by the capital
market in the assessment of the benefits of multi-output operations, or some
combination of these. Managers may be expected to respond to their new
circumstances by divesting activities. However, the literature on divestment
indicates that this typically occurs only with some considerable delay'. This is
scarcely surprising. Locating and negociating with potential buyers for specific
corporate assets may be problematic, whilst rapid change may imply high
organizational costs, not least for the managers themselves". This suggests that the
observed divestment over the succeeding interval will depend upon two effects: first,
the speed with which managers have to respond to capital market discipline; and
second the extent to which the new optimal level of diversification diverges from the
previous equilibrium. For representational purposes this may be written:
....(1)
where Anit is the observed period divestment, ~ is a firm-specific lagged
adjustment operator and (Oit-} - D*it) is the divergence between the desired and
(start of period) actual levels of diversification.
It is conjectured that ~ will be negatively related to the firm's insulation from capital
market pressures. Thus, for example, corporate governance characteristics and
factors determining the managers' security from takeover threat will influence
adjustment and hence divestment in the event of a disequilibrium level of
diversification. Given the capital market changes described above and the findings of
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the empirical literature in the US (see Markides, 1995a, b; Bergh, 1997; etc.) it is
assumed that the extent of any such divergence between desired and actual
diversification will be primarily determined by the strategic and market
characteristics of the firm (size, market structure etc.).
It was considered that identification problems and issues of endogeneity with firm-
level variables made it infeasible to specify and estimate a satisfactory structural
model of the divestment process. Instead we adopted the approach of estimating a
reduced form equation in which divestment across the interval was examined using
prior values of the governance and strategic variables. The resulting estimating
model is as follows:
3
Divestment, = no + Cl1Performancei + Cl2Leveragei + L Cl2+jCorporate
j=1
Governance Variablesj + <l6Diversificationi + Cl7Sizei+ ClsManagement Change,
+ Cl9Acquisitioni + ClloMarket Share, + Cll1Concentrationi + Ei ... (2)
where the explanatory variables are as follows:
Performance has been widely shown to be negatively related to the
contemporaneous probability of being taken over and hence would appear to
convey partial insulation from the capital market's discipline (see Palepu, 1985 for a
discussion).
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Leverage, following Jensen (1986), may be considered to reduce managerial
discretion insofar as it precommits cash flows to meet debt servicing obligations.
Ceteris paribus, higher levels of leverage were expected to increase the pressure on
sluggish managers to reduce diversification, not least because divestments can be
used to payoff debt.
Corporate Governance arrangements function so as to make managers more
responsive to the interests of the shareholders. Therefore the more effective the
institutions of governance in place the faster should be the speed of adjustment.
Here a vector of widely recognised corporate governance variables is employed
including: management equity ownership, board composition and the existence or
otherwise of an identifiable (large) blockholder [e.g, Gibbs (1993), Johnson et al.
(1993)].
The second source of variation in observed divestment across the sample is assumed
to arise from the deviation of each firm's actual and optimal levels of diversification.
This, it is conjectured, depends principally on strategies deployed prior to whatever
exogenous shock has now occurred. Thus initial size and diversification were
expected ceteris paribus to increase the distance between the actual and desired
levels and have a positive effect on divestment. Size is included both as a proxy for
organizational costs, and hence as an indication of the potential for "downsizing" in
a period of falling transactions costs, and also as a necessary control regressor in the
count data estimations since the number of potential disposals will be a function of
sizes.
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Core product market characteristics have often been considered to drive
diversification into new activities. Thus high values of concentration and market
share in a firm's core market simultaneously raise its profitability whilst reducing the
potential for core expansion. These are precisely the conditions under which size-
motivated managers might be expected to pursue diversifying expansions.
Therefore, by extension, these conditions might be expected to discourage such
managers from divestment even where capital market sentiment favoured more
tightly focused firms. However, Markides (1995a) argues conversely that core
market conditions such as concentration and market share determine the attraction
of a refocusing strategy and hence impact positively on divestment. Which of these
two effects will dominate cannot be determined ex ante, so the relationship between
the extent of divestment and market structural characteristics is ambiguous.
Empirical evidence in the US (e.g. Chatterjee and Wemerfelt, 1991; Chang, 1996)
largely confirms the importance of these factors. Of course, the same variables may
be considered as key determinants of performance and hence to work through that
construct on the speed of adjustment.
The strategy (diversification and size) and product market variables (primary
market share and primary market concentration) were taken at their start-of-period
value to avoid possible simultaneity problems. For example, firm size may not only
affect diversification but is itself also affected by diversification. Therefore, by
measuring firm size at the beginning of the period it removes any causality problem.
Two additional binary controls were included for within-period changes. These
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were: first, a senior management change variable, which almost by definition is
exogenous to the existing decision takers, and which was expected to lower the
desired level of diversification; and second, an acquisition variable which appeared a
necessary control since any additional acquisition raises the stock of potentially
divestable businesses" and therefore may be predicted to have a positive impact on
the divestment decision.
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the explanatory variables and their predicted
coefficient signs.
7.3 Data and Variables
In this chapter, the initial sample consists of 141 publicly quoted UK firms randomly
selected from the FT500 list. Financials, foreign-owned and trading companies were
excluded because of problems of comparability with other firms (see Chapter 4 of
this thesis for details). The extent of divestment activity is separately measured using
the proportion of assets divested and the number of business units divested. The
rationale for using separate measures rests on both methodological and practical
reasons. The count data specification, using the number of recorded divestments,
relates more obviously to any control problems associated with diversity.
Furthermore, this approach is advantageous in so far as value data are inevitably
unobtainable for.some smaller divestments. Divestment expressed as a proportion of
the firm's initial assets represents a measure of the importance of divestment activity
over the period.
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The proportion of assets divested is calculated as the sales price of divested units
divided by market value for the previous year. This measure was used as
information was not available on the sales of the divested unit as a percentage of the
total sales of the firm. These percentages are summed over the period to obtain a
total percentage of assets divested (similar measure to Hoskisson et al., 1994).
This can and does exceed one hundred per cent in the case of firms who were active
divestors and acquirers over the period (this was the case for 3 of the firms). In
the cases where a sales price was unreported, a proportion of 0.1 per cent of
market value was assigned to that divestment 7. Alternative assumptions were
made but the results appeared insensitive to the allocation rule selected. The number
of business units divested is the total number of sell-offs recorded over the period
calculated for each firm.
Altogether a total of 1149 voluntary divestments was reported (involuntary
divestments were excluded for reasons given in Chapter 4 of this thesis). Table 7.2
shows the extent to which the companies in the sample were involved in divestment
activity. Approximately 90 per cent make at least one divestment. The majority of
firms undertake between 1 and 5 divestments. On average, each firm made 8.15
divestments over the period, representing 1.6 divestments per year and representing
4.4 per cent ofits assets in the previous year.
The determinants of divestment mentioned in Section 7.2.2 are performance,
leverage, management equity, board composition, blockholder, diversification, firm
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size, management change, acquisition, market share and concentration. Performance
is alternatively measured using ROCE, ROE, TPM and ROS both at the firm level
and relative to the industry. Market performance is measured using an
approximation to tobin's q. In addition relative shareholder returns are used as an
alternative measure of performance. Leverage is measured as the ratio of debt-to-
equity and debt to total assets. Management equity is calculated as the percentage of
total outstanding ordinary shares owned by the directors of the firm (Johnson et al.,
1993). Board composition is calculated as the ratio of non-executive to executive
board members (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Blockholder ownership is defined as an
owner of 5 per cent or more of the firm's ordinary share capital (Bethel and
Liebeskind, 1993). Diversification is measured using the entropy index (palepu,
1985). Firm size is calculated by taking the book value of total assets, total sales,
and the number of employees. Management change is measured using a
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was a change in Managing Director (or
equivalent) immediately prior or during the period and 0 otherwise. Acquisition is
measured as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was a recorded acquisition
over the period and 0 otherwise. Market share uses a standard measure of total sales
of a firm divided by industry sales. Concentration is measured using the Herfindahl
index. A detailed description of the measurement of the explanatory variables is
given in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
From this sample, seven firms were eliminated due to incomplete data coverage,
reducing the final number offirms with all necessary data to 134.
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7.4 Methods
The empirical analysis of divestment examined both the proportionate value and the
number of activities divested. Whilst the former is indicative of the magnitude of the
firm's divestment strategy, it is highly sensitive to single decisions involving very
large disposals. (Furthermore, in some cases the asset sale price will become inflated
by the buyers willingness to overpay.) The second divestment measure, the number
of recorded disposals, has the advantage of making full use of the data available
without our having to assign values to those disposals where there was no recorded
sale price. Both versions of the divestment measure give rise to limited dependent
variable estimation. In the proportions case an OLS log-linear model is used. The
count data version employs alternative specifications based upon the Poisson and
negative binomial distributions, respectively. It is contended here that the two
approaches are complementary and necessary given the nature of the data on
divestment.
The proportions model is estimated using OLS techniques. That is the relationship
between divestment and the regressors in equation (2) is estimated by minimising the
sum of squared errors (see Chapter 5 of this thesis for more details). While the
proportions model is straightforward, the count data models are probably less
familiar and are described in detail below (see also Chapter 5 of this thesis).
The Poisson distribution is widely used in analysing count data where the dependent
variable is discrete and defined for non-negative integers corresponding to the
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number of events occurring in a given interval (e.g. Hausman, Hall and Griliches,
1984). We model the number of divestments, Y» as being generated by the following
Poisson process: Prob (Yi) = At e -u I Yi !, where Ai is the conditional mean and
variance of the Poisson distribution. To incorporate explanatory variables Xi, the
most common formulation for Ai is: In Ai = X,b. Parameter estimates are obtained by
solving the log-likelihood function using maximum likelihood techniques: In L = L
(YiX,b - Ai - InYi I).
One restriction of the basic Poisson model is the imposition of an equal conditional
mean and variance. Inmany economic applications, it is not uncommon to find that
the variance of Y! exceeds the mean, implying 'overdispersion' in the data. An
important consequence of fitting overdispersed data to the Poisson model is that the
estimated covariance matrix will be biased downwards, producing spuriously small
estimated standard errors of the parameter estimates and overstated r-statistics,
A solution to the problem of overdispersion is to use a distribution that allows for a
less restricted variance function. To this end the negative binomial model has been
proposed as a useful alternative to the Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986).
The negative binomial model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the mean
function by introducing an additional stochastic component to Ai: In Ai = Xb + Bi,
where B; captures unobserved heterogeneity and is uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables. The model can be derived by assuming Ai to be distributed randomly and
follow a gamma distribution of the form: itAi) = IIf(llai1ae-MlIIJ../,a-1.
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By choosing the particular form of gamma distribution given above, one obtains a
model which has the same conditional mean as the Poisson model but allows
overdispersion since: var (yiIX,b) = 1..,(1+(lAi) > var (yiIX,b) = Ai. Since the mean
equals the variance when Yi is Poisson distributed, the natural basis for testing the
adequacy of the Poisson model is to propose tests of the form (l = O.
7.5 Results
The descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of the variables used in the study are
given in Table 7.3. An inspection of these for the number of divestments provides a
priori evidence of overdispersion in the data, since the variance is appreciably larger
than the mean. This indicated the importance of testing for the validity of the
Poisson specification in the regression model which follows.
Equation (2) was estimated using the proportion of assets divested and the number
of divestments as alternative versions of the dependent variable. Since the sample
statistics led us to suspect overdispersion in the data, we tested the moments
restriction implied by the Poisson model using the regression-based tests for
overdispersion suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1990) - see Appendix 7A for
details. This is based on the weighted least squares estimation of (Yd.1i - J.1ion
g(J.1i),where Yi is the dependent variable, g(J.1i)is some specified function and J.1is
the predicted mean from the Poisson regression. The Poisson model is rejected if the
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coefficient on g(J..li)is significantly different from zero. Cameron and Trivedi (1990)
suggest two possibilities for g(J..li):g(J..li)= u, and g(J..li)= J..li2.Using ROCE as the
measure of firm performance, debt to total assets as a measure of leverage and the
log of employees as a proxy for firm size in equation (2), yielded z-ratios of 6.24 and
7.61 respectively which were highly significant and suggested a rejection of the
Poisson model. Rejection of the mean-variance equality led us to re-estimate the
regression using the negative binomial model. The Wald statistic for testing the
Poisson model against the negative binomial model is 5.745 pointing to the
superiority of the latter. This conclusion was reinforced by the likelihood ratio
statistic of 209.434 [2 x (491.285 - 386.568)]. This conclusion was robust to
specification changes involving the alternative size, leverage and performance
variables. For example, the corresponding regression-based, Wald and likelihood
ratio (LR) tests using relative ROCE, tobin's q and relative shareholder returns are
6.31 and 7.70 (t-ratios), 5.749 (Wald), 209.866 (LR), 6.27 and 7.63 (r-ratios), 5.820
(Wald), 208.02 (LR), 6.32 and 7.75 (z-ratios), 5.822 (Wald), 197.62 (LR)
respectively. However, it is the case that the two alternative functional forms gave
very similar parameter estimates and differed largely because the lower variance in
the Poisson model has the effect of downwardly biasing the coefficients' standard
errors. Table 7.5 gives illustrative Poisson estimates for comparative purposes, but
the following discussion of the count data results relates to the negative binomial
results, which we consider to be the more reliable.
In several cases alternative versions of the independent variables were generated:
thus firm size was alternatively measured as the logarithms of total employees, total
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assets and total sales, leverage as the debt-to-assets and debt-to-equity ratios and
finn and relative performance as return on capital employed (RaCE), return on
equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and trading profit margin (TPM). Inevitably, in
each case the alternatives were highly correlated, as seen in Table 7.3. The reported
results, in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, use ROCE as the finn and relative performance
measure, debt-to-assets as the leverage variable and log of the number of employees
as the finn size indicator. The alternative measures yielded very similar estimates.
The results are given in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 and show a considerable consistency
across specifications and with either version of the dependent variable. The results
across the models are very largely in accord with prior expectations. Among the
variables which were predicted to increase the finn's responsiveness to the capital
market and hence accelerate any downward adjustment in diversification, Firm
Leverage and the corporate governance variables of Board Composition and
Management Equity exercised a significant positive effect in both the proportions
and count models. Alone among the governance variables, only the existence of an
identifiable Blockholder failed to attract a significant coefficient.
These relationships suggest that the percentage of divested units or the number of
divestments is greater when debt is higher, the proportion of outsiders on a board is
higher and management equity holdings are higher. The former result is consistent
with the disciplinary role of debt hypothesised by Jensen (1986). The significant
effect of the corporate governance variables, Board Composition and Management
Equity, is consistent with the view that divestment is more likely under conditions of
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reduced managerial discretion. There is no evidence of divestment being related with
blockholder ownership.
Turning to the strategy variables, both Diversification Level and Firm Size have a
consistently positive and significant effect across each specification. The very large
coefficients for these variables in the count data model are not unexpected, given an
anticipated mean regression effect. However, their significant performance in the
proportions model is consistent with our strategic priors that larger and more
diversified firms may have experienced a proportionately greater fall in their optimal
levels of diversification. Those firms which experienced a Change in Management
displayed a significantly higher extent of divestment, ceteris paribus, using either the
proportions or count data models. Finally, the binary variable Acquisition, used to
distinguish those firms which made at least one successful acquisition within the
quoted sector over the period, was positive but significant only in the proportions
model.
The market structural characteristics produced mixed effects. Concentration carried
a negative coefficient which was significant to at least the 10 percent level in all
specifications. This suggested that location in a cushioned core market tended to
reduce any fall in the optimal level of diversification. By contrast, Market Share
carried a positive coefficient but was insignificant in every case apart from the
Poisson regression which, as we have argued, appears unreliable for our data. As
these two variables were moderately strongly correlated (r = 0.59) we tried entering
them separately, but the same pattern of signs and significance was maintained. Of
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course, an ambiguous result for Market Share was not entirely surprising; high
values for this variable should impact positively upon core activity profitability but
will simultaneously restrict the firm's core growth prospects.
Since our count data models are non-linear, there is some opacity about their
estimation. Accordingly, we have calculated the marginal effects (i.e. 8E[ylx]1X =
~b) for the significant regressors only, using the preferred negative binomial
specification of Table 7.S.The results are given in Table 7.6. These have been
calculated at the sample mean values of the data. They confirm, in particular, the
importance of Firm Leverage, Firm Size, Diversification Level, Board
Composition, Management Equity and a Change in Management in positively
affecting divestment and (principal market) Concentration in reducing it.
The most surprising result across all specifications of the model was the failure to
find a significant performance effect. It had been conjectured that when firms
experienced a downward shift in optimal diversification, the more poorly performing
ones would adjust more rapidly under the implicit threat from the takeover market
and this would be observed ceteris paribus in a higher volume of divestment across
the interval examined. However, neither own profitability, profitability relative to the
industry average nor Tobin's q even approached any acceptable level of significance.
The latter finding was especially surprising in the sense that a forward-looking
performance measure, such as Tobin's q, relates more obviously to capital market
discipline than one such as profitability whose observed values might be expected to
display time dependence. Dropping the market structural variables, equivalent to
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employing a reduced-form version in which market structural effects work through
performance alone, did nothing to change these results. The nearest each of the
models carne to producing a significant performance effect was when relative
shareholder returns was used as the performance measure. Even here the
coefficients, although negative, failed to achieve the 10 percent significance level.
Since the results available from the US generally report a significant negative
correlation between parent financial performance and voluntary divestment (see
Bergh, 1997) the findings here appear particularly surprising. Before rejecting the
existence of such a link in the UK context we are mindful of two caveats: first, this
chapter uses a cross sectional design in which the explanatory variables are
measured prior to the start of the period of investigation to avoid problems of
simultaneity bias. It is possible that the implied lag between the variable's
measurement and most subsequent divestment was simply too long - i.e. adjustment
may occur quite rapidly (for example, Jain, 1985 found that firm performance began
to suffer approximately one year prior to divestment) - and averaging the effects
across a five year time interval may introduce unnecessary contamination. Second,
there is evidence from the merger literature (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, for
the US and Meeks, 1977, for the UK) that strong financial performance is
associated with acquisition activity which may itself generate divestments after some
lag. Therefore it is possible that measured performance before the start of our period
captures some element of the potential to divest, thus eroding our initial prior.
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Some check on the possibility that averaging across a five year interval was
eliminating key relationships was possible by re-estimating the models as yearly
cross sections. Given the high proportion of zeros in any year, this tended to
produce poorly determined estimations". For the most part, however, these
estimations continued to reveal an insignificant performance effect. When the
previous year's relative stock market returns was used as the performance measure
it did produce a significant negative effect in two years, 1985 and 1986, although
not elsewhere.
7.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has presented an empirical analysis of divestment activity in the UK,
over the period 1985-89, using what is believed to be the most comprehensive
database on corporate sell-offs yet assembled. The period was chosen partly because
the available evidence indicated that it was when "corporate refocusing" became
widespread and because it predated any recession-induced changes that might have
been anticipated in the early 1990s.
The analysis of divestment used data on both the number and the aggregate value of
sell-offs, giving rise to two complementary models of the divestment process. Taken
together these two approaches suggest that firms' divestment behaviour was not
merely exhibiting mean reversion in the number of activities operated or simple
portfolio churning across the set of such activities. Instead they indicate that
divestment was systematically related to leverage, corporate governance, strategy
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and - to a limited extent - market structural characteristics. The important role for
leverage and corporate governance variables is consistent with their impacting upon
the speed of adjustment of actual diversification towards lower optimal levels
apparently required in the 1980s. They may be considered to proxy the firm's
responsiveness to capital market discipline.
The chapter's results also indicate that both the value and extent of divestment
activity is related to the size and diversification of the firm concerned. This outcome
holds for the proportions model as well as the count data one, indicating that it is
not merely a mean reversion process. This finding is consistent with the view from a
corporate strategy perspective that gains from divestment will be greatest for those
firms experiencing control problems associated with size and diversity. Senior
managerial changes and - less distinctly - acquisition activity over the period of
investigation also appear to stimulate divestment. The effect of market structural
factors appears more ambiguous with core activity concentration having a weakly
significant inhibiting effect and market share producing no significant effect at all.
Rather surprisingly, in view of much of the US evidence, the results failed to reveal
any significant association between corporate performance and divestment. It had
been conjectured that poor performance, like high leverage and a strict corporate
governance regime, would encourage rapid adjustment to lower diversification and
hence lead to a high observed extent of divestment. It is possible that the cross
sectional design employed here influenced this outcome by requiring performance to
be measured too far ahead of actual divestment decisions. It is also possible that
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prior petfonnance picks up other characteristics, including past merger activity, with
implications for divestment. Because of these limitations, the following chapter of
this thesis adopts a panel data model, to explore more fully the determinants of
divestment activity.
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Notes
'Other possible explanations for a downward displacement in optimal
diversification levels include changes in tax policy, globalisation and
environmental uncertainty (see Chapter 3 of this thesis for details).
2Lang and Stultz (1994) extend the Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988)
methodology to examine the implied diversification discount using firm and
industry values for Tobin's q. They report the existence of a statistically
significant discount as far back as 1978. Servaes (1996) has recently detected
such a discount in the 1960s, but he finds that it disappeared in the 1970s during
the era of conglomerate expansion.
3For example, Denis et al., (1997) examined the timing of voluntary divestments
in the US and report significant falls in firm value for three years prior to the
divestment. They summarise: "We thus conclude that the sample changes in
diversification are not timely responses to sudden changes in the value of
diversification." (p. 157) Similarly, the literature on relationship between
acquisitions and divestment (e.g. Scherer and Ravenscraft, 1987, Kaplan and
Weisbach, 1992) suggests that many acquisitions are unsuccessful and
subsequently divested, but frequently only after an extended period. Their
results also suggest that the median holding period for subsequently divested
acquisitions fell consistently across the period 1971-1982, from over 15 years in
1971-72 to approximately 5 years in 1981-82.
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4The assumption of a time-cost trade off in altering the configuration of the
firm's activities is entirely consistent with the existing literature on
diversification and divestment. Penrose (1959) provides the classic explanation
of the costs of over-rapid expansion, whilst comparisons of voluntary and
involuntary divestment point to the superiority of the former for the vendor's
shareholders, suggesting that enforced sell-offs restrict the vendor's ability to
locate and negotiate with buyers with a high willingnessto pay. However, being
over-diversified also imposes costs insofar as it disappoints the capital market
with implications for the firm's cost of capital and the managers' expectations
with respect to the takeover threat. We assume that good performance, low
leverage and weak corporate governance (i.e. weak shareholder to manager
power) reduce capital market discipline and allow managers a more leisurely
adjustment regime.
SThat is, simple mean-reversion behaviour implies that ADit= k(Dit-l) where
k>O.
6There are, of course, further reasons why we might expect a relationship
between divestment activity and (prior) mergers: first, unsuccessful mergers,
perhaps initially driven by managerial preference or hubris, may have to be
reversed; second, in an era of multi-output firms an acquisition to secure a
position in industry A might bring with it an unwanted past expansion into
industry B, with the corresponding need for a divestment.
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7It appears reasonable to assume that the overwhelming majority of divestment
deals for which no price is recorded in either the firm's annual accounts or in
one of our secondary sources, lie in the lower tail of the divestment size
distribution. In general the secondary sources use some size criterion and do
not supply full data for very small (e.g. < £1m in the case of Acquisitions
Monthly) transactions. Therefore identified but unpriced deals will tend to fall
into this category.
8The proportions model results were particularly badly determined, no doubt a
consequence of the lumpiness or indivisibility attaching to potentially divestable
activities. The count data results were somewhat better.
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Table 7.1 Summary of Explanatory Variables
Variable Predicted Sign
Performance
-
Leverage +
Management equity +
Board composition +
Blockholder +
Diversification +
Firm size +
Management change +
Acquisition +
Market share ?
Concentration ?
Table 7.2 Divestment Activity by Firms, 1985 to 1989
Number of Divestments No. of Companies
0 14
1-5 49
6-10 42
11-15 17
16-20 9
20ormore 10
Total 141
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Table 7.4 Dependent Variable equals the Proportion of Assets Divested
Constant -15.682 -15.709 -15.542 -14.391
"'(-3.444) "'(-4.144) • • • (-4.112) • • • (4.050)
Finn performance -0.354
(-0.468)
Relative performance 0.021
(0.502)
Market performance -0.049
(-0.130)
Relative shareholder returns -0.001
(0.910)
Finn leverage 1.119 1.191 1.161 1.073
'· '(2.794) "·(3.011) '· '(2.968) ·"(2.805)
Board composition 0.131 0.126 0.127 0.116
·(1.673) ·(1.713) '(1.725) ·(1.721)
Blockholder -0.600 -0.608 -0.586 -0.558
(-0.978) (-0.991) (-0.945) (0.928)
Management equity 0.282 0.282 0.285 0.261
"(2.353) '·(2.364) "(2.361) "(2.193)
Change inmanagement 1.406 1.465 1.442 1.360
· '(2.313) '·(2.411) "(2.372) '·(2.285)
Diversification level 0.220 0.226 0.229 0.240
"·(2.785) • • • (2.888) '· ·(2.751) • • • (3.145)
Finn size 0.549 0.577 0.566 0.664
'·(1.734) ·(J.812) ·(J.756) "(2.335)
Acquisition 4.689 4.495 4.525 3.991
· '(2.129) '·(2.049) "(2.034) '(1.876)
Market share 0.400 0.389 0.388
(1.409) (1.372) (1.358) '(1.643)
Concentration -1.010 -0.958 -0.996
"(-1.892) '(-1.767) '(-1.853) · '·(2.917)
R2 0.356 0.357 0.355 0.380
Notes: n = 134; t-statistics appear in parentheses: • =p<0.1, • •= p< 0.05, • • •=p < 0.01.
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Table 7.S Dependent Variable equals: (1) the Number of Divestments - Poisson
Model, (2) the Number of Divestments - Negative Binomial Model
Independent variable (1) (2) (2) (2) (2)
Constant -4.249 -3.904 -3.814 -3.819 -3.867
·"(-4.868) "'(-2.570) "'(-2.695) • • • (-2.720) ·· ·(2.894)
Finn performance 0.075 0.026
(0.759) (0.115)
Relative performance 0.001
(0.084)
~arketperformance -0.066
(-0.542)
Relative shareholder returns -0.005
(1.559)
Finn leverage 0.532 0.451 0.446 0.447 0.418
···(8.392) ·· ·(3.955) ·· ·(3.931) ·· ·(3.972) ··'(3.310)
Board composition 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.052
···(5.120) "(2.046) '·(2.086) '·(2.002) ··(1.925)
Blockholder 0.136 0.049 0.051 0.059 0.033
··(1.975) (0.285) (0.288) (0.340) (0.199)
Management equity 0.070 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.071
'· ·(4.652) ·· ·(2.852) "'(2.872) ·· ·(2.881) ··(2.331)
Change inmanagement 0.302 0.403 0.406 0.418 0.370
·'·(4.040) ··(2.332) · '(2.331) ··(2.346) · '(2.163)
Diversification level 0.085 0.070 0.069 0.074 0.065
'· ·(5.671) · '·(3.651) ·· ·(3.657) "'(3.284) ·· ·(3.528)
Finn size 0.424 0.403 0.400 0.411 0.412
···(12.029) ·· ·(5.263) ·· ·(5.219) ·· ·(5.168) • • • (5.071)
Acquisition 0.616 0.932 0.954 0.851 0.915
(0.840) (0.749) (0.765) (0.683) (0.784)
Market share 0.447 0.372 0.380 0.348 0.420
···(3.313) (0.890) (0.907) (0.790) (1.042)
Concentration -0.705 -0.595 -0.605 -0.569 -0.691
···(-3.508) '(-1.673) ·(-1.678) (-1.482) ··(2.006)
-1nL
-491.285 -386.568 -386.572 -386.376 -385.202
Variance parameter a. 0.381 0.381 0.380 0.367
···(5.745) ·· ·(5.749) ···(5.820) ·· ·(5.822)
Notes: n = 134; t-statistics appear in parentheses: • =p<0.1, • •= p< 0.05, • • •=p < 0.01.
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Table 7.6 Marginal Effects: the Number of Divestments - Negative Binomial
Model
Independent variable (2) (2) (2) (2)
Firm leverage 3.040 3.012 3.010 2.811
Board composition 0.385 0.386 0.388 0.352
Management equity 0.574 0.573 0.575 0.476
Change inmanagement 2.765 2.736 2.820 2.486
Diversification level 0.472 0.469 0.501 0.438
Firm size 2.716 2.702 2.770 2.771
Concentration
-4.016 -4.080 -3.840 -4.645
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APPENDIX 7A
The Cameron and Trivedi (1990) approach to testing the mean-variance equality
implied by the Poisson model is based on the weighted least squares estimation of:
.... (1)
Where Yi is the dependent variable, g(lJi) is some specified function, Ili is the
predicted mean from the Poisson regression and Vi is a herteroscedatic error term
with variance 21Ji2. By weighting equation (1) with V2. 1Ji, equation (1) can be
estimated using straightforward OLS techniques. The Poisson model is rejected if
the coefficient on g(lJi) is significantly different from zero, implying
overdispersion in the data.
Cameron and Trivedi (1990) suggest two possibilities for g(Ili): g(lli) = Ili and g(lli)
Unlike classical statistical tests, this approach only requires the specification of the
moment restriction under the alternative, rather than the complete distribution
whose choice is usually arbitrary.
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8. THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DIVESTMENT FOR
UK FIRMS: PANEL ESTIMATES
8.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to extend the analysis in Chapter 7 of this thesis by
examining the determinants of corporate divestment using longitudinal analysis.
This approach combines dimensions of cross-sectional and time-series data, by
surveying our sample of firms over time. Whereas Chapter 7 of this thesis
adopted a simple cross-sectional model to examine the relationship between
divestment and financial, corporate governance, strategy and market structural
variables, this chapter adopts panel data techniques. One benefit of this
approach is that it helps to overcome the problems of complex causation and
multicollinearity which undermines much of the cross-sectional work in this
area. It also provides an improved framework for modelling divestment, given
that de-diversification is inherently a dynamic process. The inclusion of
observations through time on each firm in the sample is an important and
necessary extension to the existing evidence. The panel estimates presented in
this chapter are intended to complement the results from the cross-sectional
model in Chapter 7 by addressing some of the weaknesses in the latter, most
obviously to do with reverse causality and the problems of averaging across an
interval during which other changes were occurring. However, the cross-
sectional approach does have the advantage of not requiring an explicit lag
structure.
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The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows. Section 8.2 briefly re-
examines the literature on refocusing and divestment. A discussion of the data
set is given in Section 8.3. Model estimation is outlined in Section 8.4. Section
8.5 presents a review of the results. Finally Section 8.6 concludes.
8.2 Existing Literature
It has been conjectured that corporate refocusing can be understood as an
attempt by firms to reverse their excessive levels of diversification, most of
which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Bhagat et al., 1990; Hoskisson and
Turk, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; and Markides, 1995a,b). This
explanation implies that there exists some limit to the extent to which a firm
may diversify without adversely affecting its performance and that if refocusing
became a widespread phenomenon from the 1980s, as Bhagat et al., (1990),
Markides (199Sa, b) etc. suggest for the US and is argued here for the UK, then
a large number of firms must have discovered simultaneously (for a variety of
reasons) to have been in breach of their optimal diversity levels. As a result, the
profitability and market value of overdiversified firms will suffer and the issue of
reducing the level of diversification by divestment to form an independent entity
(e.g. MBO) or to another organisation becomes worthwhile (Wright &
Thompson, 1987).
Explanations for the existence and timing of corporate refocusing have been
examined in detail elsewhere in this thesis (see in particular Chapters 3 and 7 of
this thesis). Briefly, given the existence of an optimal limit to diversification
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(Williamson, 1967; Penrose, 1959), a number of explanations have been
provided as to why firms may have experienced a downward displacement in
their optimal level during the 1980s and consequently, why some firms came to
find themselves in an over-diversified position. These explanations include a
stronger market for corporate control (for example, due to the emergence of
hostile bid advisers and debt-financed take-overs), a weakening of the
informational advantages of the M-form's internal capital market and the more
pessimistic stance of conglomerates adopted by the capital market during the
1980s.
From the evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, we have
determined that divestment is a normal response to this downward displacement
in diversification for the majority of firms over the period in question. From the
detailed discussion in Chapters 3 and 7 of this thesis, we determined what
factors are likely to affect a firm's adjustment to this downward displacement in
diversification and their predicted impact on the divestment decision. As before,
divestment is hypothesised to be affected by financial, corporate governance,
strategy and market structure characteristics.
8.3 Data Description and Variables
In this chapter, the data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 158 publicly
quoted companies over the period 1985 to 1991. The adoption of panel
techniques allows us to include firms who did not survive intact over the study
period. The criterion for inclusion in the sample is detailed in Chapter 4 of this
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thesis. The extent of divestment activity is separately measured usmg the
proportion of assets divested and the number of business units divested. The
proportion of assets divested is calculated as the sales price of the divested units
divided by the firm's market value for the previous year. In the cases where a
sales price was unreported (this occurred for approximately 23 per cent of
divestments), a proportion of 0.1 per cent of market value was assigned to that
divestment. The number of business units divested is the total number of sell-
otfs (parent-to-parent and buy-outslbuy-ins) recorded in a year. Altogether a
total of 1,627 voluntary divestments was reported. Table 8.1 shows the extent
to which companies in the sample were involved in divestment activity. Out of
the sample of 158 companies, 141 (89 per cent) made at least one divestment.
The average is 11.54 divestments per company. The largest proportion of the
sample undertake between 1 and 5 divestments. Table 8.2 summarises the
number and value of divestments by year for the sample firms.
The determinants of divestment introduced in Section 8.2 are performance,
leverage, corporate governance, strategy and market structure characteristics.
Data was collected on each variable for every year over the study period.
However, given that the corporate governance variables do not vary over time,
it was necessary to introduce the corporate governance characteristics as a
regime variable instead of as separate variables as in the cross-sectional
estimation in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 'Strong' and 'weak' corporate
governance regimes were distinguished using two criteria: one, the existence, or
otherwise, of a substantial blockholder (defined as one identifiable ownership
interest of 5 percent or more of the ordinary share capital) at the start of the
203
period; and two, the management's own equity stake (the proportion of
outstanding ordinary shares owned by the directors of the firm) at the start of
the period. Three regime alternatives were defined:
STRONG 1 = 1 if blockholder in existence and management has equity
greater than or equal to the median value for the sample as a
whole in year t
WEAK 1 = 1 ifnot
STRONG2 = 1 ifblockholder in existence
WEAK2 1 ifnot
STRONG3 1 if management has equity greater than or equal to median
value for the sample as a whole
WEAK3 = 1 ifnot
These regime variables were interacted with the performance and leverage
variables to determine whether their effect on divestment is conditioned by the
corporate governance characteristics of the firm. It was hypothesised that firms
with 'strong' governance are more likely to respond to poor performance
indicators and will therefore undertake more divestment than firms operating
'weak' governance mechanisms. If corporate refocusing is a reversal of prior
managerial empire building stimulated by a slack market for corporate control
(Jensen, 1986), then we would expect the effect of leverage on the divestment
decision to be greater for firms operating 'weak' governance mechanisms.
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An additional variable was included in the estimation to capture the influence of
the threat of take-over on the decision to divest. For example, Gibbs (1993)
finds that refocusing is positively related to take-over threat. Bhagat, Shleifer
and Vishny (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990) present evidence that the
market for corporate control accounts for a substantial amount of restructuring
during the 1980s. The findings suggest that firms facing the threat of take-over
consider themselves either as likely candidates for a repeat offer, realised the
need for change or were pressurised by their board or blockholders to
reorganise. Threat is measured as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there is a
takeover threat or rumour of a takeover bid during the year and 0 otherwise. All
study variables were calculated on a yearly basis for the sample firms.
As detailed in Chapters 4 and 7 of this thesis, alternative versions of the
explanatory variables were generated: thus, firm size was alternatively measured
as the logarithms of total employees, total assets and total sales, leverage as the
debt-to-assets and debt-to-equity ratios, and performance was measured using firm
and relative accounting-based measures [return on capital employed (ROCE), return
on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and trading profit margin (TPM)], an
approximation to tobin's q and a measure of relative shareholder returns. Inevitably,
in each case the alternatives were highly correlated and different combinations of
these variables will be used in the analysis. The definition of all these variables are
given in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The predicted sign on the coefficients are given in
Table 7.1 , Chapter 7 of this thesis. In addition, the threat of takeover is expected to
have a positive impact on the divestment decision.
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The final number of firms with all the necessary data is an unbalanced panel of
144 firms. The balance of the panel is given in Table 3. The summary statistics
for the continuous variables are given in Table 4.
8.4 Methods
A great deal of the previous empirical work on the determinants of refocusing
and divestment has been based on cross-sectional models. In this chapter, a
panel data set is utilised, which is better able to identify and measure effects that
are not detectable in pure cross-sectional or time-series data. By adopting this
approach it is also possible to control for unobservable individual characteristics
via firm-specific (fixed or random) effects, thus avoiding possible specification
bias and resulting in improved efficiency of the estimates.
As noted in the previous section, the literature suggests that divestment is likely
to be affected by financial, corporate governance, strategy and market structure
characteristics. It is anticipated that the impact of financial strength on
divestment will occur with some lag. The literature does not specify the exact
nature of the lag structure. However, Jain (1985) found that firm performance
began to suffer approximately one year prior to divestment, suggesting that
managers will react fairly quickly to poor financial indicators (see also Afshar et
al., 1992). Also, the failure to find a significant performance effect (regardless
of the measure adopted) in the cross-sectional model in Chapter 7 of this thesis
suggests that the implied lag was too long. Therefore, in this study we include
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performance and leverage measures for the year prior to the divestment. By
similar reasoning we also include lagged values for the remaining variables.
Specifically, we model divestment (DIVEST) as being determined by
performance (PERF), firm leverage (LEV), a change in management
(NEWMD), takeover threat (THREAT), diversification level (DIVERSE),
market share (MS), concentration (CON), acquisition activity (ACQ) and firm
size (SIZE). Using i subscripts to identify firms and t subscripts for time, our
estimating equation of divestment determination takes the following form:
DIVESTit =fi + a.oPERFit.l + a.1LEVit.l + a.2NEWMDit.l + 0.3THREATit.l
+ a.J)IVERSEit.l + a.SMSit.1+ a.6CONit.l + a.7ACQit.l
...(1)
Where fi is a firm-specific effect capturing (unobserved) company heterogeneity
and Eit is an i.i.d. error term. The corporate governance characteristics are
subsequently introduced by interacting PERF and LEV with the regime
variables: [PERF *WEAK] , [PERF*STRONG], [LEV*WEAK],
[LEV*STRONG].
Equation (1) is alternatively estimated using the proportions measure and count
data analysis. As noted above, the proportion of assets divested is calculated as
the sales price of a divested unit divided by the parent's market value in the
previous year. In this instance, equation (1) is estimated using a log-linear
specification employing one-way fixed and random effects models.
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The one-way model adopted in this chapter assumes that the individual-specific
effects vary over cross-sectional units but not over time. Differences across
cross-sectional units are captured by a varying intercept. The error term for this
model can be written as: Eit = ~i + Uit, where ~i represents the unobservable
individual effects and Uit denotes the remainder disturbances. ~i is time-invariant
and accounts for any individual specific effect that is not included in the model.
The choice of an appropriate estimation technique depends on what
assumptions are made about the individual effects. The variation across cross-
sectional units ~i, can be fixed or random. If ~i are fixed, or random and
correlated with the regressors, the dummy variable model is appropriate while if
~i are random and independent of the regressors then the error components
model is adopted (see Chapter 5 of this thesis for details).
The fixed effects or least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model is estimated
by including dummy variables for each cross-sectional unit, t, and estimating
equation (I) without the constant term. Alternatively, the model can be
reformulated to include a constant and N-l dummy variables. In both instances,
the model can be estimated as a multiple regression by OLS. In the random
effects model, the error term no longer satisfies the classical assumptions of
serial independence as there is within-individual correlation through time. In this
case, the efficient estimator is generalised least squares (GLS). The parameter
estimates are obtained using a two step procedure: the variance components are
first estimated by using the residuals from OLS. Then, feasible GLS estimates
are computed using the estimated variances. Initially both models will be
adopted and the appropriate specification will be selected.
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The second method of modelling divestment activity is to examine the number
of assets divested, employing Poisson and negative binomial distribution
regressions (for example, see Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). These
specifications model the non-negative integer property of the dependent variable
and allow for the non-negligible probability of zero as a natural outcome. The
statistical specification developed models divestment as being generated by the
following Poisson process: Prob (Yit) = Ait e' Ait/ Yit !, where i indexes firms and
t indexes time, and Ait is the conditional mean and variance of the Poisson
distribution. The fixed effects Poisson model is: In Ait = o, + Xitf3, where Uj is a
firm-specific effect. The model is estimated by conditioning separately the count
distribution of each firm on the total sum of outcomes over the observed years.
This removes the fixed effect from the resulting distribution, which is then
estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. The random effects Poisson
model is given by: In Ait = Xitf3 + Ub where u, is a random effect for the ith
group such that eui is distributed as gamma. Thus, Eui has mean 1 and variance
119= o, The model can then be derived by integrating out the random effect
and estimating by maximum likelihood the parameters (f3,u) of the resulting
distribution.
In many economic applications, it is not uncommon to find that the variance of
Yit exceeds the mean, implying "overdispersion" in the data. An important
consequence of fitting overdispersed data to the Poisson model, is that the
estimated covariance matrix will be biased downwards, producing spuriously
small estimated standard errors of the parameter estimates and overstated t-
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statistics. Therefore, the negative binomial model is also estimated which allows
for a less restricted variance function by introducing an additional stochastic
component to Ait. For the fixed effects negative binomial model: In Ait = Ui +
Xitf3 + Eit which with minor modifications is the estimating framework for the
Poisson model with random effects, as above. The random effects negative
binomial model is: In Ait = Xitf3 + u, + Eit, where Eit captures unobserved
heterogeneity and is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. As above, u, is
gamma distributed with parameters (9i,9i), which produces the negative
binomial model with a parameter that varies across groups. Then, it is assumed
that 9/(1 +Si) is distributed as beta(an,bn), which layers the random effect onto
the negative binomial model. Once again, the approach is to integrate out the
random effect and estimate by maximum likelihood techniques.
The advantages of the two approaches are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of
this thesis. The two approaches are seen as complementary and necessary given
the incomplete nature of data on divestment.
8.5 Results
Equation (1) was estimated using the unbalanced panel of 144 firms across the
years 1985-91, using a total of 876 observations. Estimations were carried out
for both the proportions measure and count data analysis. In the event each
specification yielded a similar pattern of results. The estimated models are
presented in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. Table 8.5 presents results when divestment is
measured as a proportion of total assets. Column (1) reports the results from
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the OLS regression and estimates from the fixed- and random-effects model are
presented in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The number of divestments is
modelled in Table 8.6. Columns (1)-(3) show the results from the Poisson,
negative binomial and negative binomial random-effects model respectively.
The variance parameter, a., in column (2), Table 8.6, is positive and statistically
significant implying that overdispersion is a feature of our data. Therefore, the
focus is on the results from the negative binomial model. Column (3) presents
the results from the random effects negative binomial model'. For the
proportions model, the reported Hausman statistic in Table 8.5 suggests that the
random effects model is the preferred specification in the proportion analysis.
Therefore, the preferred estimates are in column (3) in both Tables.
The empirical results reported in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 broadly confirm the
importance of financial, strategy and market structure variables in explaining the
extent of divestment activity. The reported results use relative ROCE as a
measure of performance, debt-to-assets as the leverage variable and log of the
number of employees as the firm size indicator. The alternative measures yielded
very similar estimates. In both models the estimated coefficients generally
conform to prior expectations. In contrast to the results in Chapter 7 of this
thesis, performance now attracts a significant negative coefficient in both
specifications. Again, there are positive and significant diversification,
acquisition and firm size effects. Statistically significant positive correlations are
also observed for firm leverage, take-over threat and market share (proportions
model only), whilst concentration and a change in management have negative
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signs (the latter is insignificant at conventional levels). The implications for our
study variables may be considered in tum:
In contrast to the cross-sectional results in Chapter 7 of this thesis, which failed
to find a significant performance effect, the longitudinal results in Tables 8.5 and
8.6 support the hypothesised effect that divestment is negatively related to firm
performance. This reinforces existing US empirical evidence on the relationship
between divestment and poor profitability (e.g. Markides, 1995b) and remains
robust for alternative performance measures. One explanation for this difference
in findings across specification is the nature of the cross-sectional design in
which the explanatory variables were measured prior to the start of the period
and their effects were averaged over a subsequent five year period. It is possible
that the implied lag between the variable's measurement and most subsequent
divestment was simply too long. (The performance effect did obtain significance
in a number of the yearly cross-sectional estimates but given the large
proportion of zero divestments in any year these results were poorly
determined). In comparison, the adoption of panel data techniques enabled us to
model the effects of the explanatory variables through time, with relatively short
lags between the variable measures and subsequent divestment. The panel data
approach is believed to be a more appropriate specification for modelling
divestment given the dynamic nature of the conditions which may prompt firms
to dispose of assets (Bergh and Holbein, 1997). Using this approach it is
possible to confirm the existence of a link between performance and divestment
in the UK.
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Leverage (reported for the debt-to-assets measure) is positively and significantly
related to divestment in both the proportion and count data models. This
relationship confirms the disciplinary role for debt hypothesised by Jensen
(1986) and is consistent with an agency theoretic view of diversification as a
managerially preferred objective. This result reinforces the findings from the
cross-sectional estimation in Chapter 7 of this thesis and from previous studies
(e.g. Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Bergh, 1997)
The coefficient on take-over threat is positive and significant implying that firms
facing the threat of take-over realised the need for change and reorganised
accordingly. A similar result has been found in US studies e.g. Gibbs (1993);
Dennis et al. (1997). This finding provides limited evidence in support of the
agency theoretic perspective of divestment, that managers are being pressurised
by the market for corporate control to reduce firm size by divestment in an
attempt to improve profitability.
Using panel data estimation, there is no evidence of divestment being associated
with a change in top management. This result contrasts to that in Chapter 7 of
this thesis, which found a positive and significant effect of management change
on subsequent divestment in a cross-sectional framework. It is possible that this
result corresponded to a progamme of divestments over the five year period as
opposed to divestment in anyone year following a management change.
The results again show that the level of diversification and firm size are
significant determinants of divestment activity (the results are reported for the
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logarithm of the number of employees). The positive relationship suggests that
the larger and more diversified firms divest both a larger number and a larger
proportion of business units. Similar results emerged when firm size was
measured by the book value of total assets and total sales. This is consistent
with the view from a corporate strategy perspective that the gains from
divestment will be greatest for those firms experiencing control problems
associated with size and diversity. The acquisition variable also achieves a
positive and significant coefficient, implying that the extent of divestment
activity is related to the stock of potentially divestable business. All these results
are consistent with those in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
Finally, the market structure characteristics produced mixed results.
Concentration and market share attract negative and positive coefficients
respectively (although the latter is insignificant in the count data model). The
negative relationship between divestment and concentration is consistent with
the view that high values of concentration in a firm's core market, whilst
increasing profitability, simultaneously reduce the opportunity for core
expansion and encourage diversifying expansions by size-motivated managers
(Mueller, 1969; Jensen, 1986). By extension, these same conditions tend to
cushion the effect of any reduction in the optimal level of diversification and
may be expected to discourage managers from divesting even when the capital
market favours more tightly focused firms. The positive relationship between
divestment and market share is consistent with Markides, (1995a) who argues
that favourable market conditions determine the attraction of a refocusing
strategy and hence impact positively on divestment. Whilst a positive sign was
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also found for market share in the cross-sectional estimates in Chapter 7 of this
thesis, it failed to reach any level of significance.
Table 8.7 reports attempts to determine whether divestment is conditioned by
the corporate governance characteristics of the firm. Columns (la) and (2a)
report the results when the performance variable is dichotomised between firms
operating 'strong' and 'weak' governance regimes for the random effects
proportion and negative binomial models respectively. Columns (lb) and (2b)
show the results when the leverage variable is dichotomised between firms who
operate 'strong' and 'weak' governance mechanisms for the random effects
proportion and negative binomial models respectively. The reported results
define a 'strong' governance environment as one where a blockholder exists and
where the board of directors own equity greater than or equal to the median
value for the sample as a whole at the start of the study period. A 'weak'
environment is defined as one where these conditions are not present. The
results are shown for relative ROCE as the performance measure and debt-to-
assets as the leverage variable.
The results show that firms with a prior strong governance environment are
more likely to respond to poor performance and undertake divestment. The
coefficient on the PERF*STRONG variable is negative and significant. By
contrast the coefficient on the PERF*WEAK variable is insignificant.This result
holds for both the proportion and count data specifications, and for the
alternative definitions of 'strong' and 'weak' governance. In addition, the
results show that managers facing weak governance constraints responded to
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the disciplinary effects of a high level of debt. The coefficient on the
LEV*WEAK variable was positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficient
on LEV*STRONG was insignificant across both specifications.
8.6 Summary and Conclusions
Although there is now an extensive literature on corporate refocusing (see
Johnson, 1996) and growing research attention to divestment (see Wright,
Chiplin and Thompson, 1993 for a review), much of the previous evidence is
limited because of its use of cross-sectional models to examine longitudinal
relationships (Bergh and Holbein, 1997). As such, previous research which
examines the causes of divestment may be subject to specification bias and
inefficient estimates of relationships.
In order to address the shortcomings in previous research, this chapter provides
a comprehensive investigation of the determinants of corporate divestment
using longitudinal analysis. The chapter reports results from what is believed to be
the first panel data investigation of divestment activity in the UK. Measures of
divestment were constructed based alternatively upon the proportion of assets
divested and the number of recorded business unit sell-oft's. Hypotheses concerning
the impact of financial, strategic, corporate governance and market structure
variables were used to construct a model to explain the incidence of divestment by a
large sample of UK quoted companies across the interval 1985-91. This was
alternatively estimated using the proportions measure and count data analysis,
216
employingPoisson and negative binomialdistributionregressions, to explore the
numberof divestments.
Taken together these two approaches indicate that divestment is related to
financial, corporate governance, strategy and market structure characteristics
and is not merely a mean reversion process or simple portfolio churning across
the set of such activities. In particular, the results find that divestment is
negatively related to performance, implying that poorly performing firms are
more likely to divest. The positive impact of leverage suggests that divestment
activity is associated with the reduced managerial discretion which might be
expected to obtain under conditions of high leverage. This result is consistent
with an agency theoretic view of diversification as a managerially preferred
objective.
The results in this chapter also indicate that both the proportion and number of
divestments is related to the size and diversity of the firm involved. This is
consistent with the view from a corporate strategy perspective that the gains
from divestment will be greatest for those firms experiencing control problems
associated with size and diversity. Acquisition activity also appears to stimulate
divestment. The effect of market structural characteristics is mixed.
Attempts to distinguish between 'weak' and 'strong' governance regimes and
their conditioning effect on the impact of performance and leverage on the
divestment decision met with success. There is strong support for the view that
managers operating 'weak' governance mechanisms do not respond to poor
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financial indicators but do respond to the disciplinary effects of a high level of
debt and restructure accordingly. By contrast, managers of firms with 'strong'
governance mechanisms do respond to poor financial indicators, however, since
they are already effectively disciplined then high leverage does not have any
additional affect on their divestment decision.
Whilst the results in this chapter largely reinforce those found from the cross-
sectional model estimated in Chapter 7 of this thesis, there are a few noticeable
differences. The most significant difference is between the reported results for
the effect of performance on divestment. Whereas the panel data estimates
report a significant and negative relationship between divestment and
performance, the cross-sectional estimates failed to find any significant
relationship. It has already been discussed both here and in Chapter 7 of this
thesis that this failing to find a significant performance effect is possibly the
result of averaging the effect over five years in the cross-sectional model. The
'perverse' result in the cross-sectional model provides an additional justification
for the panel model approach. Given the improved specification in this chapter,
it is possible to conclude that there does exist a link between performance and
divestment in the UK, as has been previously found for US firms.
Other minor differences between the two chapters include the failure to report a
significant management change effect in the panel estimates and the failure to
report a significant effect of market share in the cross-sectional estimates.
Nevertheless, the evidence from both chapters confirms that divestment is more
than just a mean reversion process or simple portfolio churning but is a
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purposeful response to financial, strategic, corporate governance and - to a
limited extent - market structure characteristics. The results from the cross-
section and panel estimation approaches are both insightful of the determinants
that stimulate a firm to divest. The two approaches are complementary: the
panel data method addresses some of the weaknesses of the cross-sectional
model, most obviously to do with reverse causality and the problems of
averagmg across an interval during which other changes were occurring.
However, the cross-sectional approach does have the advantage of not
requiring an explicit lag structure. The following chapter of the thesis focuses
on the effects, if any, of a refocusing strategy on the performance of the
divesting firm.
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Notes
IThe negative binomial fixed effects model could not be fitted to the data.
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Table 8.1 Divestment Activity by Companies in our Sample, 1985 to 1991
Number of divestments No. of Companies
0 17
1-5 50
6-10 37
11-15 21
16-20 10
20 or more 23
Total 158
Table 8.2 Divestments by Year
Number Valueta)' Value(bi
(£OOO's) (£OOO's)
1801150.00 1805922.00
5096707.47 5152742.47
6553075.47 6707107.47
12449497.40 12561745.40
11110016.47 11341308.47
9385957.47 9603093.47
3294812.00 3503647.00
49691216.27 50675566.27
Year
1985 159
1986 183
1987 203
1988 319
1989 329
1990 259
1991 175
Total 1627
Notes:
'value of divestments with reported sales price
\ralue of divestments assuming unpriced divestments have a value of 0.1 per cent of market
value of that finn
Table 8.3 Balance of the Panel
No. of Years No. of Companies
2
3
4
5
6
7
7
6
10
6
30
85
Total. 144
221
Table 8.4 Full Period Characteristics for Continuous Variables
Variable Mean S.D. N
Number of divestments 1.597 2.516 876
Proportion of divestments 0.041 0.127 876
ROCE 20.022 8.533 876
ROE 17.165 31.382 876
ROS 8.845 5.423 876
TPM 11.830 6.403 876
Tobin's q 1.212 2.754 876
Shareholder returns 0.02 0.361 876
Debt to total assets 31.753 17.224 876
Debt-to-equity 0.568 0.847 876
Board composition 0.353 0.165 876
Management equity 0.038 0.096 876
Diversification 0.852 0.494 876
Assets 1130445.30 2378904.93 876
Employees 27984.849 29906.684 876
Sales 1911511.60 3723639.72 876
Market share 0.319 0.206 876
Concentration 0.218 0.239 876
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Table 8.5 Determinants of Divestment - Dependent Variable equals the
Proportion of Assets Divested
Independent variables (It (2)b (3r
Constant
-20.191
-20.622
···(-11.205) ·**(-8.914)
Relative performance
-0.046 -0.061 -0.050
**(-1.953) ·(-1.833) ·(-1.930)
Firm leverage 0.021 0.031 0.025
u(1.960) ·(1.831) • • (2.017)
Change in management
-0.272 -0.437 -0.341
(-0.628) (-1.006) (-0.819)
Diversification level 0.166 0.213 0.175
"'(4.330) **(2.293) ***(3.732)
Firm size 1.182 2.177 1.246
***(6.499) "*(3.097) ***(5.344)
Threat 1.046 1.244 1.107
**(1.966) ·*(2.257) **(2.138)
Acquisition 1.099 0.674 0.872
···(3.108) ·(1.685) ··(2.444)
Market share 2.978 -3.084 2.444
"'(3.408) (-1.081) "(2.184)
Concentration
-3.191 -3.265
-2.904
"·(-3.286) (-1.104) *·(-2.355)
R2 0.158 0.399
Hausman 11.53
[p=0.24]
Notes: n = 876; t-statistics appear in parentheses: • =p<O.l, • •=p< 0.05, ... =P <
0.01.
aOLS regression
bone-way fixed effects model
cone-way random effects model
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Table 8.6 Determinants of Divestment - Dependent Variable equals the Number
of Assets Divested
Independent variables (It (2l (3r
Constant -4.566 -4.480 -4.916
"·(-13.512) ·· ·(-6.939) "·(-6.411)
Relative performance -0.014 -0.019 -0.014
·"(-2.980) • • • (-2.688) ··(-1.921)
Firm leverage 0.013 0.012 0.010
"·(7.258) "·(3.599) "·(2.910)
Change in management -0.047 -0.082 -0.090
(-0.632) (-0.631) (-0.790)
Diversification level 0.066 0.058 0.065
"·(6.370) ·· ·(4.983) ....(4.321)
Firm size 0.484 0.475 0.529
···(J4.735) "·(7.095) ···(7.096)
Threat 0.189 0.262 0.276
"(2.390) • • (J. 721) ""(2.321)
Acquisition 0.370 0.360 0.263
···(5.667) "·(3.199) ·· ·(2.577)
Market share 0.538 0.450 0.495
···(3.444) (1.513) (1.395)
Concentration -0.636 -0.554 -0.871
···(-3.211) ·(-1.948) ··(-2.334)
-In L -1663.595 -1400.918 -1358.249
Cl 1.131
• • • (J1.035)
a 5.720
"·(4.577)
b 5.136
"·(4.369)
Notes: n = 876; t-statistics appear in parentheses: * = p<O.1, ** = p< 0.05, *** = p <
0.01.
"poissonmodel
bnegativebinomial model
"randomeffects negative binomial model
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Table 8.7 Determinants of Divestment Conditioned by Corporate Governance
Characteristics - Dependent variable equals (1) the proportion of assets
divested' (2) the number of assets divested"
Independent variables _{_1'!)_ (lb) (2a) (2b)
Constant -20.177 -20.623 -4.841 -4.926
·"(8.725) "·(8.862) "'(6.312) "'(6.434)
Relative performance -0.050 -0.013
'(1.919) '(1.743)
PERF*STRONG -0.121 -0.029
"·(2.999) "(2.090)
PERF*WEAK -0.003 -0.004
(0.103) (0.323)
Firm leverage 0.024 0.010
"(1.958) "'(2.774)
LEY*STRONG 0.024 0.012
(0.953) (1.566)
LEY *WEAK 0.025 0.015
'(1.783) **(2.496)
Change in management -0.316 -0.342 -0.085 -0.091
(0.760) (0.820) (0.729) (0.791)
Diversification level 0.170 0.175 0.064 0.065
"·(3.645) ·· ·(3.273) ·· ·(4.239) ···(4.307)
Firm size 1.196 1.246 0.518 0.530
·"(5.128) ·· ·(5.317) ·· ·(6.949) "·(7.115)
Threat 1.108 1.107 0.282 0.277
"(2.146) · '(2.136) "(2.319) "(2.227)
Acquisition 0.905 0.870 0.265 0.262
"(2.541) ··(2.437) '·(2.522) ·· ·(2.563)
Market share 2.619 2.439 0.533 0.493
"(2.344) ··(2.172) (1.501) (1.386)
Concentration -3.029 -2.903 -0.860 -0.867
· '(2.464) ··(2.345) ··(2.320) '·(2.318)
Hausman 12.53 11.51
[p=0.25] [p=0.32]
-In L 1356.773 -1358.22
a 5.791 5.722
·"(4.582) "'(4.548)
b 5.231 5.137
·"(4.414) ···(4.360)
Notes: n = 876; r-statistics appear in parentheses: • = p<O.l, ., = p< 0.05, ,• •= P <
0.01.
lone-way random effects model
2random effects negative binomial model
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9. THE IMPACT OF DIVESTMENT ON UK FIRM PERFORMANCE
9.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to generate empirical evidence on the consequences of
voluntary divestment by an examination of its impact on the profitability of a panel
of UK firms over the period 1985 to 1993. The objective is to determine whether,
on average, a refocusing strategy improves the performance of the divesting
company. Previous work - usually in the US - has either used an event study to
isolate the stock market impact of divestment announcements, or has employed a
cross-sectional regression model to examine performance (see Johnson, 1996 and
Wright et al., 1993 for literature reviews). Neither route is particularly satisfactory.
The event study approach assumes an efficient capital market in which fads and
bubbles play no significant role. However, since it is clear that the market initially
favoured and then turned against conglomerate mergers, there is no guarantee that
its initial view of divestment is any more reliable. The event study approach also
considers single divestment events, yet it is clear that large firms engaged in
restructuring programmes, typically undertake multiple divestments even within
relatively short periods. The use of a cross-sectional design is also problematic
since the researcher is looking at the impact of (possibly endogenous) structural
change on performance, which is difficult to evaluate in the context of a long-run
equilibrium. Further, profitability levels are strongly influenced by firm-specific
factors which cannot adequately be controlled for in cross-sectional work.
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Accordingly, the analysis in this chapter uses a dynamic first-differenced panel data
model offirm profitability. The dynamic formulation allows us to accommodate the
"persistence" of profitability shock, whilst first-differencing takes care of firm-
specific fixed effects.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 9.2 explores the
hypothesised linkages between divestment and performance and reviews the
existing evidence. A discussion of the sample and data is given in Section 9.3. The
model is outlined in Section 9.4. A review of the results follows in Section 9.5.
Finally Section 9.6 concludes.
9.2 Divestment and Performance: Discussion and Evidence
Voluntary divestment transactions may be considered as part of the wave of
corporate refocusing activity that has characterised corporate behaviour in the UK
over the past 15 years or so (see Chapter 3 of this thesis for details). The
management literature abounds with discussions of "corporate refocusing",
"downscoping", etc.; terms used to describe strategies of reducing diversificationby
divesting peripheral activities. Indeed management fashions elevated a return to
"core competencies" (prahalad and Hamel, 1990) or, more colourfully, "sticking to
the knitting" (peters and Waterman, 1982) to the status of a principle of
organisation in the 1980s. However, following management fashions does not
necessarily lead to improved economic performance. For example, the
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conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s, lauded by contemporaries
as a means of improving resource allocation via the use of internal factor markets,
has been shown subsequently to have produced very disappointing results
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; etc.).
The prevalent explanation for refocusing is that firms are attempting to reverse their
excessive levels of diversification most of which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s
(for example, Bhagat et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Markides, 1995a).
This explanation implies two things: first, that there exists some optimal limit to
diversification and second, that if refocusing became a widespread phenomenon
from the 1980s, then a large number of firms must have found themselves to be in
breach of this optimum during the period in question. As a result their profitability
and market value will suffer, which may lead to restructuring divestments. This
perspective predicts that refocusing will have a positive impact on the performance
of over-diversified firms.
Three inter-related explanations for voluntary divestment have emerged from the
literature (see Chapter 3 of this thesis for a detailed discussion): First, divestment
activity may be a reversal of a past managerial preference for diversifying
expansions. Mueller (1969) and Jensen (1986) have argued that cash-rich firms
with limited opportunities for growth in their core businesses will be observed to
diversify into other activities, even where this involves negative net present value
investments. These actions may be more likely in situations of weak corporate
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governance, notably where there are poor performance-related incentives for
managers and where there is an absence of significantexternal blockholders able to
exert an influence on management (Morek, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Jensen
(1993) argues that the emergence of a stronger market for corporate control,
including hostile and debt-financed acquisitions, pressurised firms to reverse this
previous misuse of 'free cash flow', resulting in divestment activity.
Second, capital market innovations, including the development of the venture
capital industry, have partially eroded the comparative advantage of the
multidivisional (M-) form of organisation for large, multi-output firms, thus
reducing one of the benefits of corporate diversification (Bhide, 1990). Arguments
such as these point to divestment as an adjustment measure as firms respond to the
reduction in the optimal level of diversification.
Third, the capital market in the 1960s and 1970s took an unjustifiably optimistic
view of conglomerate mergers, providing an incentive for firms to engage in
diversifying activities. When ex post diversification did not prove as profitable as
expected, the capital market reversed its previous stance towards conglomerates
and started to favour more tightly focused firms. This explanation helps to explain
the timing of the trend towards de-diversification.
While these arguments may help to explain the prevalence of divestment activity,
they do not directly link it to the subsequent performance of the divesting firm. A
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number of extensions have been developed to advance the hypothesis that voluntary
divestment may improve corporate performance: First, whether through benign
factors, such as an unsuccessful hunt for economies of scope, or through
managerial self-serving, many firms find themselves to be "over-diversified"
(Markides, 1995a) in the sense that their organisational capabilities are unable to
cope with the range of business activities being undertaken. Such firms may be
considered to have breached a Penrose (1959) - type constraint on efficient
expansion with corresponding adverse consequences for performance. Markides
(1995a), Hoskisson and Turk (1990) and others have conjectured that "refocusing"
- i.e. diversification-reducing transactions - should improve the efficiency with
which the remaining operations are managed, not least by concentrating senior
managerial resources on fewer and less diverse operations. In terms of the
resource-based view of the firm, this perspective suggests that firms will be more
profitable by remaining close to their core competencies.
Second, if a firm has been performing badly a divestment announcement may signal
a reduced danger of total failure. At the very least, it signals that managers are
prepared to take decisive action to deal with the current problems and thus might
be expected to elicit a positive response from the stock market. Another
performance effect may occur through the divesting firm's share in any gains
anticipated by the new acquirer. If the change in asset ownership is expected to
generate value - for example, by a horizontal consolidation with the new owner's
existing activities or via a lowering of agency costs following a management buyout
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(Kaplan, 1989; Smart and Waldfogel, 1994) - at least some of the gains might be
expected to flow to the vendor via the purchase price. The literature on mergers
also suggests that for a variety of reasons - from hubris to poor information -
acquiring firms may simply overpay. Other things being equal, this will raise the
observed performance of the divesting firm.
The effects of divestment on performance have been examined in two principal
ways (the results from these studies are examined in detail Chapter 3 of this thesis):
Most researchers have adopted an "event study" approach and evaluated the stock
market response to sell-off announcements. There is now quite a substantial
number of event studies, very largely conducted on US data, which report that
divestment announcements are associated with significant average. wealth gains for
the vendor's shareholders. This applies to the voluntary sale of divisions or
subsidiaries either to other groups or as MBOs (Jain, 1985; Rosenfeld, 1984; Hite
et al. 1987; Rite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Afshar et al., 1992; Saadouni et al., 1996)
or as spin-offs (e.g. Schipper and Smith, 1983; Rite and Owers, 1983, etc) where
the firm is split into two quoted entities. More recent research has tended to
suggest that the extent of the announcement effect is conditional upon firm-specific
circumstances. These have included variables intended to capture strategic and
agency theoretic hypotheses. Thus divestments which appear to reduce
diversification, or narrow the focus of a firm's activities, have been found to
generate greater wealth gains (John and Ofek, 1995; Montgomery et al., 1984).
Markides (1992) found that refocusing announcements earned positive and
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significant abnormal gains, with 'overdiversified' firms in particular generating an
average gain of about 4 per cent in shareholder value. Lang et al. (1995) report that
asset sales explicitly linked to retiring debt generated positive effects whilst other
disposals produced an insignificant average wealth change. Lasfer et al. (1996) find
that the positive returns to divestment announcements by distressed firms were
significantly higher where the firms displayed higher levels of debt.
There are, however, important limitations with event studies in general (e.g.
Halpern, 1983) and of divestments in particular (Hite, 1986). First, the approach
relies on the identification of the event as a single divestment, yet for larger firms
multiple divestments are typically part of larger restructuring programmes. Afshar
et al. (1992) do include multiple divestments in their study where such events are
separated by more than 82 days of their event window. Second, there is generally
little public information about a divested subsidiary/division especially in relation to
performance. Third, there is the potential for selection bias if only the financial
press is used to collect data, as only a sub-set of announcements are actually
reported through this medium. The data collection exercise in this study (see
below) corroborates this view about the incompleteness of data reported in the
financial press.
A more recent and slender strand of the literature has examined aspects of the post-
divestment operation of divesting firms. Montgomery and Thomas (1988)
examining single divestments, found that industry-adjusted ROA improved post-
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divestment but that it was significantlylower than matched non-divesting firms over
the same period. This study links share price and accounting performance
improvements. However, it only compares data one year before divestment with
one year after for a set of companies announcing single divestments. Comment and
Jarrell (1995) found that US firms that refocused during the 1980s experienced an
upward trend in net of market wealth, while those that reduced focus experienced a
decline. Hoskisson and Johnson (1992), who examine refocusing but do not
directly measure divestment, also report that ROA improved following refocusing.
Markides (1995a) reports cross-sectional results for large US firms which show
that refocusing divestment is associated with improved operating performance.
John and Ofek (1995) and Bergh (1995) also report improved performance
following diversification-lowering divestments. However, as Bergh (1997) points
out, it is difficult to evaluate the performance effects of divestment in a cross-
sectional context, since it may take up to two years post-sell-off before
performance improvements are realised. To circumvent problems resulting from
cyclical and/or outlier observations, most researchers average several years' data
and then examine prior divestment as a determinant of the (implicit) long-run
equilibriumlevel of profitability.However, subsequent divestment occurring during
the interval of data averaging is typically ignored. This is a particular disadvantage
if there is a relatively high level of divestment activity across the sample, as there is
in ours. Many large firms typically engage in restructuring programmes which
involvemultiple divestments over a period oftime (e.g. Porter, 1987).Moreover, if
profitability adjusts sluggishly to the firm's changed characteristics - and the
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literature on profitability dynamics (e.g. Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988, etc.)
predicts that it will - the impact on average profits across any interval will depend
upon the timing of such changes.
9.3 Data Description and Variables
In this chapter, the data set consists of an unbalanced panel of UK quoted
companies over the period 1985 to 1993. The criterion for inclusion in the sample
is detailed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Since the research design involves the use of
first differencing, lags and instrumentation, it was also necessary to exclude from
the sample those firms lacking five years of continuous accounting data across the
interval 1985-93. This requirement had the effect of removing a number of firms
that were acquired during the latter part of the period. Taken together, the
exclusions reduced the basic sample to 132large UK public limited companies. The
balance of the panel is given in Table 9.1.
The existing literature on the determinants of firm profitability gives clear guidance
on the appropriate variables to include in the estimation model. First, considerable
research on profitability dynamics (see Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller,
1990, and references therein) has demonstrated that profits are persistent, requiring
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Firm profitability was measured using
industry-adjusted ROCE. The empirical literature typically recognises that real
firms operate with heterogeneous cost structures in differentiated oligopolies, thus
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precluding any simple profitability - market structure relationship. Accordingly,
following the standard practice (e.g. Machin and Van Reenan, 1993; Geroski,
Machin and Van Reenan, 1993 ; etc) measures of concentration, market share and
their interaction are included as separate explanatory variables'. The derivation of
profitability equations from differentiated oligopoly models is discussed in Kwoka
and Ravenscraft (1986) and Machin and Van Reenan (1993). Import intensity is
included as an additional market structural variable to capture the disciplinary effect
of foreign competition, and firm leverage (alternatively measured as the ratios of
debt to assets and debt to equity) is included, following Kwoka and Ravenscraft
(1986), to capture any risk premium attaching to the greater use of debt. A
description of the construction of these variables is detailed in Chapter 4 of this
thesis.
The divestment data was collected from secondary and primary data sources over
the period 1985-1993. In total, some 1839 voluntary divestments were identified.
Out of the sample, 126 firms (95%) made at least one divestment. The average
number of disposals per firm was 14.6 across the period or 1.6 per firm per year.
In approximately 78 percent of cases it was possible to identify the sale price of the
transaction. However, it was clear the remaining 22 percent of cases were
overwhelmingly drawn from the lower tail of the divestment size distribution. (The
reasons for this supposition are given in Chapter 4 of this thesis). Therefore, in
order to construct an overall divestment value measure, unpriced disposals were
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assigned a value of 0.1 percent of the seller's market value in the previous year. The
proportion of assets divested was then calculated as the sales price of the divested
units divided by the market value for the previous year. On this basis it is estimated
that each firm's average of 1.6 divestment's per year represented 4.3 percent of its
assets in the previous year.
In the regression equation, divestment is alternatively signified using the number of
divestments, the proportion of assets divested and a dichotomous variable equal to
one for the year any recorded divestment by firm i was undertaken. DIVEST;t-I, ...,
DIVEST;t_3 represent variables for observations one, ..., three years subsequent to
divestment for firm i.
In addition, a series of regime variables were defined to distinguish between
strategic and corporate governance characteristics of the firm: A 'complex' firm
(COMP) was defined to be one whose size-diversification was greater than or
equal to the median value for the sample as a whole in year t. A 'non-complex' firm
was defined to be whose size-diversiflcation was less than the median value for the
sample as a whole in year t. Diversification was calculated using the entropy index
of diversification (palepu, 1985) and firm size was alternatively measured as the
book value of assets, sales and the number of employees. 'Strong' and 'weak'
corporate governance regimes were distinguished using two criteria: one, the
existence, or otherwise, of a substantial blockholder (defined as one identifiable
ownership interest of 5 percent or more of the ordinary share capital); and two, the
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management's own equity stake (the proportion of outstanding ordinary shares
owned by the directors of the firm). Three regime alternatives were defined (see
Section 8.3, Chapter 8 of this thesis for details).
These regime variables were interacted with the divestment variable to determine
whether the performance effects of divestment are conditioned by the strategic and
corporate governance characteristics of the firm. From the corporate strategy
perspective, it was hypothesised that the gains from divestment will be greatest for
larger and/or more diversified firms (i.e. 'complex' firms), since these firms are
more likely to have breached some Penrose (1959) - type constraint on expansion.
If corporate refocusing is a reversal of prior managerial empire building stimulated
by a slack market for corporate control (Jensen, 1986), then we would also expect
the benefit form divestment to be greatest for firms operating weak governance
mechanisms.
Summary statistics for the continuous variables are shown in Table 9.2.
9.4 Modelling and Estimation Approach
The basis of the empirical design is to treat firm divestment as a shock, or
innovation, impacting upon the divesting firm's performance. It is assumed that:
(Il/K), = f(Xit, Dit) ... (1)
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where (IIIK)it is a measure of the profitability of i at time t, Xit is a vector of market
structural and firm-specific determinants of performance; and Oil represents a
vector of variables intended to measure the contemporaneous and lagged effects of
divestment.
The choice of return on capital, rather than the more frequently employed return on
sales, for the left-hand side of equation (1) was made on both theoretical and
pragmatic grounds'. On the theoretical side it was considered that the return on
capital provided a better yardstick of shareholders' well-being in a context in which
managers were being hypothesised to reduce the size of their organisation in the
shareholders' interests. More pragmatically, the return on sales for a multi-output
firm will be a weighted sum of price-cost margins in its individual markets.
Divesting one or more of these will impact directly on that sum, according to the
weight and price-cost margin concerned. Unfortunately, these market data were
simply unavailable for most divestments in our sample, rendering the use of a return
on sales variable problematic.
The appropriate elements of the Xjt vector are a lagged value of profitability (TIIK),
concentration (CONC), market share (MS) and their interaction (CONC*MS),
import intensity (IMP) and firm leverage (LEV). Finally, it is assumed that other
firm-level differences are captured in a vector of fixed effects ('A.j).
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Thus, ignoring for the moment both divestment and macroeconomics influences, we
assume an underlying model of the form:
+ ~(MS*CONC)it + asLEVit + 8(;IMPit + e;t ... (2)
where eit is an i.i.d. error term. Equation (2) is then first-differenced to remove Aj.
the fixed effects, and subsequently augmented with the divestment variables
(DIVEST). Since macroeconomics factors would be expected to influence
profitability over the cycle, a set of year dummies (Yt) are added. This yields a
basic estimating equation:
+ ~A(MS*CONC)it + asALEVit + 8(;AIMPit +
3 T
""[.P,DlVESTit_, + ""[.YYt +e;t
r=O t=1
...(3)
If divestment does improve performance, through any or all of the reasons outlined
above, it might be expected that it takes time for the effects of divestment on
profitability to be felt (Bergh, 1995). Therefore, separate divestment variables were
defined for the year any recorded divestment by firm iwas undertaken and then for each
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of the following three years to capture lagged effects. Corporate governance and
strategic characteristics were interacted with these divestment variables to see if they
had any conditioning effect on performance. The predicted signs of the explanatory
variables are provided in Table 9.3.
It is well-established that first-differencing a dynamic panel model to remove fixed
effects introduces correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
transformed error term, ejt in equation (3), and potentially biases the coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981). One solution is to estimate the
differenced equation using instrumental variable techniques. An obvious candidate is
to use lags beyond one of the dependent variable as instruments as these will be
uncorrelated with the differenced error in the absence of serial correlation in the error
process. To estimate equation (3), Arellano and Bond's (1991) generalised method
of moments (GMM) procedure, as contained in their DPD programme, is utilised.
This approach accommodates the inclusion of(t-2) or earlier values of the endogenous
variables as instruments for the lagged dependent variable. Additional instruments are
obtained by utilising the available orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged
values of the dependent variable and the disturbances. Thus the further advanced the
panel, the greater the number of instruments available. For example, in estimating a nine
year panel from year three through year nine, year three's estimation would use variables
dated year one, year four's would use variables dated years one and two, etc. The
advantage of this procedure is that it allows both the cross-section and time-series
elements of the data to be exploited in constructing valid instruments. The resulting
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estimates are claimed to offer significant gains in efficiency where T is small relative to
N. This yields valid instrumental variable estimates in the absence of second-order
serial correlation.
9.5 Results
Equation (3) was estimated on an unbalanced panel of 132 firms, using the Arellano
and Bond (1991) GMM procedure. As one cross-section is lost from first differencing
and another three from the instrumentation process, the estimation period runs from
1989 to 1993, inclusive, covering a total of 608 useable observations (this falls to 226
for estimating equations including AIMP). The legitimacy of this econometric approach
depends critically on two features: first, the validity of the instrument set; and second
the success of the instrumentation process in purging the estimates of second-order
serial correlation. These characteristics are examined using the Sargan statistic and a
robust test for second-order serial correlation, respectively.
The results are given in Tables 9.4 and 9.5, which also displays the absolute t-
statistics calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The
estimates from equation (3) using contemporaneous and three lags of the
divestment variable, and debt-to-assets as the measure of leverage, are reported in
Table 9.4. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the results using the number of
divestments, the proportion of assets divested and a dichotomous variable equal to
one for the year in which divestment occurred and zero otherwise, respectively.
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Columns (2), (4) and (6) report similar estimations but with the .1IMP variable
included. Given the limited availability of import data, the sample size falls to 79
when the import intensity (IMP) variable is included.
Table 9.5 reports the results when divestment is conditioned by the strategic and
corporate governance characteristics of the firm. Column (1) reports the
performance results when firms are dichotomised as 'complex' and 'non-complex'
by the value of the interaction of their size and level of diversification. The results
are reported for total assets as a measure of firm size and where divestment is
signified by a dichotomous variable. The estimates in column (3) dichotomise firms
operating 'strong' and 'weak' governance regimes. The reported results define a
strong governance environment as one where a blockholder exists and where the
board of directors own equity greater than or equal to the median value for the
sample as a whole. A weak environment is defined as one where these conditions
do not hold. Columns (2) and (4) report similar estimations but with the .1IMP
variable included.
As shown in Tables 9.4 and 9.5, the general performance of the profitability model
is satisfactory and has sensible properties for a profitability model. That is the
coefficients on lagged performance, market share and concentration fallwithin the range
of values typically reported in profitability studies. In each case the overall regression
diagnostics are satisfactory. A Wald test on the joint significance of all the regressors is
overwhelmingly significant. Similarly, a second Wald test on the joint inclusion of the
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subset of divestment variables is comfortably significant at the 0.1 percent level. The
assumption of a lack of serial correlation in the error is essential for the consistency of
the estimates. A robust N(O,1) test for the presence of second order serial correlation in
the error term (p-values recorded in Tables 9.4 and 9.5) is satisfactory and reveals no
evidence of statistically significant second-order serial correlation. Similarly, a
Sargan test of instrument validity does not reject exogeneity of the instrument set. The
estimations include time dummies, to control for macroeconomic influences,
although it can be seen that their joint significance was marginal, at best, when a
Wald test was applied.
Among the parameter estimates the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
was invariably positive and strongly significant, with a value in the range of 0.39-
0.52. This confirms the expected result that profitability shocks have persistent
effects. The concentration and market share variables had the expected signs:
~CON was positive and highly significant; L\MS was positive but generally
insignificant. The interaction term ~(MS*CON) is negative and significant again in
conformity with prior profitability studies. Both the import intensity and leverage
variables displayed the expected sign, but neither were statistically significant.
The principal variables of interest are those intended to capture the impact of
divestment. In the estimations summarised in Table 9.4, divestment is signified by
the number of divestments (columns 1 and 2), the proportion of assets divested
(columns 3 and 4) and by a binary variable equal to one for the year following any
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recorded divestment by firm i (columns 5 and 6). The subsequent effects are
expected to be captured by additional dummies (DIVESTit_l, DIVESTit.2, etc). Each
model is estimated with and without the IMP variable. In the full sample estimation,
all the divestment variables are positive and significant (the one exception is the
immediate effect of the number of divestments which is positive but insignificant).
The coefficients are small but not trivial: for example, the immediate effect of a
divestment (signified by a dichotomous variable in column 5) is equivalent to a rise
in the return on capital of three quarters of a percentage point. The long-run effect
(= Lf3/1-al) was equivalent to a 9 percent rise in profitability for divesting firms. On the
reduced sample size, after IMP is included, the pattern of coefficients is similar but the
imprecision of the estimation rises and many of the divestment variables cease to be
significant.
Table 9.5 reports attempts to determine whether the performance effects of
divestment are conditioned by strategic and corporate governance characteristics of
the firm. In all the estimations, divestment is signified by a dichotomous variable.
(The results from the proportion and number specifications were similar but poorly
determined.) In columns (1) and (2) firms are classified as 'complex' and 'non-
complex' by the value of the interaction of their size and entropy index of
diversification. Those at or above the median value are 'complex' and those below
'non-complex'. Separate divestment binary variables are included for the two
cases. The results give strictly limited support for the view that divestment
disproportionately benefits those firms which have breached some Penrose-type
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limit. On the full sample all the complex divestment binary variables are positive
and significant against two of the non-complex. On the restricted sample there are
three positive significant results against two in the non-complex case. Therefore,
the evidence that larger and/or more diversified firms will experience greater
profitability effects following divestment is, at best, very weak.
A similar exercise was undertaken to distinguish divestments by firms with 'strong'
corporate governance environments from those with 'weak' ones. The results are
reported in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 9.5. The results using the alternative
definitions of strong and weak governance were very similar. If corporate
restructuring is a reversal of prior managerial empire-building, stimulated by a
greater capital market threat, as Jensen and others have argued, the benefit from
divestment should be greater for firms with a 'weak' governance environment - i.e.
these will be the firms which will have been able to indulge managerial preferences.
This conjecture is quite strongly supported by our results. All of the 'weak'
governance divestment coefficients are positive, with all four significant with the
full sample and three significant with the limited sample. By contrast, only one of
the strong governance coefficients is positive and significant in the full sample case,
none with the limited sample and several of the strong governance coefficients are
actually negative.
Thus the results suggest that divestment had a statistically significant and non-trivial
effect in raising the profitability of our sample firms. However, we find at best very
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weak support for the notion that divestment is differentially beneficial for larger and
more diversified firms. By contrast, the results are consistent with the arguments of
those, for example Jensen (1993), who see corporate restructuring transactions,
such as divestments, as a response to capital market pressure on firms with weak
governance arrangements.
9.6 Conclusions
This chapter represents a first attempt to derive systematic evidence on the
performance effects of voluntary divestment by large UK companies. The analysis
has used a specially constructed database of divestments across a sample of 132
UK firms between 1985 and 1993. A standard firm profitability model, augmented
by divestment variables, was estimated on an unbalanced panel comprising our
sample firms. The results suggest that divestment does have a non-trivial and
statistically significant impact on the profitability of the divestor. This finding was
robust to alternative specifications of the profitability equation. It also provides
symmetrical corroboration of a general finding in the merger literature that
acquisition tends to lower profitability (e.g. Dickerson et al., 1997).
Attempts to discriminate between hypotheses, which purport to explain the
performance consequences of divestment, met with mixed success. Reasoning from
the business strategy literature suggests that larger and/or more highly diversified
firms were more likely to be in breach of some Penrose-type constraint on efficient
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operations. In the event, attempts to distinguish the consequences of divestment for
such firms by segmenting the sample by taking those above and below the median
size-diversification product, proved largely inconclusive. The evidence that larger
and/or more diversified divestors experience greater profitability effects is, at best,
very weak.
By contrast, the results do give support to those who see divestment as a reversal
of the consequences of previously exercised managerial discretion. When the
sample was split according to the prevailing corporate governance regime, it was
found that firms with 'weak' governance display consistent, significant positive
profitability gains while those with strong regimes experienced largely inconsistent
effects. This is consistent with the view that divestment, stimulated by pressure
from a resurgent capital market from the 1980s onwards, reversed diversification
previously resulting from agency problems in the firm. These ex post results build
on the ex ante results found in earlier studies of divestment (e. g. Markides, 1992;
Rosenfeld, 1984).
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Notes
IThe derivation of profitability equations from differentiated oligopoly models is
discussed in Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986) and Machin and Van Reenan (1993).
2Markides (1995) uses ROS, ROA and ROE, though there is little significant
difference in the results.
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Table 9.1 Balance of the Panel
No. of Years No. of Companies
6 12
7 6
8 4
9 110
Total 132
Table 9.2 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
Variable Mean S.D. N
Number of divestments 1.619 2.471 1136
Proportion of divestments 0.043 0.143 1136
ROCE 0.1892 0.0945 1136
Debt to total assets 33.348 19.329 1136
Debt-to-equity 0.7257 7.808 1136
Assets 1372796 2838701 1136
Employees 29916 30215 1136
Sales 2160470 4011512 1136
Diversification 0.8535 0.4988 1136
Market share 0.228 0.238 1136
Concentration 0.316 0.205 1136
Import Intensity 0.26 0.31 608
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9.3 Predicted Coefficient Signs of Explanatory Variables
Variable Predicted Sign
Lagged performance
Market share
Concentration
Market share* concentration
Import intensity
Leverage
Divestment
Divestment by firms with weak governance
Divestment by 'complex' firms
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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Table 9.4 Profitability Equations, 1989-1993 *
(absolute asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dROCEit_l 0.52 0.454 0.51 0.45 0.52 0.40
(9.261) (3.685) (8.888) (3.650) (10.688) (3.003)
~CONit 0.70 1.68 0.64 1.79 0.77 1.84
(3.269) (2.159) (2.726) (3.789) (3.685) (4.327)
AMSit 0.74 1.86 0.89 1.99 0.49 1.58
(1.931) (1.874) (2.046) (2.581) (1.330) (l.69)
~[Ms*Con]it -0.89 -2.868 -0.97 -3.05 -0.91 -2.96
(2.598) (2.264) (2.27) (2.469) (2.902) (2.174)
&EVit 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006
(l.260) (0.620) (0.985) (0.512) (1.254) (l.302)
MMPit -0.401 -0.21 -0.19
(1.008) (0.505) (0.407)
DIVESTit 0.0003 0.0005 0.023 0.042 0.0074 0.0239
(0.269) (0.154) (1.769) (1.860) (2.326) (3.122)
DIVESTit_l 0.002 0.003 0.056 0.060 0.0089 0.0157
(2.082) (1.645) (2.156) (1.690) (2.092) (l.687)
DIVESTit_2 0.002 0.002 0.054 0.038 0.0182 0.0228
(2.904) (1.794) (2.056) (1.090) (4.951) (2.750)
DIVESTit_3 0.001 0.003 0.087 0.008 0.0093 0.0068
(1.685) (1.140) (2.179) (0.608) (2.556) (0.846)
Waldl 139.76 40.40 103.88 77.42 143.90 48.33
[dfJ [9] [10] [9] [10] [9] [10]
Wald2 11.58 9.103 10.52 8.44 25.67 15.585
[dfJ [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4]
Wald3 10.68 1.61 11.62 6.12 11.48 1.65
[dfJ [5] [3] [5] [3] [5] [3]
Serial Correlation 0.690 0.989 0.680 1.222 0.752 0.759
[p-value] [0.49] [0.449] [0.496] [0.249] [0.45] [0.448]
Sargan 23.79 9.18 23.08 10.51 25.79 8.434
[p-value] [0.474] [0.515] [0.293] [0.485] [0.365] [0.674]
No. of firms 132 79 132 79 132 79
No. of observations 608 226 608 226 608 226
Notes:
Waldl: Wald test of overall significance of the equation
Wald2: Wald test on subset of divestment variables
Wald3: Wald test of joint significance of time dummies
*1989-1991 for estimating equations including AIMPit
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Table 9.5 Profitability Equations Conditioned by Strategic
and Governance Characteristics, 1989-1993 *
(absolute asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lill.OCEit_1 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.408
(10.232) (3.049) (10.919) (2.958)
l1CONit 0.65 l.502 0.75 l.830
(2.918) (3.860) (3.528) (4.268)
l1Msit 0.60 l.175 0.37 l.573
(l.618) (l.427) (l.157) (l.701)
l1[Ms*Con]it -0.82 -l.978 -0.85 -2.899
(2.198) (l.635) (2.778) (2.155)
M.EVit 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0006
(0.884) (l.138) (l.477) (l.243)
MMPit -0.219 -0.248
(0.510) (0.554)
[Div*Comp lit 0.011 0.023
(2.477) (2.285)
[Div*Comp ht-1 0.017 0.022
(3.072) (l.844)
[Div*Comp ht-2 0.013 0.006
(2.448) (0.454)
[Div*Comp ]it-3 0.009 0.0204
(l.671) (2.090)
[Div*Noncomp lit 0.002 0.021
(0.464) (2.l21)
[Div*Noncomp lit-1 0.002 0.016
(0.374) (1.299)
[Div*Noncomp ht-2 0.022 0.030
(4.227) (2.255)
[Div*Noncomp ]it-3 0.012 -0.0005
(2.357) (0.049)
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Table 9.5 (contd.)
(1) (2) .(3) (4)
[Div*Strong] it 0.0062 -0.0002
(1.101) (0.015)
[Div*Strong]it_I -0.0071 -0.003
(0.866) (0.135)
[Div*Stronglit_2 0.0157 0.027
(2.676) (1.569)
[Div*Strong]it_3 0.0038 0.003
(0.596) (0.179)
[Div*Weak]it 0.0075 0.029
(1.812) (3.499)
[Div*Weak]it_I 0.0145 0.019
(3.468) (2.057)
[Div*Weak]it_2 0.0191 0.023
(4.160) (2.333)
[Div*Weak]it_3 0.0099 0.007
(2.356) (0.955)
Waldl 153.66 69.17 173.67 55.71
[df] [13] [14] [12] [14]
Wald2 26.04 19.81 41.44 20.11
[df] [8] [8] [8] [8]
Wald3 9.99 1.15 10.51 1.46
[df] [5] [3] [5] [3]
Serial Correlation 0.695 0.574 0.839 0.737
[p-value] [0.487] [0.566] [0.401] [0.461]
Sargan 25.24 9.27 26.99 8.92
[p-value] [0.351] [0.597] [0.305] [0.629]
No. offirrns 132 79 132 79
No. of observations 608 226 608 226
Notes:
Wald1: Wald test of overall significance of the equation
Wald2: Wald test on subset of divestment variables
Wald3: Wald test of joint significance of time dummies
*1989-1991 for estimating equations including AIMPit
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10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
10.1 Introduction
The main objectives of this thesis have been to evaluate the extent and nature
of corporate refocusing in the UK and to provide an empirical investigation of
the characteristics of refocusing firms, and the causes and consequences of a
refocusing strategy. There is a widespread perception that from the mid-1980s
onwards, firms have been narrowing the scope of their activities in an attempt
to focus on their core businesses, primarily through divestment. This emphasis
on specialisation has been conjectured to have reversed the formerly dominant
trend towards increasing levels of diversification which had characterised the
large firm sector for several decades. Despite the plethora of theoretical
explanations for corporate refocusing, the existing empirical evidence is sparse.
Whilst research has started to take place recently, largely in the US context (see
Johnson, 1996), to date there has been no systematic attempt to examine
refocusing activity in the UK.
The relative paucity of work on refocusing is due partly to the lack of adequate
firm level data on diversification and divestment activity in the UK. Data
sources on divestment are subject to a number of omissions, especially with
regard to smaller sized disposals, performance and sales price information. The
latter problem is well-recognised in the literature (see for example, Rite, 1986).
Detailed activity data is also difficult to obtain in the UK context. Whilst firms
are required to report activity data in their company accounts this appears at a
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relatively aggregated level and miscellaneous groupings conceal the exact
number of business segments operated in by firms. For both of these reasons,
the extent of firm diversification will tend to be underestimated.
To overcome these difficulties and to provide an examination of refocusing in
the UK, a panel of data on UK firms was collected. This provides what is
believed to be the most comprehensive coverage of diversification and
divestment data in the UK. The combination of time-series and cross-sectional
elements has the benefit of allowing the analysis of variations within and
between firms. The data period (1985 to 1993) was chosen largely to
correspond with the perception that refocusing was a widespread phenomenon
over this period.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 provides a
summary of the main results from the thesis. Section 10.3 discusses the
limitations of the study. Finally Section 10.4 examines the possible directions
for future research.
10.2 Summary of the Results
The thesis initially examined the extent and nature of refocusing in the UK for
our sample firms. Using firm level activity data, a count of the number of
business segments and the entropy index of diversification were alternately
employed to measure the overall degree of diversification in individual firms.
An analysis of the extent of refocusing was undertaken and revealed that
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approximately 50 per cent of the sample reduced their level of diversification
over the study period. However, the remaining 50 per cent were either
increasing their level of diversification or experienced no change. The net
result was a small and statistically insignificant change in the mean level of
diversification across the sample.
However, within-sample changes indicated that some firms significantly
reduced their level of diversification over the period whilst others increased
theirs. Using the classification scheme outlined in Chapter 4, at most 44 per
cent (classification scheme (A)) and at least 30 per cent (classification scheme
(B)) of the sample refocused. Thus, we can conclude that corporate refocusing
was an important phenomenon in the UK over the period in question and not
merely an invention of the business press.
It was also found that firms refocused primarily by divesting unrelated assets
and acquiring activities related to the core business. Our sample of firms
undertook a total of 2,001 divestments and 2,599 acquisitions over the study
period. Of these 58 percent of all divestments were unrelated to the core
business and 60 percent of acquisitions were related.
The thesis then proceeded to examine the characteristics of the refocusing
firms. A reduction in diversification was alternately signified by a decrease in
the number of activities operated in and by a decline in the entropy index of
diversification. The results support our hypothesis that refocusing firms are
characterised by a high level of diversification relative to their industry
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counterparts. This implies that firms refocus in response to 'excessive' levels
of diversification, most of which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition,
firms are more likely to refocus if they have low levels of management
ownership. As such, it supports our hypothesis that it is the managers of these
firms who were able to invest in unprofitable expansions in the past. Finally,
refocusing firms were characterised, to an extent, by an attractive core on
which to refocus. A change in management, the level of firm debt, firm size, as
well as the firm's performance were not found to be distinguishing
characteristics of refocusing firms. However, before we dismiss the existence
of such relationships in the UK context, we are mindful of one particular
caveat: the use of a cross-sectional design may imply that the lag between the
variables' measurement and subsequent period of refocusing may be too long
and that late refocusers may not be affected by variables measured several
years earlier.
Chapters 7 and 8 examined the determinants of divestment usmg cross-
sectional and panel data techniques respectively. Divestment was alternatively
calculated as a count of the number of divestments and the proportion of assets
divested. These two approaches were seen as necessary and complementary
given the nature of the divestment data. Divestment is conjectured to be
consistent with some exogenous change in the firm's environment which
causes a downward displacement in the optimal level of diversification. The
adjustment to such a change was hypothesised to be affected by financial,
corporate governance, strategy and market structural characteristics as
examined in detail in Chapter 3.
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The results in Chapter 7 were based on a cross-sectional design. This approach
indicated that divestment is related to the size and diversification of the firm
concerned. This finding supports our hypothesis that larger and/or more
diversified firms experienced a proportionately greater fall in their optimal level
of diversification and therefore have the greatest potential for downsizing. A
change in management and acquisition activity over the period also appeared to
stimulate divestment activity. The significant effect of debt and the corporate
governance variables is consistent with the disciplinary role of debt (Jensen,
1986) and with the view that divestment is more likely under conditions of
reduced managerial discretion. The market structure characteristics produced
mixed effects with concentration in the core business having a weakly significant
inhibiting effect and market share producing an insignificant effect on the
divestment process.
The most unexpected finding was the failure to find a significant negative
relationship between divestment and performance, regardless of the measure of
performance adopted. Before we dismiss the existence of a performance-
divestment link in the UK context, we are mindful of a number of caveats. First,
the cross-sectional design in which the explanatory variables were measured at
their start of period values, may imply that the lags involved were too long and
that divestment in the latter half of the period was not affected by variables
measured several years earlier. Second, it is possible that measured performance
before the start of the study period captures some element of the potential to
divest (i.e. strong performance is associated with acquisition activity which may
itself generate divestments after some lag), thus eroding our initial prior.
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To complement these results and to circumvent some of the problems from using
a cross-sectional design, Chapter 8 examined the determinants of divestment
using panel data. This approach allowed us to take account of unobservable firm-
specific factors which cannot adequately be controlled for in a cross-sectional
framework. The panel results broadly corroborated those from the cross-sectional
model in Chapter 7. However, using this approach, performance was found to
have a negative and significant effect on divestment. This result supports our
hypothesis that divestment is negatively related to firm performance and is
consistent with previous US work in this area. The panel approach allowed us to
model divestment activity through time and permitted a much shorter lag
structure between the explanatory variables' measurement and subsequent
divestment.
The corporate governance characteristics of the firm were introduced as regime
variables and interacted with several of the explanatory variables to determine
their conditioning effects on the results. It was found that firms with a 'strong'
governance environment were more likely to respond to poor financial indicators.
This result is consistent with the agency theoretic perspective that equity holding
managers and blockholders have their interests aligned with those of shareholders
and will respond rapidly to poor financial indicators. In addition, the results
support our hypothesis that managers of firms facing 'weak' governance
constraints respond to the disciplinary effects of a high level of debt. By
contrast, a high level of debt had no significant effect for firms already
operating 'strong' governance mechanisms.
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Taken together, the results from these two chapters suggest that firms' divestment
behaviour was not merely exhibiting mean reversion in the number of activities
operated or simple portfolio churning across the set of such activities. Instead
they indicate that divestment is a purposeful response to financial, strategic,
corporate governance and, to a limited extent, market structure characteristics.
The adoption of count data techniques and the use of a panel of firms represent
one of the contributionsof the thesis to the existing literatureon divestment.
Finally, the thesis sought to determine the performance consequences, if any,
of the adoption of a refocusing strategy. Chapter 9 estimated dynamic
profitability equations augmented with divestment variables to examine the
impact of divestment on the long-run performance of the vendor company.
Divestment is alternately measured as a count of the number of divestments,
the proportion of assets divested and as a dichotomous variable equal to one if
divestment occurred in anyone year and zero otherwise. The results confirmed
our hypothesis of positive performance effects of divestment regardless of how
the divestment measure was operationalised. The effect was non-trivial: the
immediate effect is equivalent to a rise in the industry-adjusted ROCE
performance measure by three quarters of a percentage point. The long-run
effect measured over three years is equivalent to a 9 per cent increase in
profitability for divesting firms. (These figures correspond to the specification
when divestment is signified as a binary variable).
In addition, divestment activity was interacted with a series of regime variables
to determine whether the performance effect was conditioned by the strategic
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and corporate governance characteristics of the firm. It was hypothesised that
the gains from divestment would be greatest for larger and/or more diversified
firms. In the event, attempts to distinguish between firms that have breached
some Penrose (1959) -type constraint and those who have not, proved largely
inconclusive. The evidence that larger and/or more diversified divestors will
experience greater profitability effects was, at best, very weak. By contrast,
there was support for our hypothesis that the benefit form divestment would be
greatest for firms operating weak governance mechanism. Firms with a 'weak'
governance regime displayed consistent, significant positive profitability gains
while those with 'strong' regimes experienced largely inconsistent effects. This
supports the view that divestment, stimulated by pressure from a resurgent
capital market from the 1980s onwards, reversed diversification previously
resulting from agency problems in the firm.
These ex post results build on the ex ante results found in earlier event studies
of divestment. They also reinforce the more recent and slender strand of the
literature in the US context that has examined the post-divestment operating
performance of the divesting firms (e.g. Markides, 1995b). However, the
existing studies typically employ cross-sectional models to examine the
performance effects of divestment. As Bergh (1997) points out it, is difficult to
evaluate performance effects within such a framework. The dynamic panel data
approach adopted in this chapter improves upon earlier work. The positive
performance effect of voluntary divestment also provides symmetrical
corroboration of a general finding in the merger literature that acquisition tends
to lower the profitability of the acquiring firm (e.g. Dickerson et al., 1997).
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10.3 Limitations of the Research
There are a number of limitations to the work presented here. First, the sample
of firms was selected from the FTSOOlist and as such the analysis concentrated
on the largest firms in the UK. This possible sample bias implies that the
findings reported may only apply to the UK's biggest firms and not the entire
corporate population.
Second, there were a number of data limitations regarding divestment and
diversification information. A number of divestments over the study period
failed to disclose a sales price. This made it difficult to calculate the proportion
of assets divested in a given year and an arbitary cut-off value from the lower
tail of the divestment size distribution was assigned to overcome this problem.
With regard to calculating the level of firm diversification, it was difficult to
obtain detailed information on activity data. Segment data appears at a
relatively aggregated level in company accounts and miscellaneous groupings
conceal the exact number of business segments operated in by firms. In the
latter case, an upper bound estimate of two industry segments was assumed.
For both these reasons the extent of diversification will tend to be
underestimated and as such, refocusing activity may be more widespread in the
UK than the results suggest.
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10.4 Directions for Future Research
As detailed above, a number of contributions to the existing literature have
emerged from this thesis and the analysis carried out provides a basis for future
work. The research could benefit from extending the sample size and
undertaking a case study analysis to enable broader conclusions to be drawn.
The latter will enable a more detailed study of the complex web of issues
surrounding refocusing and will be applicable to more clearly defined contexts.
Whilst the research goes some way to explaining the nature of firms that are
divesting, there are still a number of questions about the specific strategy of
refocusing firms which need to be explored. It would be useful to separate total
diversification into its related and unrelated components (Jacquemin and Berry,
1979) and to identify, for example, the impact on firm profitability of a
reduction in related'\· diversification versus a reduction in unrelated
diversification. It would also provide a clearer indication of the nature of
refocusing activity.
The study has examined the determinants and consequences of divestment but
has made no attempt to distinguish between the type of divestment (i.e. related
and unrelated; foreign and domestic; MBO and parent-to-parent) and firm-level
characteristics. It would be useful to examine whether the determinants of
divestment analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 apply equally to related and unrelated
divestments. In addition, we could determine whether the performance effect of
unrelated divestments differed from that of related divestments. It would also
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be useful to determine the relative performance of the divested subsidiaries.
This would give us a clearer indication of whether it is unprofitable or
profitable subsidiaries that are being divested.
It would also be interesting to examine the relationship between pnor
acquisition and subsequent divestment activity. More precisely, it would be
worthwhile to distinguish between the proportion of divestments that
originated from previous acquisition attempts and those that grew from internal
development. Those that originated from prior acquisition activity could be
assessed to determine the average length between acquisition and subsequent
disposal, as has been done in US studies (e.g. Ravenscarft and Scherer, 1987).
Itwould also be beneficial to identify the link between the divested unit and the
subsequent acquirer. If the divested activity is related to the acquiring firm's
existing activities then we would expect this to have a different performance
effect than acquisition by an unrelated acquirer. Whilst we identify acquisitions
by firms within the sample, some of which will be divestments from firms
within the sample, a more detailed analysis of the direction of divestment
would provide a clearer indication of the extent of refocusing activity in the
UK.
Further research could also be undertaken, in addition to that already
mentioned, on the consequences of a refocusing strategy. The business press
abounds with announcements of job losses in conjunction with restructuring
transactions, however there is very little research in this area in the UK. The
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above analysis could also be extended to examine if any changes occurred in
the corporate governance mechanisms of firms post-restructuring.
Finally, an interesting extension would be to apply the analysis to an
international context. Since the completion of the single European market,
acquisitions and joint ventures across countries within Europe have grown in
importance but research suggests that multinational activity has a high failure
rate. Existing attempts to analyse divestment activity have largely ignored the
distinction between the divestment of domestic operations and the divestment
of foreign production operations. A significant number of divestments in our
sample were by UK firms exiting from overseas markets. It would be of
interest to examine the type of factors that influence this decision and to
determine whether the determinants of divestment differ for domestic and
foreign disposals. The process of globalisation means that countries are
increasingly integrated, with events such as divestment in one market affecting
markets in other countries.
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